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1&he kouse of ~ o r d s ,  on Friday the 9th of May, Lord Napier 
and Btrick, doubly entitled as a former Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg, and as a 1-ecent GOVC~~IOP and temporary Viceroy 
in India, to speak with some weight on the subject, asked the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs " whether Her Majesty's: 
Government mould grant the moral and material support of Eug- 
land to the A~neer  of Afghanistan in case of unprovoked aggression 
~ p o n  his dominions 2" He 81-gned that having by uegotiations 
wit11 Russia fixed the boundaries of Afghanistan, we had under- 
taken tho duty, strengthened by "motives of policy in connection 
wit11 the welfare of India," of defending. those bonndaries ; and 
- 
that we had also acquired, by our subsidies and general support, 
the right of controlling to some oxtent the government of"  that ' 
semi-bai%arous and semi-dependent State.', ('If," he said, 
" Afghanistan should prove a restless and aggressive neighbour, 
she must be restrained by some one. I f  we did not rostrain hey 
action, she must, in  tlie last resort, be restrained by Russia. If 
Russian forces ontered the territories of Afghanistan on one side, 
he thought i t  would be absolutely necessary"thttt Engliah forces 
sliould enter on tho olhol; and in  all pro$aldity some worso re- 
sults would arise from the conflict of these forces than could arise 
from an independent actio~b on the part of Eaglrti~d." 
" All that," Lord Derby, ill .reply to Lord Napier, '( felt him- 
self justified in  sayingJ' was, " that to mrtintaia the integrity a i d  
territorial independence of Afghanistan is, and ought to be, a 
most important object of English policy; that any interference 
with the national independonc~ of Afghapistan would be rcgarded 
6- by I-Ier Majesty's Government as a very grave matter, requiring. 
their most serious and carcful co~zsitleratio~; and that if such an 
- ioterf~ro*ncr, occwred, it is liig%ly probublo that this country mould 
F? 
iv PREFACE. 
m h 
interpose." His immediate predecessor in office, Lord Granvillp, .. 
entirely agreed vi th Lord Dorby. Lord Stanley of Alderley, dis- 
S tinguished as an Oriental traveller and scholar, cougraSnlated the 
Foreign Secretary on the satisfacto17y statement h: had made, 
B Lord Napier having offered a, fern words of explanation, the sub- 
ject dropped. o 
I t  appears t o  me that there were on this occasion srome remark- 
able deficiencies of expositioii. Notwithstanding. their aerfect 
unanimityin aclvooating the territorial integrity of Afghanistan, m~d ..I - 
in  deprecating the violation of that integrity by Russian ~ o o t s ,  
not one noble Lord, in or oat of office, made auy.allmsion to tho 
undeniable fact that such a violation of Afghan territory has been 
diplomatically snuounced as imminent. Uoreovel; all the >Yarn- 
i n g ~  and all the assurances referred alike and solely to the danger 
of military intervention,-a difficulty more likely to occur than 
any Peer suggested, and less easily mct, when it doessccur, than 
may have been supposed, but by no means the only poisible diffi* 
cnlty me may shortly have to meet. I f  precautions are not taken ' 
in time, we may soon begin to find that British influence is gra- 
dually diminishing and disappearing, not in consequence of any 
military movement by Russia within Afghan territory, but by 
corruption and intrigue in high and low places, at the capital aud 
in the ont-lying provinces, and by the closer and angmenting 
tenacity of the Russian grasp on the Oxus. I t  is against a gm- 
, 
dual growth of Russian influence at Cubnl, and especially against 
Russian interference, avowed or secret, in the event of a disputed 
euccession, that me mght most jealoasly to guard. This call only - 
be done by a new co~plzct mith tho Arneer Sher Ali. Only thus 
can we acquire and permanently retain that supremacy in thc 
oo~msels of Cabul which even Prince Gortsch$off exhorts LIS to 
exercise, and which is absolutely esse$tial for the peace and pros- 
perity of India. Coi~dially agreeidg with Lord Dorby in his ex- 
pressed aversion '< to establish English control over Afghanistan * 
against the will of its Sovereign and its people,'" I believe that 
this indispensable control over the Afghan Government can be 
1 gained, with princely anrd pop la r  consent. I 
I havo heard nothing since 1869, that cau invalidate the plan 
of ceding nnprofitnblc torritory tm its former possessws, as a - 
1 
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,. means of extending onr beneficial influence and c o i ~ c c ~ t r n t i n ~  our 
milita~y strength. Nothing has been done, or proposed, so far as 
. 
one can learn from any pc~blished despatch or fl-om m y  Par- 
liamentary &bate, down to that of last month inclnsive,-to nullii'y 
*or to modi+ thkclifficu~cies'of the situation, as they stood in 1860. 
Nothing certainly has happened, nor have any eEcient steps beell 
taken by cpr Government to clear the North-West horizon * 
from those two black and gathering clo~tds that harass and 
m a &  the .~ndian  I3mpire-the persistent hostility of the 
dun&incers, and the continuous advance of Russia towasds the 
Inilus. 
I f  the measures here proposed were impolitic or impracticable 
some intelligible reasons coulcl be sudy given for their rejection. 
Nor does i t  secxu unreasonable to ask horn those who deprecate 
the policy of confidence a id  co-operntion which i t  is tho objcct 
of these lwges to advocate, what scheme they have to offcr for 
%he settlekent of the North-West frontier and the security of 
India. Exceptiug the military projects for a furthey advance 
beyond o w  present limits, no scheme whatever has boon pro- 
pounded. Not even the expression of some hope of porrnanently 
pacifying the frontier and opening the Passes a t  any future 
period, has come to my knowledge. I have waited and searched 
in vain for something to answer. I n  some of the notices that 
were given to tile first edition of this book, its policy was pro- 
visionally approvecl, though1 further discussion was desired ; but 
where doubt or dislike was intiruatcd, there was no controversy. 
Even the lamented Mr. J. W. S. Wyllk, whose interesting 
essay in the Fo~hightly Rcviczu, for December 1869,-most vala- 
able for the accuracy of its informatiou,~contai~led some brief 
strictures, left my distinctive argument untouchecl. It is true 
that as he had herd an idportant post in the Calcutta Foreign 
Office during* the adu~inist~atidns of Lord Elgin a d  Lord Law- 
rence, when the views of Sir Henry Durand, assailed by me, 
were in the ascendant, his main object was to complete an apology 
for the Afghan policy of that period. But if, in doing so, he 
could, by exposing the nbsurdity imfiacticnbility of the assail- 
ant's own views, have monnded him in a vital qnartcr, the 
r .  , advantage w0~11d most assverily not have been thrown away. 
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The book, ~v'hateve~ its demerits, rt~ld however obscure, its author, 
. 
was decidedly aggressive, and, if it mere weak, deserved and ' 
invited A t  least a knock-down bion. Nothing of the s o ~ t  was at- 
tempted, or has ever beon attempted, here or in India,%y any one. 
The whole subjeot mas byought bcfbre a mee*g of t he  East ' 
India Association, at which many wcll iuforined persou.  were 
" present, on the 18th of March last, but while support a?d confirma- 
tion of a very important character came forme~d on my side of the 
question, the only objections urged were, as t l l ~ y  evbywhe?e &ad 
always have been, purely declamatory, and for the 113ost p e t  
irrelevant, eitlzer contemptuous tomarda the Afghan peop?e, or 
vain-glorious with reference t o  ourselves. 
No attention scems evcr t o  be given to the indications of an 
increasing regard for human life, and of more enlighteued prin- 
ciples of government, that have been manifested in the action 
and p l i c y  of the present Ameer of Afghanistan, both during the 
civil mar and since the pacification of the country. . . 
I n  reply to the argument, based on recorded facis, that the 
British Govermnent callnot reduce the Hill tribes to good ordsr, 
or keep the 'Passes open, but that the Afghan Qovermuent 
formerly did so, and could, with our concurwnce, do so  again, we 
are told that the Afgl~ans are a ferocions and perfidious race, and 
can never be trusted. This inhuman doctriuo has no foundation 
in either his to~y oF ethnology ; science a ~ l d  experience equally 
contrndict it. There i s  not on Ghe faco of the globe, and there 
never has been, any race that is i~ lhe~eut ly  treacherous or turbu- 
lent. There are no ip idents  in the annals of Afghanistan that 
cannot be paralleled i n  oer omn, O? in those of the o ther  nations 
of Europe. National Eharacter grows and changes. The Afghan 
Government has  visibly improved before the eyes of t h e  present 
generation, and niay, with British Counsel Snd conntenance, 
improve still more, and that very rapidly. l\%eanwhile, there is 
no question of imposing Afghan rule npou a reluctant and highly 
civilised popnlation, but only ono of yestoring it, on  our own 
conditions and  under our control, among Afghan tribes who would 
rejoice a t  renuion. B 5 
I t  is not proposed that ,the Imperial Government of India 
should rcsign any of its polver- or ipfluencc between t he  Iildus 
a 
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and the Oxus : on the contrary, it is believed that b i  the means' 
here suggestcd, British power would be consolidated within the 
l-'unjauls, and British influence extended and stsengtdened in 
, ~ f ~ h a n i s t &  and Central Asia. Until the futility of these expec- 
tations, and th6%ullity of 'the foundation on which they rest, aye 
shown, there cau be 110 serious or effectual opposition to the 
policy of this book. Nothing call be more erroneous, as will be 
show: furthes on in the proper place, than to say that this matter 
m s  decidedlome for all in 1857, when the proposal of Lord 
~ & q p c e  to transfer Peshawur to Dost Mohaumed was abso- 
lutcly rejecte4 by Lord Canning. That was, in fact, a very 
diffeyent matter. To assert roundly that British territory must 
never baceded, because all previous judgments are against it, is 
simply to beg the question as a whole, all particulars of time and 
circumstance being excludcd from consideration. 
One gl;at object of the following pages has been to show from 
Orecent experience that our local functionaries must not be  trusted 
in India, any more than thcy are in Great Britain and Ireland, to 
guide Imperial affairs. Almost in direct proportion to the degree 
of their departmental dexterity, and the length of their Eastern 
residence, they are generally incapacitated for the higher branch 
of statesmanship. A clear view of Imperial operations can only 
be obtained fsom the central watch-tower. At  the same time i t  
would be premature, if not presumptuous, to endeavour to define 
exactly the limits of such a transaction as this, or to enter upon 
the dictation of its practical details, without a thorough topo- 
graphical and technical intelligence, a perfet;t knowledge of ways 
and means and persons, to which a politician at home need make 
no pretension. We may give the fullcst &edit for the requisite 
information and skill to the executive authorities in India. The 
fullest confidenco &ay bo fhed  in their zeal and ability to per- 
form what the Nation desires %nd the Soveyeign commands. But 
a solicitude for the maintenance of British 'Cprestige" so fse- 
quently presents itself as the sole official objection to ceding terri- 
tory, that I must depart a little from the rule just prescribed, in 
order to give a hint of the actual Froceciure that is contemplated. 
The measure in question ought to be carried out in  snch a 
nzannemthat no one should be able to prate of British prestige 
. 
a * .  
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boing lost cjr diminished. No o m  should bc able to say, or to . 
suppose, that the restoration of Afghan territory to the Afghan 
State ~Vas a symptom, or was likely to be the causo, 4 wealrness 
in the British Empire. I t  shoulci be mado the oc2asion bf a 
display of our militmy power on so $raucl a &le, and on such' 
a conspicuous field, that all Central Asia and all Ind% should 
" ring of it. Wi th  the hearty good mill of the Afg$an Govem- 
men$--without, i t  may be hoped, a shot being fired, certainly 
without anything worthy the name of a contast,ethe Afgbn , . 
succession and the Imperial supremacy of Her Majcsty Q n ~ n  
m 
Victol-in, should be settled and proclaimed simultaneously. 
d, 
Jzcly ls t ,  1874. 
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THE %astern Question, viewed with exclusive regard to 
the intercsts of Great Britain, identical in this instance 
with the interests of humanity, is nothing more tlmn this, 
-Shall British .or Russian influence predominate in the 
regions between the Oxus and the Indus ? If all the 
'Province: of Afghanistan c m  be united under one strong 
,Government, if the rulers of Ballch and Herat can be 
enabled t o  hold their own against all comers, in friendly 
concert with the rulers of India, the Eastern Questibn is 
settled for us. Russian agents at Teheran, and even in 
Turkey, might then be left to do their worst. We, among 
all the nations of Europe, need then care the least about 
the occupancy of Constantinople, Baffled and checked 
in Central Asia, the expansive irnp~ilse of Russia must be 
drawn more closely within the mnge of European diplo- 
macy, where Great Britain cannot be isolated. France, 
Italy, and Austria, very indiffwent as -to the fate of Cabul 
and Eolrl~nra, will always insist on a oontroiling voice in 
the Levant. b 
In statii~g the problem concisely, f d o  not pretend t o  
set forth x~ythiqg nely or original. It will be seen by-and- 
by that we have somefii-nes rnismanagecl it, that we have 
very often, and very recenfly, neglected or refused t o  con- 
sicley the ~ntltter'at all, but whenever we have condescended 
to give it any attention, our policy has been always the 
same. The formation of a strong and friendly Govern- 
ment in Afghanistan was theanim 'of our policy in 1839, 
when we carried Shah Xuja11 to the throne of Cabd. Such 
was tile aim of our policy.in 1855, when we'innde a treaty 
of "perpetu:~,l pexcc rt1-1~1 friendship" with the Ameer Dost 
\B 
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Mohammed, having made ho&i.le demonsi,rni,i611s in v:Lin 
during the Punjo,ub wars, and fruitlessly incited tile llJl 
tribes of. the Peshawur border against for sever&l year;;, 
perceived tha t  we held with a firm grasp our nelJr posses- 
* sion on his fr8ntier ; add the pressure of Persia, e n c o ~ ~ ~ q -  
iiig iqtrigues and rivalry in his own fmiily, begiliiling to 
shake his* au tl~orit y, the Bin eer in 1 8 Ci il: made frien dly* 
otiertnres to  our Government. By the Treaty of 1855, 
the .Ameel* Dost Mohrtmned ,pined absolution for the 
past, and a clear recognition of his title as an independent 
Sov&eign. If, wliicll is very probable, this policy of re- 
conciliation ~i tn  be shown to have helped in the establish- * 
ment 'of a central authority a t  Cabul, i t  was so far cnn- 
ducive, tliongh in a small way, towards the acl~ievement 
of our great object, the consolidakion of Afgl~anistan into 
a strong and united State. But it cannot be preter-derl 
.that t11F measures of 1855 were successf~d or sufEcient 
for that great object. Before the end of 185G, ille King 
of Persia had occupied Rernt with n large aruy, and 
claimed Impc~ial  supremacy over thc wllole of Afghan- 
istan. This led to the costly Persi:in wax, and t o  the 
secoiid Treaty with Dost Mohanlnlcd in 185'1, by 'cvhich, 
without actually g~~arnnteeiag his (' present possessions in 
Cabul, and C a ~ ~ d a l ~ ~ r , "  we undcrtoolr to assist hiin 
with money and munitions of war '' Lo defend and mrtiu- 
tain" tliem "against Persia."" 
Persia, was coerced by our fleet and army ; and the 
new Treaty with Dost Moha~nined piwvecl t o  llave been 
most olsportunely concluded, for ifow? had been on bad 
terms with the Afghans ill 185.7, they might hnve thrown 
their illto the .scale agaiiast us with fearful, per- 
haps &,tal e&ct. But7 this accidental benefit could not 
have been foreseen. The lfmited and temporary advantage 
of tllese measures certainly failed to secure onr great ob- 
ject of an orclerly slid mi ted  State in Afglianintan, per- 
Alanently amenable t o  British ilifluence. The mission of' 
Ml;jor M>;joT-General) Ha. Eumndcn and his brother 
l;o Cal2dnha,r was arraaged on terms so ill considered, nncl 
Otlgrllg ~ r ~ f i e c ~ ~ r e d ,  t l q t  o w  cnroys were kept more like 
:* CoIlecliou of Y'lwities, vol. ii, p. 431. 
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prisoners tllan guests, and k c r e  constailtly in  dtwger ol' 
assassina;tion. As if we hncl exlm~stecl all our yesources 
in this llumiliating experiment, every opportunity of inter- 
~ e u t i o n  a d  intercourse was khro~r-n nwaycbet&eeu the * 
return of the Lumsdens in 1858, &d the  c~en,th of Dost 
_Mohammed ill 1863. That greatest of all possible appor- 
timities was not merely rejected, i t  was perveqted to our 
damage :tncl clisgrace. 
The right of priniogeniture has never prevLiled i6 A£- 
gllt~nisian, or in any Mohnn~rncdttn State. S11ch n,f;igl~t 
mould be obviously iiicompatilrle wit11 those j~eculiar inci- 
dents of a polygnn~ous household,-the absolute Jegiti- 
rnncy of all acknowledged sons, and the  inequali'cy of 
thcir r :~nk  a i d  consicleratiou in the f:r.nzily according t o  
the position of their rnothers. Amid val-ying customs of 
succession to thc throne in c1iEerent countries, ope rulc is 
uiliversnlly recogniscd as perfcct.1~ confo~inable wirth Mus-, 
snlinan law, tlmt the reigning Sovereign may select from 
niziong hi8 soils that one wl~oni 110 rrmy consider most 
~voi- t l~y  t o succeed him. I11 accordance wit11 this pnt1.i- 
at-chal usage, the Anleer Dost Mohammed had chosen 
G11aln1l-i I-Iy der Khan as heir-apparel] t,-wllo, under that 
title, collcludecl vi th our Government the  Tretity of 1855. 
G11olnln I-Iyder, Shcr Ali Khan the present Ameer, m d  
their more noted b r~ t~he r ,  Rfoharnmed Akbnr Elran, were 
a11 sons of the Ameer's favourite wife, a lady of high de- 
scent. On Gholam Hyder's cleat11,-Alcbar Khan having 
died some ycars p~eviously,-the Ameer nolninated Sher. ' 
Ali Khan as his succe%sor ; md  011 his own death-bed, in 
t h e  cmnp before Remt,  confirmed the selection in a family , 
council, a d  recorded it in  a wrs ten  tastament. Dost 
Mohammed died on June 9Lh, 1563. All these facts 
were duly notified to the Gove"rnor-General of India. 
The succession of Sher Ali Kliail is thus described in 
nn article of the EcZi~2bz~~:r/h fieview for January 18G 7, 
since avowed and accepte'd as a demi-official defence of 
Sir John Lawrence's fo"reign policy. 
" Sher Ali Rhan it was whom Dost l\foharomed, some time be- 
. 
fore the expedition to Herat, had Publicly selected as %is sue- 
cessor, passing over the claims of both tho elder l'rinces, A f d  
(" 
0 
. 
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Khau and Azim Khan. The selection, according to Fdn~ilp ous- 
tom, was anthoritakive. Slier Ali ever since had borne the cle- 
signatioq of heir-apparent ; and when Dost Mollaln~&d died, 
none ventured to question his title to succeed. Evan Azim ICLau 
himself in thab 61st houls of confusion was fain to join in the 
general homage due to Sher Ali as rightful Arneer of Afghan- 
istan.':* . 
,The ca1Sture of Herat, the last and crowning triumph of 
Dos-b Mohammed's memorable career, was received ivith 
abparent indifference both in London and Calcutta. The 
f i r n ~ s ,  which may be considered as a tolerably ft' i ~r ex- 
ponent of tlw ruling opinion in higl~ places, set down the 
whole affair as " a battle of kites and crows," and declared 
the contest for Ilerat, " though so inexhaustibly interest- 
ing for Afghans and Persians," t o  be "of no concern to 
us."? It is extremely doubtful whether the same view 
was talc&% at St. Petersburgh. 
It may have been diffiq~111; for most Englisl~men t o  look 
so far east, rnllei~ every eye was fixed on the gigantic 
struggle of slairery and freeclom in the Wcst, from wllicli 
almost every one had so muc1~-politically, socially or coin- 
mercially-to hope or to fear. In  the summer of I S 6 3  
the civil ww in the United States was at  its height, and 
the cotton-famine of Lancashire (the touch-stone of m o d  
pr.ogress in Great Byitail]) ha8d carried :t gulden harvest to 
India. The wealth of Bornbay was boiling over, but had 
not yet reached the point of evaporation. At Calcutta 
financial affairs were in the ascendant ; 1862 was the iil-st 
?ear since the Rebellion of 185'7 it* which there had not 
been a deficit, in which the Home Cl~Lrges had not been 
defrayed fyom loans raised on the London Stock Excl~ailge. 
Great was o-ffici&l ex~dkation about that time a t  the newly 
discovered elasticity of tlxe Indian revenue, continuously 
manifested ever since in a very remarkable rnailner, though 
counterbalanced in a manner equally semark-kable, by the 
elasticity of the expenditure. Visions of perpetual 
prosperity ruled the hour all Qver Indii~ in 1863. No one 
seems to have had a thought for Ceiztral Asia. The policy 
6 THE OSUS AND THE INDUS. 
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of 1839, 1855, and 1857, was completely forgotten, or re- 
me~nberecl oirly t o  be reviled. There was no one t o  ~emiacl 
our G6vernmeat tha t  promptitude tmcl dceisioy -on t l ~ e i ~  
part  might prevent a war of succqssion in t l ~ e  do~nlniol~.  . 
of Dost Blohnulmed, :d kcep tlic A@an State unclividecl, 
. coimectecl with 11s by nelv tics anc1 willing obligcztio+zs. 
Never did our Government stand more in nwcl of a ye- 
mindcr, hncl it only l ~ e n   good newspape~ artjcle. The11 
the  crisis poclucecl by the fill1 of EIerat 5~11~1 the cleat11 of 
Dost Mohan~~ned pressed most strongly for cnnsider&iofl, 
t h e  Governor-Gencd, Lord Elgiil, was a t  piinla, ~vllicI1 
he left on the 36th September, 1 SG3, on a tour through 
tlre Punjanb, intending to  visit t he  frontier s t d o n  of 
Pesha~v~il; and to be at Lahore, whcre a great camp of 
esercise mas to  be nssemblcd under the Coininancler-in- 
Chief himsclf, :tbout the close of the  year. A11 $he mem- 
bers of thc Governor-General's Council were at t7alcuttLx,n 
where thc routine business of Goverilirlent was carriccl 
011. The Foreign Secretary, Coloilel (al'twnwds Sir 
Henry) D w m d ,  accoulpa,z1iecl the Viceroy on his tour. 
U p  to tllc clnto of Lord Eigin's Inmenlccl dentll, which 
happened on the 20th NovcmLcr, 1863, a t  Dlrm'maelrz 
in the valley of Kangra, Sllcr Ali Khan's overtures for 
our recognition had met wit11 no response. Altl~ougll the 
clesirc of Dost Moham~nccl fo'ul. our  support in settliilg the 
succession in his Gmily was imcle suf'ficiently inanifest 
tvlmr the Treaty of IS55 was coldudecl for the Airleer, 
" a d  0 1 ~  the pc112 qf' his hei.,a," by his son, Gholam 
Hyder, "as the  rep~eseatative of Ameer Dost Mohan~inecl 
Khan, aid  in persou o n  his o w ~ t ,  nc'cozmt CIS Iieir-~fppa~-ent;"~' , 
and api i l ,  -when, on the death af Ghdnrn Hydw, the 
Arneer il~forrned the Goverr~in~ent of India tha t  he had 
nominated one of his younger sons, Sher Ali Khan, to  
succeecl t o  dl his domiuions, tile language and conduct 
of tho British nnthorities, on every occasion between Dost 
Mohammed's death anrJ the  &nal success of Sher Ali IChan, 
~epeatcdly left tlle field qflite open for a fratricidal war.. 
Though a11 histov,  and all political scieilce might have 
taught us tha t  no coln~~iilation sf untoward events could ' 
* Collecfio/~ of 2'recrfics, vol. ii, p. 431, see llppenclix A. , 
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cond~~ce to tlie disunion and disorder of the Afgllan tcui- 
tories so s ~ ~ r e l y  as a disputed succession, or promote so 
directly.the designs of a rival Power, we ileglebtec- :~11 
.the chanbes that offered, and all the means a t  our ciis- 
posal for f o r~d ing  a d~Gable settlement. 
There ought not to have been a moment's do111)t or 
hesitation as to Sher Ali Kllan's title. We had explicitlyg 
acknowledged the right of Dost Mohnlnmed to norniuate 
l i s  8uccessoY when the Treaty of 1855 was mtified by the 
Govepor-General,, A seco~d nomination, made by Dast 
Mohainmed 11 the death of the first heir-apparent, was 
duly notifie c$ to our Government. On the death of his 
father, the desigilated heir ,peaceably assu~necl the reins 
of power. No one cienied or disputed his right. His 
brothers professed subniission to his authority. Why was 
not this erfectly regular successioii prornptly recognisecl 
, bv the $: iitish Government ? 
- d 
I11 the absence of the consultative Mi~mtes,-if any 
were recorded,-and of the other oEcinl documents of 
the day, we can only conjecture now,-as the Afghans, uf 
all parties, mnst have corijectured then,-that uncler 
sorne predominant influence at  our political head-ywtrters 
(probably that of Colonel H. 31. Durand, the Foreign 
Secretary) Sher Ali KHan was not the British candiclnte, 
-that our Government for the time being would have 
preferred one of his bruthers ; and though not prep;~recl 
to  support our own man openly, hoped that  sonlething 
' might turn up for his advantage, if qe cleferred as long 
as possible the recognition of the le2itirnate successor. 
That there are considerable grounds for i tnp~ting this 
half-hearted an$ faithless policy t o  one or more of tlie 
high functionaries the; in power will hardy, I tlink, be 
- 
dihuted. V 
A pamphlet published a t  Calcutta, highly eulogistic 
of Sir John Lawrence's foreign policy, and known to be of 
demi-official authority, gives , the following retrospective 
glance at  the unworthy s~~sgiciohs a i d  ~ullawful self- 
seekings tliat misled the British authoriLies : 
- 
Th%re wore many who Bolieved tlmt Mohammed Azim IChan 
lcvos supcrior in capacity t o  Sbor Al i  Kl~en, mil i d d i  he was more 
a, 
, 
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loyally dispoked towards the Britisli Govcrun~eat  clnring the crisis ' 
of 1857 than any other Afqllan Sirdiw."* 
Herek an extract from a letter of the Cakutta, Corres- 
pondent of the Times, understood t o  bc iden_ticalrwitll the 
Editor of the Prieizcl of 1T,)~clic~,  hid n peison generally" 
well informed as to the doings of the Indian Fgseign 
^Office. This letter,.dated July 23rd, 18G3, a montli after 
Dost Mohn,mmeci's clcath, appeared in the 'Ti?nes 'of 
August 28th. " The nem Ameer, Sher Ali ICl~r~n,~' say% o q ~  . 
own Correspondent, " is as no tusiously llostilo t g  the 
Englisll alliance as his brother by a cli8erentl, motller, and 
~ i v d ,  Aziu  Khan, is in fLvour of it." n> 
Agczin in his letter of August 28nd, 1863, published in 
the  Yimes of September 3Stli, he calls A z h  Khnn "our 
friend." 
I strongly suspect the real origin of tllese rrunoms to  
have been that Azi~n IC1zill-1; having been for soke yearsp 
Govcruor of the dist,ricts of I<ooruiu and Kllost, border- 
ing on the British frontier, had talseil f d l  a d v a n t a g e  of 
every oopportmnity of inte~course with English officers t o  
sound his own pmises, and t o  spread a belief that he alone 
was friendly, m c l  the rest of the fimily hostilc. During 
his pensioned retirekent a t  Rawulpindee, on Briiish t e u i -  
tory, in 1865, he did his best t o  strengfien the 
imp~ession in  hi^ fhvour. I cannot help feellng some- 
what confirmed iu. this view by the fbllowing passagcs 
from Lord Lawrence's speech in the I-Iouse of Tlorcls on 
April 19th. Spealdng of the Treaty coilcluded Dost 
RIohamncd in 185 5, ke said :- 
" Sir Herbcrt Edwardes " (then Coiuu~issioner of Peshawur) a 
" pnt himself into comrunnication with a son of the dmeer,  who 
was then Governor of n border provigce of ATghaniststu" (this 
was Azim Khan) "and th1.oug.h hial l lade arrangements vitll the 
father. I was then the chief civil and military authority in the 
I'unjab, and with niy co~lseut he  allowed the sou of the Anieer to 
say, that if his f'athcr was willing to come forward we should meet 
him lmlf-way.'' 
And after relating tXe dd1 of d f iu l  Khan, the eldest 
son of Dovt MohuminedJ who Ly Azirn Khan's agency, - 
* Fweip Policy of Sir JoJm LUIUTL'ILCC (reprinted from t l ~ e  !&zgZisl~- 
nml ,  of Jnnunry 4thJ 1869)) Cnlcntta, 1869, 1). 7. / 
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as we shall see,--contrived to dispossess the Pllmeer Sher 
Ali of part of his clominions, and ruled a t  Cabul. from 
June 186 6, t~ October 1867, he said :- 
I 
" His brbther who had first sought relatious with us" (Azirn b Khan) " asceucled the thrGne. The Ameer," (a title quite un- 
warranted by Aairn Khan's brief usurpatiou) " however, did not 
fulfil tfie expcctations of his friends. Some of those who had. 
gained himhis  throne fell off, and after some months he  was ex- 
pellea from t l p  country." 
' In the article of the Eclinbz~rgh Review for January 
1 b ~  7 p ~ z i m  Khan is pronounced to have b e l l  " incornpar- 
ably Afzul I<&an's s~qxrior in state-craft," while Sher Ali i 
is declared "not equal to Azim Khan as a 8tatesinan," 
&ild it is said that his " political proclivities had hitherto 
been towards a Persian, rather than an English alliance." 
The notions that swayed the ForeignuOffice a t  Calcutta 
in 1863, aoine out very clealy in the following passage :- 
"~ith'o:ont m y  r e d  love for the  English, Aairn Khan had yet 
established a strong claim ~ipon  our goodwill by the course he 
adopted in 1857, when the whole Afghan nation elamonreci to bc 
led down the passes that they 1uight join the mntinous Scpoys in  
a lneritorious extermination of the  ididel English. Dost Mo- 
hammed would, perhaps, have bcen unable to yesis& the popular 
ary but for Azitn I<hau's steadfast and opeuly declared advocacy 
of the English cause."* 
I am illclilied to attribute these supposed good offices 
to Aeim Khan's own invention, or t o  that n~tful  inani- A 
~ ~ ~ l a t i o a  of the British Moonshee, or news-writer a t  
Cabul, in which, as the Eclinbu~gh Reviewer tells us, 
that wily Sirdar was so great ail a4ept.t Such considera- 
tions, however, even if they had been v e l l  founded, ought 
to have been far beneath a great Government like ours. 
We could well s;H?ord t o  despise the evil dispositions of 
six yeass back ; while anp reliance upon what is called 
the "loyalty" or "friendship" of one Afghan Chief more 
than anotl~er, was a very weak pretext for  slighting the 
lawfd successor, a lotally inadequate excucjre for deviating 
from the ~traiglitfo~ward coume of,full ,znd immediate re- 
cognition. 
9 % IJdii~O~rgh Review,.No. 255, J i i i i~i~ry 1867, p. 18. 
1. Ibid., January 16G7, pp. 31, 32, 33. 
. s, 
'I"lIc! Ido Inmcnted Mr. J. W. S, Wyllie, whose corn- . 
l l lptlf+ t ) I1  tlIC: first edition of this little book call for some 
,,..ti,:, 01, lxwt, dinrncterised my snspicio~~ tlmt Azim 
I < I ~ : ~ ~ ~  ,x::i-; tile Critish fii,vounite as a " ~ % s s  nbsu~dity,"~ 
:.jdillY.. witil i't~ll ~ f i i ~ i i d  lill0~1edgE of the ficts, tha t  " the 
h v l ~ l l ~ : ~ c ~ l i c s  of the Incliml Government were never %t any . 
' t j t l i i I  - ~ ~ i ~ ~ l  KIlun's side, :~ncl, e u k m  O I E B  Slyr Ali had 
I,{ I I , ~  i * ( ) i 2 ~ , ! j , , ; , w t / ,  they mere iiirnl-ially exerted 111 favpl: bf 
 slit^,. :ili, :mrl uf l h n  only."* Here he does bot deny,- . 
I,( '  r :~ t l l~s  S ~ ~ C I ~ I S  v t o  admit,--that befo7.e Xlzer Ali Izu& been 
,.lwj~j,ci.+..~~l tha sy1i111ntIlies of the India11 G o p m n e n t  had 
1rt.t.n t.srart~d i n  ftt~our of' some one else, tilough not of ' 
x i  I .  i h c l  I linve no doubt that while nll the 
rt.ii:tnlt..,. { k t '  tlic ihlcut ta  Foreign O&ce was placed upoil 
:\ ; ! i ~ r l  I<Im 11, its i q p i i d  cnncliclate for the Afghan succes- 
kit i7<.;ts, i l l  : IC~-IOI . (~:XIIC~ with Elis o w ~ l  scheme, Afz$ Kllan, 
tbltl:~ f w liher.. In the W O I ' C ~  of &!r. W y l h  nhimself,, 
L b  .lt':,,rd I<II:LI~ \vas in truth ;l nonentity, set up by Azim 
, 
li 11:r r l  :IS :t con t-eliicnt xncl decorous screen to cover the  
i 
Nlit lwtil Dcce~iher 1863, just six months aftcr his 
htlicr's tlclath, and t l~rcc  weeks after Lord Elgin's death, " 
wlleil Sir TTilliam Denison, a@ seniol" Governor, had 
t&nl ~~ro~ision:d clmge of the Yiceregal office,-was Xher 
At- mistan an, It limy be useful to see what account of 
I Ali Kilun recognised by our Government as the Ameer of 
this step is &ven by the Frioiid of Imiiu, a jou~*nal 1 
gv~ lv~ ;d ly  :rccseclited ulith Qpme notl~ority as an organ, or 
at hitst ~ L S  on obsequious partisan, of the Calcutta Foreigll 
* 
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Office. On December 24th) 1863, the ~ d i t o ;  writes as 
follows :- . 
"Whene,the late Dost Mohitrnmed appointed his son" (Sher 
Al i  Khan) "higlre i r  and succe&or, he duly notified tho fact to 
our G overnmerlt. 
(( Soalong as iL was c lo~zbtf~~l  wl~ctller tlie ncm Anleer would 
~nalce good his claims," (i. c., so long as our conntezla~ce wo~~lc l  
have been ~ t s e f ~ ~ l  to  him,) "we  abstained from recognisiug his 
yosition. BL$ now that  his opponents, daim Khan and Afznl 
I&au are quiet, however personally discontented, our Government 
I& c10,ye ouly what is just and politic in strengt~leniug his power 
by their lorma1 ccognition." f This policy has been called by me half-hearted and 
$~ithless. It was half-henrtecl, because me virtually de- 
murred to the  succession of Slier Ali I<han without 
vcnt~ring to object openly, to support mothel: cnncli- 
date, or &veil to impose conditions for our recognition. 
-It was fAithles8, became by the Treaty of 1855 ?ire 11ttct 
clistiilctly accepted the line of inheritance instituted by 
Dost Mohammed, and on the  decease of the heir nnmecl 
in that Treaty, the nomination of a full brother, Sher 
k l i  Khan, in his place, was duly columunicated to our 
G ovenment. I11 that same Treaty we had promisecl 
" never to interfere,"'* c~nd now, on the very first occnsion 
after Dost 1,'lohanlmed's death, under the pretence of in- 
partiality and non-intervention, we practised the most 
inj~wious interference, by " abstaii~ing from recognising" 
the P1inee's " position'." At thc most ~ l ' i t i ~ i ~ l  
cortjuncture possible, the first succesg~iod in new dynasty, 
we struck.a blow a t  the very founclatim-stone of ,z strong 
ancl stable Gorernment. 
The F~ier~d o$ I7zcZich talks of Sher Ali's " oppoizents." 
He had no opponcizts, u$il, by "absthning from recog- 
i~ising his P ~ ~ i t i o i l "  as ruling Ameer, whicll the Pq*ied's 
language admits he had made good, we enconraged his 
brothers to cons im and rebel against him. The well 
understood fact t 'i l u t  there were se ret rivals in his fkrniIy E ought to have been an adclitioifal p ea for prompt recogni- 
tion, if perfect good fiaith was to be preserved. 
I have said t l ~ t ~ t  the ta idy recognition of the new Ameer 
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in  December 1363, while Sir Williani Denison was at ' 
the head of afLirs a t  Calcutta, produced improved rela- 
tions bktween the Goverilme~lt of India and t h s  Ruler of 
Afghanistan. But it must not  be supposed $hat & coinplet~, 
redress and rectification of the  iGjury done to Sher Ali 
Khan was therehy effected, or that full colificlelncc in  
' British good faith and intentions cailrhave been 
tllereby restored. The mischief was in a great meas2re 
done, and irretrievable, A flat denial of' Sher ~ l ? s  in- . 
llerent right t o  the succession under his ft~ther's auoii-ft- 
ment, and a more or less coi~cenled preferenre on our part 
for some other member of t h e  family, were obviously 
involved in postponing liis recognition for six months. 
Unless the actual lettiel. of recognition contained soine 
judiciously evasive apology for t,he delay,-attributing it, 
let us say, to Lord Elgis's illness and death,the difki- 
culty of moicling a, denial of Shcr Ali's right t o  the in, 
heritance must have beeu almost insnrmonntable. After 
so long a silence, soine explanation was evidently called 
for. 
Whether the letter of recognitiun was o r  was not 
couched in some such terms as those just quoted from tile 
f i iencl  of I7zdia,--whether Sher Ali Khan was or mas 
not told in substance, t ha t  me had "abstained from recog- 
nising. his position," " so long as it was doubtfd" that he 
" could make good his claims ;" whether he was plainly told 
or not that the Governmeut of Inclin would not, forestall 
the choice of the A$@ Chieftains and people,.-it m ~ w t  ' 
have been perfectly clear to  him and to all &mterested 
parties, that we ignored llis title, and recognised him a 
only by virtue of possession. 1Te;~drnittgdl the fclct only, 
not the ~ i g h t .  By so doing we informed Sher Ali Klmn, 
his usual advisers, and his malbontent relatives,-sure to  
lmve a t  least one inforinant in the Durbar,-tlxit the 
British Government had no l.egamrd for any law or custom 
of successioa, would have recognised any one of the  
brothers, and cared " so .little for Dost hfohammed's 
nominee as to have waited six months in the expect il t' 1011 f 
-perhaps in the hope-that bawoulcl be s q ~ ~ l a ~ c t e d  by .fl 
one of his rivals. The question of succession w m  t,lms F 
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. degraded bv the British Government from i point of 
~ir/ht iuto n' point of fict, horn a matter of Mussulman 
law, family compact, and Treaty engagements, into . 
mere ihtt~i)' of brute force and casual possession. 
It followed as a logicgl consequence of this policy,- 
and equally whether proclaimed in words or not,-that 
we should,always esteem possession as the best, if not * 
tlie' ozly proof of sovereignty, and that if any one of 
tIw brot1zer:rs' could contrive to gain the capital, and to 
makebimself Ameer ~ T L  Jnct by the death or flight of his 
predecessor, 1; would meet with no hindrance or inter- 
ruption from t u r  Government, and would be recognised- 
to say the least,-as freely and as promptly as Sl~er  Ali 
Khan had been. 
This may not have been the deliberate policy, or evon 
the conscl;ous line of reasoning, adopted by our Govem- 
a e n t  ; the lesson drawn by the rival parties in Afghanistan 
may not have been what is here suggested; but most 
certainly our Government acted as if it wished to teach 
tlmt lesson, and tJhe rival partties in Afghanistan acted as 
i f  they had learned it. And tbe subsequent action of our 
Government, down to Decetnber 1868, was entirely in ac- 
cordance with the lesson it had tanght. We recopised 
three brothers, one after another, as Alneers of Cabnl, 
solely by virtue of their holding the ca,pital. I n  apparent 
obedience to the same rule, we have now reverted to the 
first of the thrcc. 
. In Decepber 1563, when tlie Amee~ Sher Ali Khan's 
letter, announcing his father's cleat11 %nd his own accession, 
was answered by Sir William Denison, the Uucler Secre- 
t ~ r y  a t  the C G u t t a  Foreign Ofice was Mr. J. W. S. 
Wyllic, afterwards the acknowledged author of the article 
in the Eclidmyh Bevie& for January 156'7, so oken 
cpotecl in these pages. The apology for Lord Lawrence's 
Afghan policy tllerein coininenced mas continued by him 
in n, very interesting essay, signed with his name, in the 
Po~t&ghthj 12eview for Decernbr "169, containing some 
brief strictures on the fimt edition of this book, in the 
justiceaf which I could not acquiesce. My reply to these 
strictures was admitted int40 the columns of the Dciily 
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iVezos,+?? where Mr. MTyllieJs rejoinder  also appeared. Having  . 
access t o  the secre t  records of his o ld  depa r tmen t ,  Mr. 
Wyllie', in response t o  my cl~aIlerge, produced ,a  copy of 
Sir Wi l l i am Y enison's I etter, in its Englisl: version, which 
was in the following terms :- * r 
" To his E i g l ~ t ~ e s s  AMEER SHER ALI I ~ A N ,  Tf ide~ ,o f  
C Cithzd, etc. 
"Pour  friendly letter communicating tho melanchroly tidings" of 
your fatller's death was received by my Inmentea predeEessp, . 
Lord Elgin, wikh the utmost regret for the loss of so firm 
aud constaut an d l y  of the British G.ovcrnmeat. PSn  will 
have learned from m y  separrtte letter of the deathr?f the late Vice- 
roy and Governor General, an event which mas preceded by a se- 
vere and protracted illness, dnriug vliich a formal reply to your 
o.nnounccn.ieut mas uecessnri1,y postponed. My separate letter will 
also 11avo informed you that I lmvo assumad the offico of Goveruor 
General, and that I take this early opportunity of aclmowlcdgiug 
the receipt of yonr I ~ h u w e f i ~ ~ ,  in which you iutimate yoar~uccession 
to the lntc A~necr  Dosb Maliomed Khan, aud yomb desire, as Rnlef: 
of Afghanistan, to maintain tho samc friendly relations with the 
British Govertmcut as  havo lleretofore existed. Yon may rcst 
assured that thc British Governtneut pslrLicipate in this desire, and 
I sincerely trust that under your rule Afglianistm may possess a 
strong and ~mi ted  government, and that the good ~mderstaudiag 
a d  friendship that prevailed during the lifo time of the lato Amecr, 
your preclecessor, may coutinuo to  gniu strength and stability 
under your own administration. Moved by n sincere wisl~ ~ O T  tho 
pclwsnent welfare of your rule and of the poople of Afghanistau, I 
deem i t  advisable to cornmend to your carefill consideration and 
attention the words of the late Viceroy, whoa acknowledging, in 
his lettor of 3rd J d y  last, the anno~ulcement made bg the Iajo ' 
Ameer of the capture of Herat by storm under yony Highness's 
loading. I feel that 7 callnot too strongly press upon yoixr atten- 
tion the nccossity for your taking the utmost cam to  prevent any 
of yonr Highness's oficcrs on thc Persian fronkior from permitting 
tlmnselves to be  led into any measures or enterprises which coulcl 
justly give umbrage t o  Persia. I a& confident that your Highness, 
conscious how greatly the interests of youyself and tho Afghan 
people are at st& in this matter, will bo solicitons to maiutaiu 
penco and order on your own froaticrs, and will countena~lce no 
agpression on the part of any persons over whom your Highness's , 
off~ccrs have influence." 
Decr. 8th, 1863. (Signed) W. DEN IS ON."^- 
+ Dccernber l ' i tb, lSG9 ; Jnnhrg 1st aid dth, 1876 
+ Daily Arews, December 27ih, 18611. I 
. 
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This interesting clocunmit very reinarbably confirms 
the clmrge, and verifies the imputations, brought against 
the Iizclian Foreign Office in the previous pages. Sl'though 
its terms 'are pore cautious and coasicleratetlian I had 
expected, they amo1mt;as I anticipated, to an " evasive 
apology for the delay, a t t r ib~~t ing it, let us say, to  Lord 
Elgin's illness and death." " Mr. Wyllie himself admitted * 
that i t  wai, in fact, an evasive apology, for he " specifi- 
aiJly 'dissvo%ed " the " accidental " plea, and based the 
defencz of Lorcl Elgin's Government, for its " apparent 
dilntor&ss" bl recognizing the Ameer Sher Ali, " on 
policy  alone"^^ " Extenuation need not be pleaded", he 
had said in the article whicli led to our controversy, "when 
the means of jus-tification are ample".$ But until the 
appearance last year of a volume containing ektracts from 
. Lorcl Elgin's Letters and Journals, Cj we had no means of 
knowing,how very evasive, not to say unveiacious, that  
apology was. In the letter of recoo.iiition, the signature of 
which, in the words of M hlr. ~ ~ l l i e , ~ " ~ o r d  Elgin's advisers" 
"procurecl horn Sir William Denison",ll reference is made 
t o  the "severe and pj-otmcted illness" of the late Viceroy, 
" during which a !hnial reply to your amlouncement was 
necessady postponed".y[ The recently published letters, 
however, prove that  the illness of Lord Elgin could not 
with any propriety be called "protracted", while its brief 
and fatal severity can have hacl no influence whatever on 
. the delay i11 recognising the accession of Sher Ali. The 
death of Dost Mohammed on the 9th June,  1863, must 
have been known a t  Simla before &.end of the rnontli. 
, Lord Elgin having started for his tour through the Pm- jaub 011 the 26th September, up to the 22nd October 
" continued his &arc11 $11 horseba~lc". We aye told that in 
a long letter to Sir GE.la~lesmWood f the 18th October, ant1 
in " others of the same date, there.is no hint of sufTering 
or of ill-health."** On the 4th November, "having with 
* A?& p. la. + Dnil!j rVezus, DecemLcr 27tl1, 1861). 
1: f i ~ t t ~ i g h t l y  lieview, December 18'29, paS 
5 Lettew and Jozw~zals qj' Jmzes, 3ighth Eurl of ZZgir~, editch by 
1 Theodore Wnlroacl, C.E. (John Plillm-my), 1872. 
I( B a b y  flezos, Dccember 27141, 1869. l T  Aqzte, p. 14. 
*" Letters and Jozi~?zols, pp. 457, 459. 
i~~i.-Ii:~p. " 
- I thiri k ' I ,  he continues, "that the expedition" (against 
t l l c ~  Sit:ir):~ fhnaiics) '( will be a success ; and I labour in- 
c ~ + w n t l ~  t o  urge the necessity of confining itsIobjects t o  
tllih firs6 intentions. P1:tnsiLle reasons for enlarging thEi 
a t d , , ~ ~ l l  11f such urlvent1ures are never wunting, hut  I shall 
c . ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ; L v c ) u ~  t o  I;eup this within its limits."* 
'I'lii.; na.; ~vr i t , t en  on  the 4 t h  November. It is clear, 
rlicw.~t;,l.c~, t h t  the nohle s~zffe~er, intent on duty t o  the 
I:tst, 1.cb111aiued in the f~ull :wd active exercise of supreme 
ii~itlicwity 11)) t o  ti~;tt clnte, On the 6th the  attack was 
t11:chrc~l t o  be mortal. On the 20th he died. And this 
is \vliat is called in  the Calcutta Foreign CJffice a "pro- 
i r:ic,t rtl illness." 
Y Botll positive md negative evidence mag be drawn from , 
th! Letters awl Jouwznb t o  show that Lord Elgin was 
l d y  informed npclnbndly advised as to  the affaim of 
-2f$~mistttn, and that  the announcement by the Ameer 
Sher Mi  Kim of his accession was received with offensive 
? 
silence, fkonz no necessity, from nb inad;erteace,-as, in- 
deed, Mr. Wyllie avowed,-bnt from deliberate motives 
of what was cttllecl policy. NO extract is given in the re- 
cently pul>lislied voluine from any letter t o  Sir CCharles 
Wuod bet\\-een June lrth,  1s 6 3, when the news of Dost 
3Iuhmmnecl's dent11 c&ld hardly have arrived, and August 
30th, when the lhne for a gracious and cordial greeting 
I H : L ~  be said t o  have passed aw~qy. And in a lettw of the 
U e t t e m  a d  Jozn.nnls, p. 458. 
. I 
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. latter date, the TTiceroy illell tions that lie l~as  "nrrallged 
with the Coininal~der-in-Chief" to hold a " cams of eser- 
eise" a t  Lahore, as lie coiisidcrs that the "state o ] ~ ~ ~ f i ~ i , a  i , ~  
AJ:gImnistctn, gnd on ozu~j .o&w,  would rendor a demon- 
'stration, which would ;t?t once afford evidence of our mili- 
tary ~ttrength, and gratify the  pride and self-importance 
of the Sikh chiefs, a t  this moment especially opportune."* ' 
The distlnct mention here of "oz~~~f io~zt ier" , -mens~~res  
t y  b8  talce el^ against the Hiadostanee fanatics of Sitnnu 
being then imminent,-shows that '(the affairs in Afghan- 
istan": separately referred to, can only have been tile s 
internal affaii2s of tllat country. I t  is not apparent how 
that country's afEnirs car1 have rendered a c'dernonstration" 
opportune and advisable, unless the Aineer Sher Ali Khan 
was, indeed, supposed t o  be " hostile to the Eaglish d i -  
ance.".f. Whether such redly was the supposition at  
.political &ad Quarters in August 1863, or not, me cer- 
taiuly learn in a despatch clatecl the 9 th March 1 SG4, from 
the Government of India to the Secretary of State, report- 
ing on the Umbeyla calnpaign against the Sitana fmatics, 
that the secret enmity of Sher Ali Klxm was in fact 
assumed wl~ile that  expedition was plainled and in progress, 
though no grounds for such ail assumption are given, ant1 
its erroneous nature seeins to be admitted. For while it 
is said that " emissaries of the Arneer of Cabul mere nt 
one time suspected of encouraging the coalition and the 
hostility of the  tribes", we are told in the same sentelm 
that the Amees " has sent troops agzinst the Moinnnd 
Chief, and taken steps to cocrce hi6 qfractory fc~ther-in- 
law."$ 
In September 1863, when the orders for the Sitann ex- 
pedition had bee; given:Lord Elgin mote to the Secretary 
of State, " I wish by a sudden and vigoro~~s blow to check 
this trouble on our frontier while it is in a liascent condi- 
tion." 
" The Af&ans in their distracted state might fbrnish 
sympathisers ; we should bo i av i td  to interfere in their 
. * Lettws and Jozcrncds, p. 459. 1- h t e ,  p. S. 
. j: Papbrs, Late DisturOances en t l~e  North-Vest frontier (NO. 158 of 
1864), p. -124. 
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ilLtel'll:tl &irs, in arch 10 o p p e  those among t h c ~ n  nrllt, 
,vl.rc :tllcttillg our il10h:ir~netlan advemwies."" 
'Llkree lllollt~ls, tllol-&re, after receiving from Sher  Ali 
~ < l ~ : ~ ~ ~  tLl l lcss  of 11is pcncefi~l and uncl isp~tec~ accessiou, 
tllc: T'ireroy of Ixdia l i d  muclc: 110 r-esponse t o  t h e  Alneer's' 
f\-itql,llS' t , ~ e r t ~ l r ~ ~ ,  escept by :z meaach1g display o$ force 
llis' iYuliticrJ and nrns ex1)ressing some anxiety as to 
,i t+, ;;ylul~~tl~isers" " abetting our Moha~nfnedan ad- 
. 7 )  0 6 \'~l'>ktrlL!s. r 
2iTjcl it' n.c luulr back to  the previous year, when Dost 
~ I I ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ I I ~ I I c ' I I  \VitS enteriug 011 his final and v c tor iod  mill- a I ~ : ~ i : _ I . ~ ~ ,  :il (l tr1,hcrve tlie Viceloy giving " a good deal of 
I ~ a , l l ~ i , l ~ ~ r : t t i ~ ~ l ~ ' l ,  ;LS to  IIOTV lle can "with the  least risk of 
$,:.c.tti,lg t /)is (hvtwmlent illto tlmble, pu t  a spoke into the 
I 1 ) , ~ , t ' ~  wl I(.YI ill his progress towt~rds 1. eratJy,f it can hardly 
tl, itd,ttd t l ~ a t ,  like several other Viceroys in  their first 
yt.:ir, lie 11atl fillcn under the benlilclering spell 8£ str:mge0 
it.ri11s ; ~ u c f  details, and hnd allowed himself' t o  be fettered 
I K  tlw evil spirit of the  Calcuitta Foreign Otfice, embodied 
iLi i t h  l,~*st mcl highest for111 by Colonel Dnrand, who ac- 
t t i 1  1 v e r l e r e  'I'hat cvil spirit. of haughty 
:tvt>r&tn t o  :dl i~hlereut energy, t o  every natural effort, t o  
t ~ . ~ r y  social unrl spiritual force of purely Easbern origin 
:t11$1 gluv4h, pervadcs uud prompts more or less every de- 
~ ~ ; i ~ * t n ~ v f i t  01' ons Incliall adininist.rntion, is pre-emine~lt in 
virult..~lctb :it C1:~lcntttr, : L I ~  chuncterised in a very mni.lred 
, 
tltyxcbc t l ~ c  politicul career of the late Sir I-Ienry Dur&nd, 
'She long list of a.rrors con~initted by this respect&b 
c~f-liuCr cli~rhg t w e n t j  f ca~s '  elnploymellt in  civa and diplo- 
1l1i1 tic ~ l ~ ~ t i ~ ' ~ , - t d \ ~ i ~ p  arising froin the  same bald sectaria~l 
~ ~ s t ~ j ~ ~ t l i c c i s , - c ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ i i ~ ~ ~ t e c l  in the persistent imgortullity, 
wllicli l~arclp fhiled, with which h& sou&{ the  co&catiolz 
~f I J h r  : ~ d  the extinction opthe  dynasty alld State of 
;\.IS'S"'". 
W l r t h e r  the Ali~ew a]$ the B&i& Elnp& jvere in- 
r l e l ~ t d  for the restoration of friendly intercourse t o  tile 
" I;tit(-r.s ~ 7 1 t l  J c ~ w M ~ I s ,  1). 454. a c 
1. 'So Sir C'11:wlcs Wood, Aag~tst 9 1862, ~ ~ t t ~ ~ ~  nlzd J ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ .  
C 
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- sound j~~dgmen t  of Sir William Denisoa, or to the resump- 
tion of control by the Members of Council, from whom 
the Foreign Secretary, Colonel Duraad, had beell sepa- 
rated during &is tour with Lord Elgin, cannot be a t  
'present ascertainecl. It is abundantly clear, hovever, 
that $us deferred recognition of 8th December, 1863, did 
nut, and could not, really produce the effect in strengthen-a 
irrg the Arheer's power, that i t  was probably intended by 
% Sjr William Denison to  ~ ~ o d ~ ~ c e . "  The happy moment 
was past. The recognition that might have conveyed an 
expre8sion of respect for the last- wishes of Dost Mohmn- 
med, and a ~ % r d  of congratulation and good counsel for 
his sdcc~ssou, now carried with i t  an air of scoru for 
the father's memory, a persolla1 insult for the son, an 
effectual incentive for his rivals and enemies. 
Sher Ali Khan was ~ecognised by our Goverament, 
with a d$bbt implied,-if not expressed,-as to  the supe- 
riority of his claim, in December 18G3, six montlm after 
his installatioa. Early in 18 64 his elder half-brother, 
Molzammed Afzul Khan, who, as the Friend of India 
tells us, had remained "quiet " till then, displayed the 
first signs of disaffection, as if he now felt himself let 
loose;. 
I n  January 1864, one month after the recognition of 
Sher Ali Khan, and just about the time when Afzul Khan 
4 was beginning t o  show his teeth, Sir John Lawrence 
arrived a t  C a l c ~ t t a ~  nd assumed the office of Viceroy of 
* India. 
The first battle of the civil war,*destined to  last, with 
* but little intermission, for fonr yea% and a half, was 
fought between the Ameer Xher Ali Khan and his half- 
brother Afzul E%an in' J ~ l n e  18 6 4, when the latter was 
defeated. Immediately after this battle, Afzul Khan 
made a show of sub&ission to  his brother's legitimate 
supremacy, and a reconciliation between them took place. 
Witl~in a very short time, however, his son, Abd-oor- 
* "But now," said tfie*Priencl of India, '<that his opponents, Azim 
. Khan and Afzul Khan, arc quiet, however personally discoi7tentcc1, otw 
Governmnt has clone only wh& is just and politic, in strengthening his 
power. by formal recognition." Ante, p. 10. 
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Ralmnan, having snddedy fled t o  Bolrl~n~n, Afzul Xhall 
IVRS :~srcsted by the Arneer's orders, and kept for a short 
tinle in close confinement. It is some slig11C illdication of 
tile progress of Inore humme views, thnt, n ~ t w i t h s t a r ~ d i n ~  
aClvice wged on the Ameel-, and numerous pre-' 
cedents in the Afghan annals of thc last half-cepturp, 
- A h 1  K11:1,n was ueither put  to death nor deprived .of 
sight. Ris i~nprisonment was very soon mitigtted into> 
sort of hor~o~urable ~ e t i r e n ~ e n t  iu the  Anleer'& hoasel~old, 
wllere he was trented with respect and indulgence, and, " 
tl~ouqh constant$ attended and ~vatclied, allowed fo Lalie 
escrcise OIL 11orsebnck. n 
It desrirves, also, to  be ~*ecordccI to t h e  credit of Sher 
Ali I<11an, that he had previously treated his brother 
Azinl Khan, " our friend," and pc rhnp  the most formid- 
able of his rivals, with clemency and generous conficlence, 
although Azim Khan had fully betrayed his knlsitious, 
designs, and had fallen into t h e  Ameer's power. In  
August 1863, ns the 3cli92b111'gh Reviewer tells us, Sher 
illi by a r:@d n~arch, 
('Compelled Azim Khan, who was hardly p i ~ p r e c l  for sucl~ 
j~ornpt  action, to tender a formal snbinissioa. The t w o  L K I ~ I ~ P ~ ~ s  
thrn embraced : Azim I<ha11 swore fealty t o  the Ameer, ard  in 
~.o tn tm obti~iilcd n coufirmation of all tho dignities and emoluments 
I I U  11:lil enjoyed during the late reign." * 
111 April 1 864, Azim Khan again brake out in I-ebellion, 
and was artin overpowered by t h e  Ameer. I11 the words ' 
of the f i d z ~ ~ b z ~ ~ g l ~  Jieviemer, , 
"Azim Rhnn's vcnt~we ntterly collapsed. Abandoued by his 1 
troops, Azitn Khan %TI May lGth, 3 86b, fled for refuge illto 
British terrritoiy, and became a pensioner of Sir John Lawrence ' 
at Rtiwul Pindee."t P f- 
The P~mjcm1) A d m h i s t ~ a t i ~ ~  Repoq~t for 1863-4 says 
that Aeiin Khan was "forced t o  take refuge in British 
territory, where he met with a private but  honourable I 
reception, due to one who, during the worst times of the 
mutiny, 11ad discouraged, any violation of i t  by the f 
A fgllans. "$ 
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Afzul Khan's arrest, amply justified by hi's previous 
conduct and by s~~bsequent events, was, of cou;se, de- 
nouncecl-by his adherents as an act of treachery on the 
.part of tlie Aqi-teer Sher Ali. All the hostile elements ex- 
ploded in rapid success'im. I11 a battle before Cand;~ha~, 
fougld in June 18 65, the ~rneer's eldest son, Mohammed 
Ali, a young man of great promise, was killed. This was' 
iterlible 6low to Sher Ali Khan. For many months he 
p, rernarnecl a€ Candahar in a state of despondent aplztliy, 
nlcnosj amounting to melancholy madness, while his 
encmies were gathering strength from all quarters. His 
brother Azih Khan, " our friend,"" returned from his 
pensioned refuge 011 British territory,-only seventy miles 
from the Afghan frontier,--and joined his nephew, Abd- 
oor-Rahman, son of the imprisoned Afzul Khan, with all 
the troop he could muster. The united forces of uncle 
. and nephew marched upon Cnlsul, and occupied the place 
without much difficulty in February 1366. The loss of 
his capital roused Slier Ali from his gloomy lethargy. 
He took the field once more,-his brother Afzd  Khan 
accompanying the camp ~ m d e r  the usual restraix~t,--but 
was completely defeated by his brother, Azim Khan, on 
the 10th of May, 1866, and compelled to  retreat upon 
Candal~ar. The Chiefs in whose charge Afzul Khan had 
been placed by tlie Ameel-, went over with their troops to ' 
the enemy. The victors re-entered Cabul in triumph, 
and proclaimed the released Afzul Khan Ameer of Af- 
glianistaii. @ 
Heaceforth, up to October 1868: when Sir John Law- 
* rence sent a congrttt~11a;toi-y answer to the letter from Shcr 
Ali Khctn aancpcing his decisive victory near Ghuznee 
and re-occupation of &~bul, our Government seems to 
have been betrayed into"a series of errors, partly from 
trusting to false information, partly from imperfect appre- 
ciation of the undisputed facts before it, but chiefly from 
the defective moral basis on which its policy was founded. 
Let i t  be granted for the pi%sellt, that a t  the period a€ 
Dost Mohammed's death, it was neither just nor expedient 
8 
'I 
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for uu to ~ t t e i n p t  any active interfe~cuce in the a&irS of . 
Afghnnjstan. What ought t o  have bee11 our policy ? 
We were still bouncl to the Afglm~ State by t1:e o b l i p  
tions of the Treaty of 1555, under which, ~s alE.eacly ex-. 
pla.ined,# the British Goyernnleut Bad explicitly &now- 
leclgecl the right of the reigning Ameer to nomin;ke Ilis 
'own successor. This prerogative, Gmiliar and racceptnWle 
t o  Mussulman nations, was obviously the mpst e&qti& 
process for sec~uring a peaceful transfer of po&er, and fcr 
preventiiig the disi~ltegration of the united A f g h a ~  Pro- 
vinces. The non1il1ation of Sher Ali Khan was folmally 
conmuuicnted to our Government. Yet when the time 
came for giving effect to this nomination, instend of mising 
our voice proniptly and emphatically in its fhvour, our voice 
I was so late m d  our langua.ge so ~~ncertain, as t o  excite 
, 
strange rumours of' our red wlshes and inteatioils, Instead 
of' upholcliag the wl~olesome prerogative whicll we*Imd lxe- - 
viously helped to establish, and which offered the only 
security fbr peace and good order, we contrived to unsettle 
everything, and to give the sigunl for war. 
For when it vas  seen that the great British Government, 
which had ~nacle treaties with the A~neer Dost Mohammed 
and " his heirs", refused its mo1.al s u p ~ o r t  o the Anjeer 
Sher Ali Khan, and refrained from friencUy intercourse 
wit11 him, the natural assumption was that we would have 
preferred, t t i d  shonlcl still prefer, another member of the - 
f'amily. This 1nay or may not have been,-I am inclizecl 
. 
to think it was,-$ trne assulnption, but a t  any rate it ~mc 
irresistible, not onlg iii the bszars of Afghanistan, but in 
the streets of Calcutta. It mas proclaimed by the press * 
of India. Azim Khan was not called " ourfriend" by mere 
guess, w i t h o ~ ~ t  some leakage of sa$ugs and doings in the 
Couix5l Chamber and the Foreign OfEce. 
Let us, however, take a fresh depar.ture,-set down our 
dilatory recognition as an unfortunate :~ccident,-and ob- 
serve what was the course of our Government after the 
arrival of Sir John Lav?renGe a t  Calcutta, w11en Sher Ali's 
t ro~~bles had commenced, 
Slier Ali Khan, pi1 blicly chosera by the Ameer Dmt Mo- 
Ante, p, 6. I 
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, hammed, and formally announced to our  Government as 
heir and successor t o  the State,  had t o  wait, as we have 
seen,  six,montl~s before his position was recopised.  His 
&, brother ,  Afial, Kban, raised from captivity t o  t h e  throne, had only t o  wait six *eks t o  be recognisecl as "Walee of 
CabuL" 
'On May 21 st, 1866, Afzd Khan was illstalled a t  Cabul,* 
n R e r  the dvents already described. On July 1 lth, d e n  
t h e  ?Lneer %her Ali Khan had reigned for three years, 
and y bile he still, in Sir J o h n  Lawrence's own words, 
"retamed his author i ty  a n d  power over a large portion of 
Afghanistan," still "ruled in Candahar and in IIerat," the  
British Viceroy addressed his rival as " W d e e  of Cabul", 
i n  a letter which breathes in every line w h a t  may be 
t e r m e d  t h e  spirit of partition. 
The entire let ter ,  which 1 extract from t h e  demi-official 
Ir axtide ia? the Edinbwgh Rcviszu for January 1867, runs 
a s  follows :- 
"I have received your Higbiless's fricudly letter, giving an nc- 
couut of lato events in Afghauistan. I t  ~ L B S  been to me a source 
of  sincere sorrow that misfortunes such as yous Highness describes 
Lave bef'dlen the great house of the Barukeycs, and that calamities 
s o  heavy and protracted have been experieuced by the people. I t  
was, and still continues to be, the hcarty desire of the British 
Government that the hfghnn nation sho~lld remain under the 
s t r o n g  nucl nnited rule of the Bardmye family, and that this family, 
endowed by the Creator of the wodd ~ 4 t h  wisdom to be at pence 
a m o n g  themselves, shotild be respectecl both in their owu country 
a n d  by snrrouucling nations. Wherefore i t  has been a souroo of 
distress and anxi~ty  of 1@1cl to me that strife and division h a v ~  
arisen among the members $ your Highness's family. 
'( My friend ! your Highness alludes to the fi*iendship which 
cxistccl betwccn your Highness's renownod father and the British 
Government, aild yonr EIigliness says that f ~ o m  this Gove~vmnent 
y o u r  Highness expects similar treatment. I t  is the earnest wish of 
t h e  B~~it ish Govenlmmt that that fgieuGhip sho~~ld  be perpetuated. 
3 3 n t  while I am desiro~q that the alliance between the two Govern- 
m e n t s  should be firm and lasting, it is incumbent an me to tell 
y o n r  Eigl~ness tlmt it woilld be inconsistent with the fame and 
hl.epntation of tho British Government to broak off its alliance with 
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up the  semhimce of central and supwrne authority. This 
may have imposed on the vulgar, and probably brought 
recruits aad resources to the  insurgent cause. But it 
p g h t  not Yo hnve imposed on the Imperial Governmeat of 
India. With whatcverFesei-va.tions our Government may 
have cloaked their recognition, Afzul Khan was hailed by 
tlieh as " Walee of Cabul," within six weeks of his reappew " 
anEe 91 the'sceue in that  newly assomed character. They 
cued  not foF his qualifications or claims for the part ; it 
was en~~1g11 for thein that  he had possession of the stage. 
Andl after all, what did the  reservations of this letter 
amoimt to ? S2mply to a refusal "to break off the alliance 
wit11 the Ameer Sher Ali Khan," " so long as he retains 
llis authority and power over a large portion of Afghani- 
stail.)' " My friend," says the British Viceroy, " the rela- 
tions of this Government are with the actual rulers of 
~ f ~ l ~ a n j s t h .  yozw E i i g h m s s  is c ~ b k  to consolic~ctte your 
po~im* i n  Cc~bzd, cmd i s  s i n c e w l y  d e s i ~ o u s  of being a f ~ + ~ z d  
urzd c ~ l l y  of the B r i t i s h  Govemme7ztJ I shal l  be ~vmdy to  
cccceyt YOUY H i g l m e s s  CLS such." 
I11 plain terms :--Go in and win ! If Afml Khan and 
his followera tools: this letter as a broad hint that  they must 
follow up their first success, and finish their adversary, SO 
as  to furnish the British Government with a decent excuse 
"to b7~mlc of its u l l i c ~ ~ z c e  with the A m e e ~ *  Xher AZi I~~KLIL,'~ 
it was the only~natural conclusion for them to draw. What 
a tone,  hat an attitude for a great Government like ours 
t o  assume ! Called by its vast respoasildities m d  in- 
terests as the Imperial Power of India: t g  arbitrate between 
contending parties, and appealed to  from Lotl; sides, it 
bids them fight $ out'. 
Meanwhile, untmil AfzGl Khan could get the better of 
his brother, and " consolidate his power in Cabul", the  
British Viceroy recognised him as " Walee" or Ruler "of 
CabulYn--the very title that his father, Dost Mohammed, 
had assumed in his treaties with the British Govern- 
ment. # 
The Viceroy says i i ~  his letter :-" I cannot break the  
existing engagmeats wit11 Ameer Sher Ali Klzan, and I 
must continue to treat him as the ruler of that portion of 
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Afghanis;~an over which he retains control." I am no t .  
aware tha t  there were then :LIIY other " existing e n g a p  
ments" with Anleer Sher Ali Khan escept, thc.Tre:tty of 
1855, concluded for " his I-Iigl~ness Ameg DoBt Mohn~l~,- 
med Khan, Witlee of Cabul and of' those co~untries of 
Afghanistan nov  in his possessionJJ, by Gholam $Cycler, 
" "in person on his own nccourlt as heir apl~arent."* Slier 
Ali l i d ,  f i~s t ,  succeeclecl t o  the position of "he;. apparelit", 
with the  knowledge and assent of our ~ovZrn~.nmeot nud, 
seconclly, to the position of " Walee of Cabul anci ~f those 
countries of Afghmistnu now in his possession." How 
then could w e  profess a desire not t o  " bred< existing en- 
gagements", when on the first revcrse of our ally, in t h e  
crisis of :i civil war, we ~~ecogniseil his rival as Walee of 
a \ b ~ l ,  a i d  treated the  Alueer llimself only as Lord of wlnt 
lie stood on-"as the  ruler of that portion of Afglm~istnu 
nvcr ~yll$l he  retains control" 2 ,l n 
M%en the  Viceroy's I c t t c ~  was written, the Anleer Sller 
Ali I<han retained control not merely over " :z 1:~rg.e por- 
tion", but over by fix the larger po~tion of Afghanistan. 
According t o  the E(li?&uyI~ Itsviewer, the Ameer was t1ic.n 
in possessloll of "the distrilts of IChelat-i-Ghilzge, Canda- 
bar, Glliris111c, Furrc~11, and Her:~t", while "Fyz Riohmnmecl 
mas in open insuwcction" in  his ~ :LVOLZ~,  "at Tukhtnpool" i11 
Bnllrh, and his I - i d ,  Ali111 I(l~itll, held "notliing but Cabul 
t~lid Gl~uznee",t xncl hnci. only held t h e  for six weeks. Yet  , 
this was tlie time chosen, with strange nlncrity, by the 
J3~itis11 Viceroy, E3r ariclressillg Afzul Khan in the ter~ns 
prescribed by the J'rEaty of 185 5 ,  as " Walee of Cal~ul". 
Nor was the more high-sounding tikle witliheld very r 
long. Tile Pzcnjnzcb i ldnzinistmt i t  12tpo~t for 1866-7, 
infonl~s us that  when Afznl IChafi annotmced t h e  defeat 
of the Anleer Sher Ali on tllg 17 th  January, 186 7, near 
Khelat-i-Ghilzye, a, second letter was addressed to him by 
Sir John Lawrence, in mhicll the Viceroy congratulczteci 
" His Hiyl~ness  the A m w  ~ I ~ o I ~ c m z ~ i z e c Z  A fzz/ l i lTI~aa, 
FlhZee of CCL~ILZ cmd CCCC?tidul~~~~,'' up011 " an event which 
" 
m 
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.f. EtEi~dwyh Eeuieza, J n n u a ~ y  1867, pp. 30, 31, 33. 
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'seemed likely to bring a b o ~ ~ t  peace, and t'he e~taFlisl~inent 
of a strong government."" 
This smond letter was dated February 25th; 1861. 
Mr. Wylli6, refwring t o  this document in his I-io~.tm@tZy 
Revz'ezv article, did not give the exact t e n o ~ ~ r  of these con- 
g-rat~~lations, but said that they "were tempered wikh a 
reiret, and $veil a p~efereuce for his rival, so nakedly de- * 
clare4that t)e records of diplomacy might be searched 
in vain for a pa;l.allel." He  then quotes what he calls "the 
most important clauses " of the letter, in which-strange 
t o  say !-we may " search in vain " for any expression of 
" regret" or of "'preference." On the contrary, the Viceroy 
thus emphatically and apologetically repudiates any lean- 
ing towards Slier Ali Khan :- 
"My fi~ieiicl ! The British Government has hitherto maintained 
a strict ueutrality between the coiltending parties in  Afghanistan. 
&hnours, I am told, have reached the Cabul D ~ l r b a r  of assistance 
having been granted by me to Ameer Sller Ali Kllan. I tnlro 
this opportunity to request your I-Iighess uot to believe such idle 
tales. Neither men, nor  arms, nor  money, nor assistance of any 
kind, have ever been supplied by my  Goverilmant t o  Ameer Sher 
Ali Khan. Tour  I-Iigh~iess and  I*, bo t l~  eqnnlly xumided by me, 
have fought out the battle, each upon j70ur own resources. I pnr-  
pose to continue the samc policy for the f~ltnre." t 
In plain terms once Inore :-Go in and win ! 
A belief has been already expressed in these pages that 
* 
our Government really supposed, when the former lettel. 
oS 1 l t h  July 1866, was writken, that i$ was holding the 
balance evenly between the contending parties. Credit 
may, perhrtps, be claimed on its behalf,"-liotwithstal~di~lff 
the natural purport of the words wl~ich I have pointed 
out,-for not haqing inknded t o  stir up more sti.if'u, or to 
encourage Afiul Khan to gursue the advantage he had 
gained, iu order to supply us with a pretext for " bre&ing 
off the alliance " with Sher Ali Kh~xn. Xo much cmdit may 
be given, but only on the ground originally t&ea 1111 by 
me, that both letters breathe tke spirit of partition. Sir 
John Lawrence's only, iden of acting as peacemaker was 
,- 
28 THE OXUS AND TZLE ISDUS. 
* r, 
.that of stggestiug an  amicable division of territory anlollg. 
the  rival brothers. The po1ic.y of his itdmiuistn~tion rrras 
that  of looking on, and gently aiding, mheoevw a ch:mcc 
offered itself, in some such arrrtngelnent w tthnZ prol~ose~l 
in  the following passage from 19% Cr~lcuttn delni-o%ciul 
pampldet :- m 
"For ourselves i t  has been our opinion that the pzogress oftllc 
war u ~ i g h t  have been more than ouce averted Ly the partitiolf of 
Afghnuistan b e t ~ ~ e e n  two or mow of tho rival Ch'icfs, whfist Jllo 
British Governu~ent assumed the. position of tllc Pnramoont, 
130~vw.''* h 
This was a policy, in my 11uld.de opinion, neither upright, 
nor dignified, nor prudent. T ' V h t ~ t  our  policy ought t o  
have been, wit11 due r c g n ~ d  both for our own interests and 
for our treaty engiigements with the  Afghan State, s eem 
plain enough. 
We had formdly recogi~ised t h e  Ameer as s€~cessor t~ 
llis fixtlux, and therefore,--under the  Treaty of 18 65, mncle 
with Dost Moh:lmlned and "his heirs"--as "Waleen (Rnlcr) 
" of Cabool and of tllose countries of Afghanistan n o v  ill his 
possession;" smcl we llnd bound ourselvcs "never to  interfere 
in those territories." Jy S ong, tlierefore, as my of those 
countries were in his possession, *he British Govemi~~ent  
ought not to  have recognisecl any other Ruler. That clues- 
t ion ought never to  have been raised by anything sllort of 
his death or utter dispo.;session. It was no t  consiste~lt 
wit11 good fhith towaucls the acknowledged head of a 
. friendly State to  a g g r ~ v a t ~  i i ;~  di~trnctiolls or  t o  aid in i t s  
clisnl embelment. Slfzli a course was equally inconsistent 
with an enligliter&d r e g a d  for om- I~nperiaI interests. 
Such a course was, however, adopted by the British a~~ t l l o -  
rities in India. b 
Afiul Khan died in October 1867, and his brother, 
Azim Klmn, "our friend", was recognised by our Govern- 
a lon lnent as Ameer, not oiily withont a moment's hesit t' 
or delay, but with a remarkable denlonstration of renewed 
confidence. The P Z L ~ ~ C L Z L ~  Rcpoyt for I S 6  7-8 states that 
" his succession was recognised by the British Government, 
* Polieign Policg of Sir Joht  Lnzu~mtce, Calcutta, 1569, f 11. 
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. und bin ~ec;n$eY tho Agent of Be B~itislz Gownmlent, 
who lzud been hitheyto detained at Pes7zawur pending the 
civil wu~~s,,fbZlowi~zg on the death of Dost Molzammed, again 
- took up I& resgence at Cabul."" The Punjaub Repovt 
does not, however, tell as  t l q t  the Vicesoy's letter, dated 
Nover~ber 13th, 186 7, recogiiising Azim Khan as Ameer 
of Cabul, was despatchid without that Prince having even 
announced the fact of his brother's death or of his own ac- 
ceesioil, tlmt !he never made any reply t o  these voluiiteered 
congrat~lations, and that he treated the British Agent 
with marked incivility. Mr. Wyllie, however, in the 
Foorttnightly Rcviezo article of December 1869, says that 
before the death of Afiul Khan, Aziin Khan, the  real 
rules, "had made a habit in the Cabul Durbar of railing 
?pilist the British Government iu a strain of unbridled 
n~solence", indulging on one occasion in " a fi~rious tirade 
ggainst l$hglisli ingratitude and selfishness", and even 
" doing his best by actual deeds t o  stir up against us, in 
an orginised league of holy war, the numerous predatory 
and fanatical tribes whose mountain fastnesses overl~anp: 
our North West frontier."T On his brotlm!s death, how"- 
ever, " he felt", Mr. Wyllie says, that he " ought t o  be re- 
cognised by the British Government, and the sooner the 
better. Accordingly", conti-ilues the demi-official apologist, 
" he took early occasion to hint in rouizdabout fashion to 
_ 
our Moonshee that he expected from the Governor-Cleneral 
some expression of condolence for the death of his brother, 
Blneer Afzul."$ He got even more tk+n  hc expected,- , 
not merely condolences and compliimnts, but the immedi- 
, ate recognition of his title, and tlie restbation of a British - 
Agent at  1zis~Court. The Calcutta delusion as t o  Aziin 
Khan bcing " oh-  friend " a t  bottom, was evidcntly not 
yet extinct. Mr. TVyllie admits that '( etiquette undoubt- 
edly required Azim Khan hiinself to have made the first 
move ; lze ought to have claimed British recognition Ly a 
special letter to the Viceroy, formally announcing his 
iiistallation." But he pleads, '%3irm John Lawrence lrnew 
" Pz~y'aub .Repor!, 1867-8, pas. 45, p. 14. 
*i. .Fortnigl~tly Review, December 1869, pp. 592, 593. 
$ IM., p. 611. 
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for a fac t~ t l~a t  the submissioil to Azirn Kh&l liad bcen uni- . 
versal."* MY. Wyllie, nevertheless, in another part of the 
same scrticle, explains that whatever " submissipn " there 
was in Cabul to Azim Khan's usurpxtion was only enforced 
by " EL reign of terror", by "$he penalty of dent11 adminis'- 
tered to batches", ancl by filling the prisons with the ad- 
herents of tlie A~neer Shcr A1i.T' In  a subsequel& essay 
he acknowledges that the return of Sher Ali in Cabul mas 
"a  god-send" to  its inhabitants, as a relief fro& '"the 
frightful tyranny of Azim Khan. t Nu testimony could 
more effectually prove the blindness and incapacity of the 
Calcutta Foreign Office. At  the time of. Afzul I-Chan's 
death tlie cause of Slier Ali was evidently considered hope- 
less by the Government of India: In the Bombay Ad- r 
ministration Report for 18 6 7-8 -every word in which re- 
garding a political subject of such importance mnst*bave 
merely echoed the instructions of Ca.lcutta,+after thg 
statement that " by the death of Afzd Khan, Azim Khan 
has become Walee or Ruler of Cabul", Sher Ali Khaa is 
termed " the Ex-Ameer."§ 
During the long struggle of four years awl a half, XBer 
Ali Khan sued frequently, but in vain, for assistance or 
support, in any shape, from the British Government. 
Setting aside for the moment all consideration of his rights 
and of our treaty obligations, it ought t o  have been as 
clear as day, a t  a very early period in the contest, that the 
Ameer was fighting our battle, that his cause was more 
popular than th%t of his rivals in all the provinces ,of 
Afghanistan, and that he alone could hold the country as 
-- s compact State. ' ,- 
At almost every important crisis in tlle&vil war, even 
after their most signal successe%, Sherr Ali Kl~au's op- 
ponents made overtures to him for peace,-i. e. for a par- 
tition of territoTy,-but the b e e r  firmly refused all terms 
except those of entire submission to his autthority as Sove- 
reign of all his father's dominions. 11 Even thls significant 
(r *I 
* J'o~tniy?ttly Review, December 1869, p. 612. 
j- ILid.? 1y .  593, 594. $ &id., March 1870, p. 282. . 
$ Aclr/~z?~~.zstrcttion R e p o ~ t  of the Bombgy GYovernncelzt, 1867-8,cp. 108. 
11 See Allen's Indian Jdnil, November 2211d, 186G ; and Pu~tjazcb 
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-fact C O L I ~ ~  noZ dpen tlie eyes of o u  representatives at C ~ I -  
cutta. 
The cnr;eut newspaper reports ~manim ously testify to 
the prevailing* unpopularity of Xher Ali IClzan's opponents, 
a&d prove that h e i r  temporary and nnstable ascendsncy 
was solely due to the superior geaeralship in the field of 
Aziin Rhan and his nephew, Abd-om-Ral~man, and t o  the 
help which *he latter received from his father-in-law, the 
A ~ e e P o f  B~khara." 81 this is pretty well epitomisecl 
in the $lc~~t ta  pmnphlet, eulogising Sir John Lawrence's 
administrati on, evidently coinpilecl from a~~tlientic sources, 
which we ha.ve.nlreztdy quoted. The writer tllus desc~ibes 
the state of affairs while Afznl Khan was in power a t  
Cnbul, between June 1 8 % ~  and October l S 6 7  :- 
" Mtantime the grossest oppression chari~cterised the new acl- 
ministratioq, Money mas required, and little scruple was dis- 
-played iu  wringing i t  out of the peoplo of C ~ ~ b u l .  Ca~avans were 
stopped and plundered until trade was at; an end ; a i d  
loans and contrilsutioas were exacted. At  the same time, clisnf- 
fection at  Cabul was put  d o ~ n  with a high hand by Mahol~ed 
Azim Khau." 
"The oppressed people of Cabul now began to yearn for tho 
return of Shere Ali Khan f ~ o m  Candalmr, in the  hope that ho  
would redress their tvrongs." t 
The Edinbzwyh Reviewer, speaking of the same period, 
says ;-" All power centred i11 the hands of Azjln Khan, 
* 
who ruled with a tight hand, feared by many and loved 
- 
lq none." $ 
And referring to the period between October 1s 6 7 aid 
August 1868, when Azim Khan, recog%ised as Alneer by - - 
* 
our Goverlzinept on the death of his brother Afzal Khan, 
held possession of CabuS the Calcutta writer mys :- 
0 
Adn~inistmtion. Repor~t, for 1866-7, par. 297, p. 95. Mr. Wyllie, also, 
says thnt in November 1866, " messengers were sent" from Afzul ICIr~hail 
and Azim Khan to Sher Ali, proposi~lg peaae 011 t e r m  of a partition 
of the country,~Sher Ali to retain Cnndahar nlld Herat, and the con- 
federates to keep C n h l  with Bdlch addPil."~07.t?zigI1tly Beview, Decern- 
ber 1869, p. 594. 
Zdinbwy?~ Review, ~ a u ? ~ a r ~  186 7, pp. 21, 22. 
$'OW&Z Policy of Sir John Jawrence, cnlonttn, 1869, 13. 8. 
Edinbwyl~ IZeviezu, Jnuilctry 186 7, g, 31. 

L i  i 
i 
3 .I 
* 
'PHE OXUS AX11 THE TSDUS. 3 3 
0 
- ing effectual measnrw of clircct resistance or co&oion. If 
Herat were once fairly incorporated witli tlie .Pcrl;;i:~u 
manai-chy, and a Russian Consulate estnblished there, i t  
would no€ be so easy t o  detach i t  again as i t  might have 
been t o  defend it. 
Thetomn of Balkh, now called Tulclitapool, is not twenty-, 
fi& miles from the  river Oxfts, and hardly two hundrerl 
rnhs.from '~$nt is now the Rirssian city of Samnrcnnd. 
The Province, from the year 1520 until i t  was reconquerecl 
by Do& Molxmmed in 1850, formed part of the Kingdom 
of Bokhara. The Ameer of Bokharn, is nov a vassal of 
Russia. I f  BAllrh were a petty Principality, independent 
pf Cabul, or if it form@ part of a distracted and divided 
Afghanistan, tlie petelisions of Bolcl~artt. u  its forlvier de- 
pendency would veqT soon be revived. 
It is oldy as constituent Provinces of a strong Afghan 
State .  witli its chief resources a t  C d ~ u l  and Canclahar, 
that ~allc11 and Herat, Koondooz and Badakllslinn, can be 
preserved intact from the  ,encroacl~ments and a~gressions 
of their neiglibours. It is only while their polltical con- 
nection with Cabul and Candallar continues, that Great 
Britain cull exert i ts  influence, for protection or tutelage, 
over those outworks of its Tnditln Empire. It is only by 
virtue of t he  Treaty of 1855 wit11 the Aineer Dost Mo- 
hammed Khan and his "heirs", that Great Britain has any 
3 diplomatic intercourse or reciprocal engagements with the 4 
Walee or Ruler of Cabul. Under this Treaty there n7as 
t o  be " perpetual peace and friendship '$between the Bri- 
tish Government and the Wdee  of (31ahul; and the latter - 
undertook " to  be the fiiend of the friends sad the enemy 
of the enemies of the fop~er ."  
Though so many imporlmt steps had been t&en be- 
tween 1855 and 1863 tow&& fully realising our main ob- 
ject of a strong and united Afghanistan, amenable to  
British infl~;ei~ce,-Dost Mohammed having reduced the 
more distant provinces of Ball&, Koondooz, and Herat t o  
obedience ; Lords Dalhousie a d  amning having estab- 
lished relations of deTeasive and oFensi~e alliance with 
the Wadee of Cnbul,--the, Govel.nrnel~t of Sir John Law- 
" I 
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.rence, between 1864 and ISG9, woulrl have t l i r o ~ n ~  tlirsra 
great a,dvnntagcs to the  winds. At tllc snpreiiw crisis c,f  
the civil war, d i e n  hoth payties l d  :rppcdcd f i~r  nllr 
1-ecognitim, the Cro.i.crrimcnt of' 1ndi:i I,c,siti\-c~ly"sngFt~st~tI 
;ind encourngccl u re-partition of' tlic State, that .~ \ . r>~~l t{  
have destroyed British irifluencc, that ?~-oultl liave I;rol:cll 
' up Afgllniiist:~11 into se~-er&liet y Pri~~cip:~liCi;s, c.nc11 imc 
1mwerlcss by itself, a t  ennlit,y ~vi th  the otlwss, :ind $oai;cs 
or later clcpencleut for mere esistciice on the lxii,ron:~g~~l' 
o w  busy ccst-i~petitors. c 
S h c ~  Rli 1T;h:tn himself has s:~~-ecl u s  for the tirne ~ I . O I N  
11ttcr discomfiture, frcm a miuev:~blc rct,roqh*ssion, AIo~rrl 
lie did it. If tlie Afgllnn P r o v i ~  me stdl ~ulitctl, ns I),! 
receivecl t l ~ l n  fiwn the wise vigol-ous 1 ~ 1 e  of his 
father ; if British influcncc in Central Asia still sri1)si:. 1s at  
all ; if' tlic c l ~ w  of o w  I~nperinl polic~, i l i i ) \~$~  clrppped, calk 
still be recoverecl. ; a a  servant of Grmt Briti:u~, :I+ limnc ow 
:tbroacl, a p p a r ~  to deserve any credit whntcver firr tliis 
I~ecious  m d  fortunate reprieve. W e  owe i t  t o  S l i c ~  Mi 
Rlinn. 
13efore his second instd1:~tion at CaLul in Septcn11rt.r 
ISGS, ant1 the decisive victory near Gliuznee over t l ~ c  
fiwces of his brother, Azim Khan, in L)ecembcr of tllst 
ymr, t h e  A~llcer Shes Ali owed us nothing. Tlml 0111. 
Govcmlnent, roused a t  last  to somc sense of its lost c y  
portunities, oiYe'el.ecl him some little assistance in money and 
warlike stores. He o'ivecl us  nothing up t o  the date of'tliat 
oKer. On the col~t~a;;)., bnt for our ambiguous bella.sio~rr, 
-. 
the intrignes and, insnssections of his brothers-if t h y  
had ever been set on foot-~ould have been much lcss , 
formidable. o 
The dehy in recognisirlg Shes Ali Khan's accession ni:ly 
be chiuitably imputed by sonGpeople, though not by me, 
to an oversigl~t or misliap. Short as .nTas the clclay in re- 
copising Afiul Khan, it was yet ,z cleliberate act 011 tlir 
part of our Governnlent. VTe illcited the Ameer's r i d s  
by delaying to rccopfse f;is title, and we recognisecl his 
rivals ~ i t ~ l i o u t  any title a t  all. 
Those who were allowed to  .guide 1n1peri:il affairs at 
Calcutta, and ~vliose advice w : ~  trust  ccl in Lnnclnn, be- 
r r  
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a tween 1864 nhd 1869, failed ntterly to master-the situa- 
tion. To ts~11.e thc best view of their policy, it mas no 
policy at. all, but mere be~vilclerinent,-as if they *had de- 
.tided to look on, and see who would win. To take the 
worst view of it,-an& one, I believe, nearer the truth- 
i t  wag a policy hostile to Sher Ali, but covertly hostile,- 
a t  first inclined towards Azim 1<11:~11, "our friend," as a* 
c%ndidate for power ; more decidedly aftermwds, in favour 
of p&i-tition.'- 
A gpmpse at the foregone conclusions on this point may 
be obtaiaecl from vol. ii of the Collection oJ Treccties, com- 
piIec1 by Mr. C. U. Aitchison, then Under Secretary (now 
S e c r e t a ~ ~ )  of the Foreign Department, and published at 
Calcutta by authority Ifi Jnpuary, 1863, six n~ont l~s  before 
Dost Mohammed's death, while Colonel (afterwards Sir 
Henry) Durand was Secretary to Government. W e  read 
as folIo~$ in the pl:climinary rema& to the Treaties with 
Af@$anista,n : -- 
" The recent invasion of t h o  Cabnl dominions from I-Ierat, ra- 
sulting in the siege of that town by the Ameor, has excited much 
speculation as t o  t h o  future of Catsul. Them s e e m  Zitfla doubt 
t l ~ a t  7~c IGi~zyclonr is o d y  keptfi-om t i i s m r n , b e ~ m c ~ t  by tho personal 
injZzmzce of the A~nce.1; who is now of great age."* 
"Thy wish mas f ~ ~ t h e r ,  I la~ry,  to that thought.'" 
There wonld have been no danger of " dismembennent", 
if the British Government had known how to do its duty 
to itself and to its neighbour, and had determined to do 
it,-if it had encoun~ged the reign of ,,Law, instead of re- 
lying upon "personal influence." & ~ t  petty counsels pre- 
, vailed a t  the most critical tlmoment, 'Imperial traditions 
were forgotten ; the professional policy of Calcutta came 
into play uncllkcked.  good faith and good will towards 
the slowly forming State of Afghanistan were wanting, 
because the lawf~d Ruler was understood to 11nve a will of 
his own. Without avowing our preference, a negative 
support might be given t o  the pretender, whose personal 
influence was imagined to be favowable to us, by simply 
tvitl~l~olding for a time our yecognition of the regular succes- 
sion. ,Sir John Lawrence, though not responsible f o ~  this 
a .  
* CoEIection of [I'vercties, vol. ii, p. 437. 
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first error,*did nothing to rectify it. On t11; c6ntraV, lie 
recoguised the first pretender who contrived t o  seizc on 
the capital, and thus converted the negative support of 
disorder and confusion into positive support. - 
The o6cial apology in the Edi~~lmyh Review, was *' 
written about the end of 1866, when symptoms of the 
Calcutta policy having broken down were beginning to 
raise ~mpleasant remarks. The False informatioir and f,t;lsa 
inferences on which it was founded were explbding iii au 
directions. The Ameer Sher Ali was proving hirmelf to 
be neitl~er so weak nor so unpopular as he had been repre- 
sented. Afzul Khan, recognised in July as  Walce of 
Cah l ,  was not getting on at  all. Iu six montlls he had 
made no progress, notwithstanding 'the Viceroy's exl~ol-ta- 
tions, in " ~ o ~ z ~ o l i d c ~ t i ~ ~ y  his 2Jozuer in Cu bu  2," OT in driving 
Sher Ali Khan from " a  large p o d o n  qf Afiylzanistc~~t." The 
British Government were still u ~ ~ a b l e  t o  " b w a k  ogC i t s  alli- 
ance with Ameer Sher AZi K J K ~ ,  zcho l ~ad  given it no 
qfence."" The Reviewer writes :- 
"At Cabul nothing of any importance occurred after the in- 
stnllation of the rival Arneer, Afml Khtlb. Bat tho prospects of 
the party have sensibly deteriorated in the interval. They Iiold 
nothing now but Cabal and Ghuanee."?. 
To make out n good story for Sir John Lawrence's 
Government, under these circumstances, was no easy 
matter. The Reviewer has done his best. He evidently 
anticipated the dtimate success of the Ameer's cause, and 
is dimly conscious of the worst point in the  case,-the hasty, 
recognition of Afzut 4111an. Carried away, however, by 
loyal admiration fog the distinguished person whom he 
has undertaken t o  defend, and by natural solicitucle for 
the credit of his own Depal-tment, he taIcerj"t11e bull by the 
horns, decla~es that  the British Goverllment has been 
faithful to  Xher AX, and " has given n o  counte~zunce " t o  
Afzul Khan. X-Ie speaks of the  "pertinacious efforts of 
Azim Khan t o  lure us from our fidelity to the Anleer 
Ali's cnzlse." R e  assures .,is that  " the  relations of the 
Ailleer Sher Ali remain o n  the old footing of mutual trust 
e 
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and good-will."* He  characterises the Viceroy1; letter of 
tbe 1 l t h  of July, 1866, as " the frank avowal of a pre- 
ference fsr the Arneer Slier Ali."? "Above all," he says, 
:' the repitation of being the ally of the British Govern- 
ment was a tower of s&ength to Sher Ali Khan- 
- 
( l  1 I s r  though, since the commencement of the strife, innutner-, 
atlo proofs have been given of our determination to let the Afghans 
fight oul; theh own battles without the grant of a single musket 
on rupee to o h  side or the other, Sir John Lznvrence has takcn 
110 less gains to let i t  be known thronghout the length and breadth 
of Afghanistan that Englaud does not depart lightly from her cn- 
gagements, andC t h a t  mo p ~ c t e n d e r  cule h o p  f o r  awy c o ~ d e n a n c t ~  
jiorn 1 ~ m ;  so long a s  the  Prirzce zul~om she has ouce ~ccagnised cis 
Sovereign vetccins any tlnznte~*id hold  q o n  the  cozu~try ."I 
He protests invain : his own scrup~llously accumte narra- 
tive, and $he Viceroy's letters, contradict him. 
In order to maintain our condemnation of the policy 
-pursued 'at Calcutta in 1864 and 1 5  G 6, it is not at all 
necessary to insist that the Arneer ought to have bee11 
supplied a t  first with muskets or rupees. If the moral 
support that was due to a frienclly Sovereign had been 
extended to Sher Ali a t  the outset of his troulsles ; if no 
countenance had been given to  the pretenders, Afzul and 
Azim Khan ; the material help that seems to all India and 
Central Asia to  have been a t  last extorted from us, would 
probably have never been required. Money is the great 
want of the Afghan State, Every one, great and small, in 
that poor country, knew what effective aid we could give 
t; its lawful Buler, without moving& single battalion,- 
such as we had given to Dost Mohamlfied in 156 7, snch as - 
we have now given, a t  the eleventh hour, to Sher Ali Khan. 
If the British Viceroy kad taken his stand on the line and 
rule of succession instituted by Dost Mohammed, approved 
by our Government, and recorded in the Treaty of 1855, 
-if he had declared that he would deal with no one but 
the Ameer Sher Ali, on the ground of his absolute right, 
and had taken suitable meansto pake  this decimation 
public, it would havfj found its way to the hemt and - 
reason - of all Afghanistan. Conspiracy and rivalry would 
* &linburg?~ Review, ~ a n u h l y  1867, p. 31. See Appendix B. 
t Ibid., p. 34. $ Ilid., pp. 30, 31. 
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. Viceregal &a.ir of state. The most able a d  cxpcricnceri 
member of our permanent Civil Service would hardly sh im 
as Prim? Minister. 
I n  puldy  Imperial matters we rnnst do our statesman- 
'ship at home, and @LIP plans inust be coiistr~~cted 011 
British principles. W e  must beware of official experts. 
.-- 
13mq%,ct their achieve~nents ; chronicle their information ;* 
distrust their conclusions. Thcse are too frequently clic- 
t@ed by thb generous restlessiless of special and sing~~lar 
qudifiptions, by a noble ardour for work audg1oi.y. The 
measures they recommend, whether of masterly inter- 
ference or of masterly inaction, are too often tahitecl, also, 
by a certnin touch of contempt and antipathy for tlic alien 
races wl~oln they may affect so deeply, to ~vhich we are less 
liable in  the l a t i t ~ ~ d e  of London. 
Even as far back as 1 S:38, we should never have thought, 
- on any ;%lcul;ztion of profit or security for ourselves, of forcing a twice expelled Kiny upon the iviost insignificant 
State of Europe. Nor would Lord Palmer.ston a i d  Sir 
Jolm Hobhouse have directed such an enterprise against 
Afghmistan, unless it had been previously clcvised aucl 
collcoctecl i11 Calcutta, unless they had been assurecl by tllc 
Inclian Executive of its advisability and practicability. 
The Court of Directo~s might, indeed, most reasonably 
coin~lain tlmt they were not collsultecl a s  t o  tllc invasion 
of 183 9,. andVdeclare that they totally clisaly~rovccf. of it. 
The East India Company may be fidly absolved ; but  the 
Jnclian Government who the expedition, r~nd  thc 
Lnclim Services, who iiailed i t  witlz.enthusiasm, cannot es- 
cape their &are of the bltme. . em-- 
L o ~ d  Aucklnnd, the Governor-Gcnerd of those clitys, 
not a very strohg i n a ~  a t his best, had been three years 
in India, and was completely subject t o  the illflucllce of 
tllree clever Bengal Civilians, the Foreign Secretary and 
his Assistsnt, and his own Private Secretary." 
There is so much danger of even the best possible 
Viceroy succumbing more or less to the official atmosphere 
midst ~ ~ l l i c l l  he lives and works, that far from giving him 
credite for greater experience, the Imperial Goverunmnt 
* IZayc's Tar in ~ ~ $ c ~ n i s l a n ,  1857, vol, i, pp. 312, 315. 
ougllt t o  .tiglltcn its vigilmt snlmvisiou ':~~icl co~r  tr0l, 
rather tllxli relax tllenl, aftcr evcry ac1clitiun:~l yc:tr t , (  
Viccrepd residelice i n  India. 
During tlic five yews preceding IS(ii), our clca1iAgs wit], 
Afghuistan grievously clalnaged tlmt coulltl:)., and lhcecl ' 
om. Govcrinnent in a position of grecit tlis:~dv,zntu~c tint1 
discredit before all India m c i  C'e~1tl.d Asill. Our Bat&- 
- tiom1 policy of lwolnotiag a strong,. orclerly, : i~zcl  fi.icnrlly 
C~ovemment over the  mnted Provinces of A f g l ~ m i s t : ~ ~ ! ~  
though occusionnlly talkcd about, was ueglected in Loncltrl~ x 
~ ~ 1 1 ~ 1  ubnrlcloilecl in Indit~. Trusting for g~~ idance  €0 the 
ofi?ci;lls of Cdcuttn, the  Secretary oi' State c ~ d d  never ncc 
his way t o  my cleciclecl line of action. And so we driftccl 
on, a t  the mercy of events. And although the worst cu.11- 
sccjuences liavc been for the time averted by the  persever- 
ing gallantry of' the Amecr SherAli, nucl t h e  popularity i d '  
his cause, the t e r m  of our connection with thcf A f g l ~ n l ~  
F Xtatc were left 011 a very loose ancl nl:~kesld% foo?ing. 
I t  relliains to be see11 whetller Lord M;LS'O redly got 
i,eyoncl a makedlift. These has been no visible symptoul 
ot' anything better a t  present. H e  certs~inly succeeded. to 
;L pitiful political inheritance. A t  his Lo~.dship's assunlll- 
tion of the Viceroyalty, the attitude of t he  Imperial Power 
of Inclia, towards Afghanistan,-so fhr as our past actio~, 
inciicatcd,--was something like this. Our successive piw-  
j e c t ~  uE fkvouring "our friend," and of bringing t~Lout lic 
1x~rtition of the country, Iraving f'nilecl ; Hussia having I 
uttedy subdued Bolclmra, and llaviiig ~ d v a n c e d  toward? 
our frontier much mow rapidly than we exlsectecl ; S l w  
- Ali Khml having p~covecl more able a i d  more pop~ilar tailnil 
me lmcl been led to believe,-showing hiillself capable of 
standing done without us, or seeltklg tiid ~lsewhere a t  his 
own discretion, -the British Goygnment at last felt ituclt' 
obliged to propitide his good will by delicate nttentious 
and handsome presents. 
Our statesmen must lesnl, in their treatment of Easter11 
aEairs, t o  trust their ~ ~ 1 1 ,  judgments and to  believe in 
theh, ow11 doctrines. W e  can offer po  instruction or ex- 
ample to  Oriental nations, if we lower om. stsndnrcl of 
political morals to  their level. *Wl~enever our Govern- 
% L 
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ineat, co~nprolnisecl or persuaded by its local q reseu ta -  
tives, has deviated, in its dealings with India, China, and 
other semj-civilised couutries, from the iutenlationcil rules 
and maxims generally accepted in Europe, it has always 
made a blunder, and mb have geiierally had t o  pay for it. 
Sooner or later, in one way or mother, we shall have t o  
- par for every one of these blluldew. 1 
The sen11-official Bdi?iburyh Rev iez~w,  extolling the 
.cvkclom of " 61astedy inactivity," protests-very superflu- 
ously, J! sllould imagine,-against a "re~occupatiou of all 
Afgh:~nlstan.~ I can see no special military obstucles t o  
n campaign i i ~  Afglianistan, with or without the Ameer's 
leave and concurrence, sl~ould any just provocation, hostile 
intrigue, or iueaacing. movemeilt from m y  cparter, render 
such a costly expedit~on dvisable or unavoidable. Every 
year of friendly relations will diminish jealousies, dispel 
d e a r s ,  anrfreduce the political difficulties of purely niili- 
tary operations in that country to the vanishiug point. 
But the so-called peaceful occupation of any part of the 
country would be quite as costly as all openly-wowed 
cxmpaign, and every year of it would only multiplg a d  
qgl-avate the sources of disgust and arinogunce to the 
people of the co~ultry. There are defects in our inode of 
aclmiuistration, as well a8 peculiarities in our manners and 
ways of life, of which the Afghans would be more imim- 
. tient than the I-Iindoos have been, and which arc yet :i 
constant source of irritation in o w  longest-settled lrldian 
P-rovinces. Besides, the ASg11ans have tried it already, 
and they clicl not like it. 1 
---~ I clis~niss then at  once all idea of securing our position 
in India, and spreading our influence in Afghanistan, by 
what has been ;nlled "'the forward game,"-whetl~er our 
advance were to be conihed to putting ganisons into 
Quetta and other straiegical points, or extendecl into 
more direct political domination, by the actu:tl possessiou 
of certain districts. Both of these plans have been brouglzt 
forward under distinguished auGpices. It has been urged L 
that by a very littleepressure, or. as an equivalent for s 
subsidy, the Ameer Sher Ali might be incluced to conscll~ 
.. 
" &li~ill~r!/h It'eviezo, J a u u n ~ y  1867, 1). 43. 
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to the introduction of our troops, and e i t i e r io  cede the - 
fertile districts of Koorum and IChost, and perhaps Jel- 
lalabad: or to allow us to hold them as his tengats at an 
aaaual rent. The occupation of any point or part of 
Afglzanistan, whether we entered by the Bolan or the 
IChyber Pass, would be an immense mistake. y e  as- 
' srweclly shodcl not- sit still when we were there. The 
temptations to further encroaclments and vkxatious in- 
terference would be incessant and unavoidable. In pco- 
portion t o  the extent of our territorial holding, p d  the 
efficacy of our management, the a~~thor i ty  and dignity of 
the Ameer would suffer and decay, untilmhe was either 
driven from the tl~rone, or forced, as an act of self-prese~va- 
tion, to head an inswrection against us. Whichever 
form the crisis assumed, the British Government woulcl 
be reduced to the alternative of either once more with- 
cll.awing from Afgllanistan, or of attempting th&firesponai-, 
Lili tics of conquest and scvereignty. I n  either case the 
prospect would be appalling. 
And yet the urgent ilecessity for strengthening British 
inilapce in ' Afghanislu into an exclusive allisye and 
virtual supremacy, becomes every day more evident. If 
we do not assume that position, another Power will do so 
before many years have passed. Whatever we may think 
of the policy towards Afglmnistan pursued by our Govern- 
ment during the last five years, it is obvious that the 
~o l icy  of Russia in the adjacent regions has not failed. 
Ihe  B d i ) ~ h y h  Reviewer treated with some degree of in- 
I, 
credulity the prec$cfed subjugation of Bokham and the 
occupation of Sainn~alld. " Since that semi-officid essay 
was ~ ~ ~ ~ b l i s h e d ,  t se events liave come to pass ; and a pro- 
vince of Bokhma, including i t8  aneicnt ca$ital, Samarcmd, 
bas become Russian territory. @Even in January 186'7, the 
Beviewer hesitated to declare himself of that contented 
pwty of politicians ~ 1 1 0  stiginatim what they  call^" Rus- 
sopkobia " as an "exploded whose (' vision of the 
future is $hat of the Gossack a i d  the Sepoy lying down 
like lczlnl~s together 011 the banks of the Indt~s."t g e t  he 
* E d i ~ ~ b w g h  Review, Januaqw 186'7, pp. 3, 41, 46, F 
Jy Ibicl,, 13. 44. 
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pronounced that, "with respect to Central India the Iniiian 
Government can do no wiser'thing than fold its lxqds, and 
sit still."* Meanwhile the Russian Government has been 
etretchiae its legs, anda moving onwards. The advance of 
Russia towards the frontier of India, steadily pursued for 
thirty years, has been slow but sure. If  any one sllould , 
ask me what the plans and objects of Russia are, I can only 
i.dswer t l ~ a t ~  do not know, but I am quite certain she dl 
list tell them to  us, if we put the question to her. Nor 
do I bfdieve that safety is to be sought in the "neutralisa- 
tion" of Afglianistan, or in m y  other fruit of that ' friendly 
uaderstandin~ with Russia" that has been so much talked 
about. Nelxtralisation is nonsense, The neutmlity of 
Switzerlancl is protected by the physical conformation of 
the country, by the free instit~~tions and noble spirit of the 
people, a ~ d  by their adinir"ab1e military organisation. Bel- 
-giurn caliwot rely upon treaties, but is forced in self-defence, 
i d  fox the maintenance of her guaranteed neutrality 
and independence, to keep up a very large army in pro- 
portioii t o  her population. 
There is still so much of weakness and instability in the 
footing which Russia has obtained in Central Asia, that 
any diplomatic overtures in this matter will probably be 
received for some time with perfect complaisance, and met 
by the most friendly professions. She may seem to be 
more polite in form, but will hardly be more pliable in 
i'act, than she was about Poland in 1863. As to  her re- 
t2ring one single step, or giving agy more than verbal 
assurances on the subject of further expansion, it mani- - - " 
t'estly appears that it would be useless to expect any such 
concession, or taplace $he slightest reliance on any speci- 
ous display of the sort with which it might suit her for 
the time to  amuse us.t It is already clear enough that 
the assurances given by the Russian Government t o  
Lord Granville that Khiva is not to be annexed or per- 
1n;~nently occupied,$ are of about y much value as were 
c. 
'3 
,* Edinbup-gh Ecview, Jnnuary 1867, p. 47. 
+ Appendix C. I 
$ Pupers, Cent,*al Asia (C, 699 of l873), pp. 12 13. 
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those g i v h  t o  Lord Clareudon in 1869, and repeated in 
18 70, that; the El~peror would not retain Samarcand. * 
I t  is by 110 means necessary to assume that Lt~ssia has 
ally designs distinctly and deliberately hostile t b  the Bri-* 
ti& Empire. Perhaps she has no" fixed design, because 
she can form no certain estimate of how m~tch is feasible, 
and how soon, until she has tried. She may be 
watching events, but she does not sit still wi$L her han& 
folded. She goes 011 step by step, and secures every step 
she One thing is certain,-she is not gring to 
plant herself firmly on the Oxus, a t  a vast expense in men 
and money, for nothing. It is no very ext"l.svagant sup- 
position t o  n~ake, that she wants revenue t o  pay for her 
soldiers and establishments. And there is more revenue 
to be got on our side of the Oxus than on hers. She 
wants, also, t o  obtain complete control over all,the lines 
of commerce. era 
The commercial and political attractions and interests 
that have led Russia so far towards the frontier of India, 
are suEciently obvious, natural and legitimate, without 
our seeking for any occult or malignant cause that par- 
ticularly concerns ourselves. Still we have undoubtedly 
stood in Rnssia's way som.etimes; her determination t o  
recover a i d  repair all that Vas lost or damaged in the 
Crimean war, and to resume her traditional policy that 
was then interrupted, has been proved suficiently by the * 
manner in which she has shaken off the restrictions on 
her naval power impgsed by the Treaty of Paris. With- 
out actually planning the invasion of India, or contem- 
plating open war with us, she may think i t  convenient t o  * 
have constantly at  her disposal so$e ready meals t o  clis- 
tract our attention, and divert our resources at the next 
great European crisis. It is &r own fault if we allow 
her t o  succeed. 
The actual state of the chcssboard, and the peculiar 
nature of the check that threatens us, were well ilndicated 
some years ago by on$ whose wide observation and keen 
discernment are now, we may hope: applied towards the 
solution "of some of those problqns which he d e h e d  so 
clearly. The followiilg detached sentences from the Section 
* Papers, Central Asia,, No. 2 (C. 704 of 1873), pp. 9, 48. 
. . 
'PRE OXITS A N D  TILE INDUS. 
o n  " ~ e n t m d ~ n k n  " i  Mr. Grant DUFS P o l i t i ~ a l * S u ~ ~ ~ y ,  
do scanty justice to  his lucid exposition, b u t  they &e 
sufficient fjx this pa r t i c~~ la r  point :- 
r C  The po&on of affairs ;at this moment is then this,-Russia 
11ns got very consicle~able influence over Khiva, has incorporated 
with he$ own territory a large pal% of Kholrand, and has BOB- 
11 nl-2 within her gripe. 
"*Come ili shw, or come it fast, tlie end will come, and Russia 
will,de.i.ourthe flholp of what we usually understand as Central Asia. 
" When Rnssia is fsidy established in Bokhsra, she will come 
illto uece&ary coilliexion with the little-known country which lies 
between Bokhnrt and those parts of Afghanistan with which we 
are familiar, and she will pass almost involuntarily within the do- 
ya in  of Indian politics. Already she is said to have a body of 
Afghans in her pay."* 
Since t h a t  m7as w i t t e n  Russia has become "fairly es- 
tnblisheci in BokBara." She has passed "within t h e  domain 
-,f Inilian*politics." It is now our business t o  counteract 
and nulllify her obscure but  growing influence in the  region 
from whence it spreads towards India. 
To promote and facilitate trade and travel, t o  make o 
Northern frontier secure and  inviolable, and  t o  shut o 
from India a prolific source of wild hopes a n d  injuriou 
panics, there must be a strong-and orderly Government 
Afghanistan, exclusively s~lbject t o  British control. 
must  not be  open t o  t h e  Alneer Sher Ali, or  t o  any f11tul.e 
- Ruler of t h a t  country, to  intrigue or to  negotiate with 
Persia or Russia, or with any  of their dependeats. 
Wow is this constant and  exclmivg control t o  be exer- 
cised ? The Ruler of Afgl~anista,n is not at present ill 
* 
actual contact with t h e  Im 3erial Power of Indi~Y. H e  is not i w ithill our immediate r e p  1, or exposed to direct co'ercion, 
Unless we decide on the  fpn idab le  operation of forcing 
the Passes, we cannot get a t  him a t  all. Bwt h e  will very 
soon be in  actual contact with Russia,--if, indeed, he be not  
so already. The great Northern Power may not  as ye t  feel 
11er foohing sure enough to  decide 02 the  nex t  step ; bu t  
- when Bokhara and  Rhiva have been reduced t o  unresisting 
obedience, and their 'resources organised i n  subjection 
' * 
* A Politirctl Xulsey, 173' bl. E. Grant Duff, b1.P. (186S), 131). 64, 66. 
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t o  Russhn sulwcmacy, n solid base will be provided for 
Sonthern expeditions. Whatever extent of noiniual, and 
oste~ls%le sovereignty may be left t o  the Amel;r of Bok- 
lzare and the Khan of Khiva, the Afghan State will theg 
be only separated in fact from the Russian Empire by :t 
river,-that river navigated by Russian steamers& Thc 
" British Empire is separated from Afghanistan by Cre- 
mendous chains of mountains,-every pass" and valley 
occupied by llostile tsibes inured to mo~u&ain warfare. 
Under these circ~zmstmces-sl~ouIc1 the relative @tuation 
remain unchanged,-it needs no insight to fore- 
tell which of the two Empires must xvi~ld a predomi- 
nating. influence over the poor and coinpamtively weak 
State interposed between tllem. No Afgllm force could 
coinpete with Eussian troops ; am1 roubles will go as f a -  
ns rupees, We had better not rely on the i%rzbu~$b 
Reviewer's opinion that Russia " cannot nffo$ t o  sub- 
sidise". * 
How, then, is the relative sit~mtion t o  be clzangecl ? 
As it does not seem advisable that we should go to the 
Afgl~ans, suppose we were t o  induce the Afghans to comc 
t o  us? Instead of making a more clistant froatier for our- 
selves beyond the Hills, suppose we wwe to make n nearer 
frontier for tlxm on this side of the Hills. Anticipating 
the time,-not perhaps very distant,-when the Oxus 
~ v i l l  be the Russian bo~uldary, suppose we were to make 
the Indus the British boundary. For OLW purposes a river 
is better tliail a chain of rnounLains. At present we have 
- 
in fact 110 frontier ntW1; and are in contact on tlie Afghan 
border with no responsible anthority. Let us bring the r 
Ameer in contact with us, and then make hirn respon- 
sible. 0 
We hold vast tracts of Afghan territory, much regretted 
by their former possessors, which are a heavy bwden to us, 
but would be a precious boon to  them. If our Govern- 
ment were t o  cede tlie Division of Peshawur, on certain 
conditions, to the Afleer Sher ,Ali Khan, we should make 
the most by the transaction. Besides the increase of re- 
renne, he would acquire much dignity and autbo-rity by 
: * h 
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having reg,.incd for the Afghan people those lost fragments 
of the Uooranee Empire. The stronger 1le is, the.greater 
his credit& the eyes of the Afg1x-m nation, by vlrtue of 
QIE good offices, the  better for us. Our profit, after having . 
parted wit11 Pesham~u-: would consist in the reclrzction of 
our eixormous establishments, and in the concentration OF 
ou? military strength in formlclable and clisposable masses, ' 
tlidugh in si$ller numbers, on a redly stronger and more 
healthy line, lnsteacl of a t  least twenty-five thousancl goocl 
tro~ps*,~beiag frittered away in more than s hundred forts 
and fortified posts, scattered along an undefinable fsontier 
of 800 miles, oh the skirts of lofty mouytain-ellains. Even 
a t  Peshczw~w, where a force of about 3009 British soldiers, 
and as many Natives, with more than twenty field guns, 
axe constantly stationed, we learn that a great fortress is 
to be cons$!tructed '' at a cost qf zyzua7ds of I~ulf-c~-~~~illiolt 
-steding," $-nearly five years' revenue of the whole Pe- 
S ~ C Z T V L I ~  Division,-to protect " our magazines", and to  
afford " a place of refuge for non-combatants, women, and 
chilcken." And then we are told of "hostile tribes a.ncl 
unruly neiglibours." Surely this intelligence should strike 
us with a sense of humiliation. Who are these unruly 
neighbours, against whose attacks our magazines are to be 
protected in this expensive stronghold ? The Afghans ? 
Not t h e  AFgllans who are under the Governmeat of the 
Ameel*,-but "the hostile tribes" who we under no Govern- 
ment at all, md can be brougl~t uncley no Government, 
so long as we insist on occupying am untenable position 
on one side of the Hills, ~v11ich prev8nts their investment 
@- 
or effect~~al invasion. 
The following lisl; of expedition8 against the vnrioas I-Iill 
tribes along our border hf 800 miles, since the annexation 
of the P~mjaub  in 1849, gppears in a Parliamentary Re- 
tun1 of 186-1 :- 
* I include in this rongh estimatc 9,000 IleguIar troops in the Peshn- 
W L I ~  Dist~ice, 10,000 mcn of the Pur~jnub~Irregnlnr Force, and some + 
thousands of Military Police, I-Iorso and Foot8. 
+ The l'inzes, November 24th, 1868, Letter from Cnlcuttit, dated 
October Nth .  
'' P q ~ o ~ s ,  East Inrlirr (North-West Ihn t iw) ,  No. 168, I ~ G L ~  p. 130. 
-1 Apl~cndix D. :I: Daily Mezos, h l y  24tJ1, 1869. 
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Peal.. Tribe. Troops. 
1850 Afreedoes . . . . . .  3,200 
1651 Meeranzai . . . . . .  2,050 
1852 flornunds . . . . . .  700 
1852 Rnnizni . . . . . .  .. 2,000 
. . . . . .  1858 Oatnankhoyl 2,000 
1852 Kaghan . . . . . .  650 
... 1852 Oluerzd Waziris 1,500 
1852 Hnssnnzais . . . .  860 
F 1853 Sheoranees . . . . . .  2,800 
1853 Kusranees . . . . . .  600 
Teav. Tribe. Troops. 
1853 Boree Afroedees . . . . . .  1,500 
1854 Michnee Mo~uands ... 1,600 
... 1855 Meerazai ... 3,700 
1855 Rnobenlth.ey1, 0r&zais ... 2,300 
. . . . . . .  1856 Meeranzal.. 4,5563 
1857 *Bozdar . . . . . . . . .  2,640 
. . . . . .  1858 Sitana fanatics 4,877 
.... 1858 Kabul ltheyl Waziris 3,991 
1561 Muhsood Waziris ... 6;106 
. . . . . .  1863 Sitaua fanatics: 5,1330 
To make the calendar complete, three "more recent 
expeditions must be aclded :- FC y 
. . . . . .  1866 Af~eedees 6,000 1868 Sitana fanatics and Rns- 
1868 Bezotees . . . . . .  1,000 I sunzals n . . . . . .  20,000 
Twenty-three little wars in twenty years, besides innu- 
merable blockades, embargoes, reprisals, and fines on Chief- 
tains and Clans, enforced by military executioll ! There 
was a n o t l ~ e ~  little excwsion under Colonel Rezes against 
the Bezotees, on February 24th, 1869, hardly  ort thy of/ 
beillg ranked with the above, for our loss was only thirty- 
tllree killed and wounded.-fAnci while the first edition 4 
of these pages was in type, the mail that left Calcutta on 
the 27th of April, brought the intelligence, quoted from the 
ikdiun Daily News, that " there lias been another raid 
into British territory on the North West, and about 2,000 
head of cattle appropriated." " A handful of troops have 
turned out", 'it adds, " and we shall soon hear of another 
dashing retribution. Of course, the raids are very annoy- 
ing, but the splendid army on the  Punjab frontier wants 
occupation, and these occasional expeditions are excellent 
discipline for our t,ro6ps."$ As some one said in the House 9 
" of Commons regarding the Abyssinian expeditios,-" it * 
keeps our men in wind." 
According to the official list tllb-e we;e 5630 men en- 
gaged in the expedition under General Sir Neville Cham- 
bcrlai~l, against the Sitana fanatics in 1863, usually called 
the Umbeyla campaign. Yet from a previous paragraph 
in the same despatch we learn that  when the Bonair 
- tribes, who had bccomc involved in the affray, a t  last gave 
in their submission, " our force was now in a position to do 
9 
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snythii~g'; bi?i f~i  a2om than 9 0 0 0 stmng. "* Five BI.itislr 
Regiments were included in tliis small but eEcient army. 
In  the cnqpaign, from the 15th of October to the 16th of 
Qecember,.1863, our casualties amo~ulted to fifteen British 
of%cers killed, twenty-one wouadecl, and 847 killecl and 
tvoundecl. of all If we consider this heavy loss, 
a i d  observe the progressively increasing number of troops * 
employecl, until we find General Sir Alfred Wilde a t  the 
head of SO, 000 inen in 1 8 GS, this chronic little mar seems 
quite c,yalsle of growing into a great one. 
Since the first edition of this book was p~~blished the bor- 
der raids can hsrdly he said to have fallen off either in fre- 
quency or virulence. The large body of troops put in motion 
a.gainst "the Hussunzyes" in IS68 seems to have produced 
a very ephemeral impression, for in the EIofizezvcwd &!ail 
of November 13tl1, 186 9, we find the following nasatisfac- 
--tory intelkence. 
rrA British force is at this momeuti more than halfway up the 
Black Mountain, and a severe retribution has been taken for the 
petty, but politically important insults which the Bussunayes 
have offered us so frequently or late. Last week a large village 
was burnt, its crops were wasted, and a hundred aud fifty head of 
cattle carried off by our troops. This vigorous measnre will prove 
a significant warning, at the very comlluencement of the cold 
season." 
The " significant warning" does not seem to have been 
effectual, for after a lapse of six months we hear of a new 
outrage almost in the same locality. 
"The DeZhi Gazette has an account of another raid by a Black 
Mountain tribe into the Agror valley. ?In April 9thJ a strong 
p a ~ t y  of Akasyes came over the crest, surprised the village of a 
Unrcha, slew its head man, busat some of the houses, and made 
off with all the catt2e they aould collect. This village, and scve- 
ral othcrs dotting the face of ,&he slope, cannot bo protected by 
the force in Agror, as there can be no reliable information as to 
thc point of attack. Almost every night troops were posted in 
the villages nt the base of the hill, but the enemy did not dare to 
molest t h n .  On the 16th they again came over and plundered 
and burnt the village of Xirnbleboote. No livcs were taken ; one 
woman was wounded. Next day they pluudered another village, 
and the rest were deserted by the inhabitants. They have 
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actually driven off eveq  inhabitant on tho sGpe 'of tlie moun- 
tain.*'' 
T h e e  is an encleavour t o  account in some degree for 
these incnrsions, and for the failure of our Govisnment t o  
check them, in the following extract of a letter from '<od'r 
own Correspondent," dated Calcutta, May 1 Sth, 18 70, 
which appeared in the Thnas of June 13th, 1870. 
"The frontier campaign of 18G8, in the Huzam districtJCh- 
tween Peshawur and Cashmere, is not yet forgotbn. The Indian 
press, mith a rare unanimity, declnved it t o  be a fiasco, and tho 
verdict has been confirmed in a manner as humiliatidg to our 
wisdom as it is flattering to our sense of justice. That campaign 
Tras caused by disturbmces in tho Agror valley, which wero 
traced to Atta Mallornod Khan, the Chief. W e  deposed him, 
and sent him off a State prisoner to Lahore. But now the revenue 
settlement officer has discovered that we had provoked the rebel- 
lion-as m m y  hold that we did in Oude-by stripping the 1111- 
foytmate Khan of his villsges. 0111 ' ~ u m m a r y ~  settlewnt, left him 
only l G 7  tenants out of 1,044, and but one-third of the r e n h - f r e e  
estate given hinl by the Sikhs, as a warden of the marches, and 
tllen we held him to be no less responsible for the quiet of tho 
frontier than he mas before. And all this mas done with the best 
intentions, in pursuance of that dead-level policy which has given 
birth to the New Tonaucy Act. After investigation by Sir 
Donald Madcod, the facts were reported to Lord Mayo,when he was 
ou the spot gazing at the villageswhichwe had bnrnt in the so-called 
campaign. Immediate and full restitution has been ordered. The 
Khan has boon permitted to return to his restored estates, after an 
explanation of the mistake and its origin. The local sympathy 
with him is great, and led to the disturbances. It  is to be hoped 
that he will henceforth prove a most faithful buffer betmeennus 
and the wild tribes wlqm we fomerly forced him to summb to 
- his aid." 
The Khan may have been a " most faithfril" brri does ' 
not seem to have been an infaQible " buffer," for just n 
year later, " we have the repo~t  of another raid by a bor- 
der tribe irlto the territory "o Agror, on the Nortli- 
Westem Frontier. It occurred on the night of May 4 thy" 
(1871) " and seems t o  have been an insignxcant exploit."? 
The raids and ret$iatory expeditions just mentioned, 
- all occurred to  the North of the citynof Peshawnr. We may 
now glance at some recent events of a similar nature in 
6 
" Homezua~d Mctil, May 2lst, 1870. " 4. Tbid., Julie loth, 1871. I 
- 
a 
f 
2 
1 i 
. * 
TEIE OXUS AND THE INDUS. 51 
* a *  
the Southern district of the Peshnwur Division. * Here is 
a piece of news from Bmnoo,--or Edwnrdesnbfid as it is 
now officidly called,-da~teci 13th Jtme, 1 S 70. The 'canton- 
ment of Bunnoo is a l ~ o ~ ~ t  midway Between Pesha~rur :incZ 
Dehra Ismail Khan, nettr the Koorutn river, and five nliles 
from what is termed the Western frontier. 
I' Intelligetce has been ~eceived that the Waziris on the Bunnoo ' 
frontier are ' up.' For some time they havo been ripe for miscllief, 
and have beeu fanning their excitement to fighting pitch by solno 
grievancp, peal or imaginary. This feeling has at  last culminatcd 
in a raid upon British territosy in which we regret to say they wero 
only too success£~~l. On the morning of the 13th instant, a strong 
body of the Mahomed RLail Waziris waylaid a relief party of 
troops of the Pnnjaub Frontier Force proceeding from Eii~vardes- 
abad to an outpost called IIoosum, and cut them up nlmost to 
a man, six being killed on tho spot, and uearly all tho sost 
wounded. The Waziris then retreated to the hills in safety, vith 
the loss, a$far as ascertained, of only one man. As the ambus- 
cade took place only a few milcs out of the cantonment, the efi~ir 
has caused intense excitement dl dong the 
"It says very much for the alertness and discipline in tho Bml- 
noo cantonment, that within an hour a European officoT a d  :t, 
troop of cavdyy were in full pursuit; but the affair was over. 
The avengers went rapidly up the Kclorum valley, but did not 
see a soul."* 
It may be taken for granted that retrib~~tion fell sooner 
or later on the guilty tribe, or some of their neigllbonss, 
. but  in this instance it does not seem to have been very 
promptly administered, for on July 4th of the same year 
there was mother indecisive affah mith the Wazi~is of 
the Mabomed Kliail near the same' Koor~zm outpost, in 
r " which our troops were commanded by Colonel Gtlrduer 
and Captain Mc&ean.t 
Then, two montlis hgving- passed, we find in the I~Zicin 
Public Opinion of Beptebber 6th, 18'70, a, paragraph 
headed " The Mahomed Khail Waziris again." 
"Late on Sunday afternoon, a small party of hIahomec1 Khail 
Waeiris succeeded in driving off seventeen Lead of cattle, which 
had been allowed to remain behind aftet the rest of the herd had 
returned to the Pill0,ge with the guard which accompanied them. 
* 8 I~dzdirr?z Aiblic,Opi~tioz, June 21st, 1870. 
t. IIomewn7d i l l i i i l ,  A~tgnst 19tl1, 1870 
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Ou the 3Qt.h nlt. :I. party of about 140 men mew seal by a patrol 
near tho dam wliiclt dwerts a stream from the Roornm for the 
supply crf the post, which they had succeeded in destroying before 
they were observed. A fowe of Cavalry and Infanrrry started, 
and soon drove off the euerny, who ytreated into the Idls. 
aepoy of the 4th Sikhs was slightly wounded, and three of the 
BiInhorned Khails received wonnds." 
But just a t  the time that the Mahomed Kbail ~ a z f r i s  
were cutting off o w  patrols, and insulting Bur outposts, 
their lriilsmen of the Bajir Rhail were showing their 
defiance of the nominal authorities on the othe1"side of 
the nominal Punjaub frontier. In June $870, the Bajir 
Khail Wmiris slew the Afghan Governor of I<host" and 
fifty of his people, including ten head-men. Whereupon 
Ameer Xher Ali is said to have given orders to "annihilate 
the m~~t iaous  villages of the Bajir K h d , "  and to that end 
t o  have put in inotion three regiments, 1000, irregular 
horsemen, and four guns. 6 -4 
The extracts that I have preserved are not sufficiently 
complete to show how the Afg11an brigade aped on its 
avenging enterprise, nor to what extent, and on what 
esact occasions, punislimeat was inflicted on the Waziris 
by the British Government of India. There can be no 
doubt, however, that they were punished. The following 
account given in the Times of March 21st, 1872, in a letter 
from " our own Coirespondent," dated Calcutta, February 
23rd, describes the penalties enforced against a tribe wl~iclz 
had given aid and corufort t o  these inveterate Waziris of 
the Mahomed Khail, in some of their freebooting i n ~ ~ k -  
- sions, nearly two years after their ambuscade against our 
tmops near the outpost of Koorum. 
"We have recently succeeded in anoperatio% after the manner 
of our older deeds in India. I t&graphed you that brilliant 
dash of Brigadier-General Keyes from Edwardesdmd. The origin 
of the expedition was a simple one. The tribes of the Dour 
Valley had been ordered to pay immediately a fine for having 
harboured theMahomedKhails during the late disastrous outbreak. 
- The reply from the valley amounted to a defiance, and the next 
morning Brigadier-General Reyea was on his way to the valley, as 
direct as an arrow from a bow,with a force of about 1,300 sfantry, 
" See &I&. 
. * 
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300 Horse, and two howitzers. A small party which was puslied 
on to reconnoitre lost heart, and at  last ran, and the Brigadier on 
the following morning had to begin his advance by a pass, which, 
by the rule> of mar, ought to have been occupied by the enemy. 
The little force was asseqlded a t  four o'cloclc in  the morning, 
and, after four hou~s '  hard marching, arrived at tho Lochee 
Pass. There was a slight deteution here, o,nd rations mere served 
out. At 11 the men wcre again in motion, and an hour's hard 
ulgrchizlg and dragging of guns brought them to a platean on 
which were thi-ee of the refractory villages, Haiclerlcail, Solrail, 
and Haisee. Eere demands for submission were made, but 
klaiderkhil showed a decided hostile spi~i t ,  and our troops were 
fired upon. Tw? Sikh regiments-the 1st a d  4th-were then 
pushed on; the village mas stormed and fired; the 1st  Punjaub 
Infantry and tho 2nd Punjaub Cavalry completed the work, and 
the village was destroyecl. This decided the other villages, which 
at  onco gave security for tho fines, and submitted. It was tlie 
work of one day, and a couple of hours before midnight the last 
of our gallaat little force was in camp, with a loss of half a dozou 
men and many horses." 
The report of the same affair in the Times o j '  Indict of 
Febrmry 1 gth, 18  72, says that " the tribe, on finding the 
frontier force upon them on the morning of the '7th instant, 
professed reacliness to pay the fines demanded. This they 
did, however, only t o  gain time to collect a force. They 
were severely punished for this, for after waiting a, 
short time for the promised paymellt, our men made 
their advance, and ill the engagement that followed the 
* Afghans lost forty or  fifty men, while the casualties on 
oyr.sicle were only six wounded. Moreover, their village 
was completely destroyed." .) 
. And yet in the Times of Ivzdia of June zoth, 1873, .- 
(letter from corsespondent of the Pioneer ,  dated Pathan- 
pore, June IOthj, we axe told,-more than a year after 
the severe punishment iiltbicted on this tribe,- 
(; The Waziris, notwithstanding their professions of peace, 
remain incorrigible. Eight camels of the 5th Punjaub Caval~y, 
stationcd at  Dchre Ismael Khan, were a few days ago proceedir~g 
with supplies to the Tank detachment. Just as they neared Fort 
- Girnee, a party of Waziris,pounced upon the prey,mhich apparently 
was without a military escort and in  the sole chayge of two camel 
drivers. One of these they $ound with cords to a, tree, the other 
mas compelled to accompany them, and to drive his camels across 
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the bordex. The sowars of the Girnee Fort p&sl;ed, but their 
efforts mere useless, for the brigands weye safe within their awn 
lavless land. A small drove of cattle mere just about the same 
hime stolen from the village of Jutta." r p  
Again the Pioneel- of April I s t ,~  18 74, says : C 
"We hear from Kohat, under date the 24th March, that a 
In~go part of the force at that place, comisting of two Regiments 
of Infantry and one of Cavczlry, with a battery of Artillery, was 
to march for Thull the following day. The object of the expedi- 
tion is to punish mamuding Wasiris." 
At the same time a "frontier Cowespondent" diites t o  
the same paper, that + 
'' The Bezotee tribe, who are snbsidized by OUT Govenlmeat; 
for their services in keeping open t,he Kohat Pass, have been q 
giving the British authorities some annoyance." 
No one can refuse the meed of admiration to our officers, 
both of Che Civil Service and the Army, in i&e border 
districts of the Punjauls. No one would question their 
zeal, their talents, tl~eir.devoted gallantry, or the beaevo- 
lent objects they have in view. The question to be 
asked is, what is the result of i t  all? What have we 
f 
gained,-what has the cause of oivilisation and progress 
gained,-by all this bloodshed, by dl this lavish expendi- 
ture of money and rnmitions of war, by all this display 
of valoul-, military skill, and laborious energy ? What 
profit or glory do we get, what benefit do we confer, 
what exalkple or lesson do me give, by periodically burn- 
ing the villages, cutting down the fruit-trees, destroying 1 
the crops, and taking the lives of our turbulent and trea- 
- cherous neighhours '2 Of course these unruly borderers * 
are always in the wrong; they are incorrigible marau- 
ders, hereditary brigands, and recpire pe"riodical chastise- 
ment. BLI~ this periodical ch~stisement has worked no 
cure. The infliction of such punishment by n great, 
powerful and enlightened nation may be a just and neces- 
sary act, but it ought to be effectual. There seems to be 
- little glory and less profit, when the revenues of India, 
and the blood of British solcliew me annually wasted in 
carrying oat a penal process that is neither exern-j+ary nor 
reformatory, from which we reap'ncither reparation for the t 
* p s t  no; s&nnty for the futnre. The rctribrrtire mi& 
mldcrt:~ken a t  every provocation during the last twenty- 
l;)w ycal>TJ at n vast espense of blood and treasure, l i ~ v c  
1;ecn barren of rcfonnatory results. All that we cml say 
is, tha t  by means of twenty-five thousnncl good troops, 
:ud the occupation of 11101'~ than a hu~idrcii forts m d  
fortified posts, ~ v c  lmnnge t o  hold our own, t o  reprl the 8 
octnsio~ial ag~rewions of the Hill tribes, :uid t o  repay 
thcm in kind. The same story is repeated, offici:~ll~ ;mil. 
privately, by every one of local esperieuce, tlut our 
relations wit11 the iuonntaineers are more embittered t11un 
ever. Tlie slopes and valleys held by the border tribes, 
cspccislly between the Khgber r q g e  and the Swat 
country, arc becoming n sure asylum for despewto out- 
laws, political refugees, niicl religious fanatics, all llostile 
t o  tlle British Government. The tnrbalent population of 
this dcba$able Itmcl is 11ow incessantly recruited, instruc- 
ted aid infln~ned by crimixinls and nclventurcrs froin onr 
cnvu Provinces, subsiclised, iLs lms been clearly provcci, by 
the Wal~alms mcI other Bloliammednn sects of Beugal 
:~nd Ilindostan, 
I n  short, the stahe of our North-West frontier is utterly 
intolerable, and pomises to become worse instead of 
better. No one holds ou t  any hope of pemmment improve- 
ment, or offers any plan for the pacification and settle- 
, ment of the Hills, except tha t  which amounts t o  the 
invasion and conquest of a part of Afghanistan, n. bloody, 
tdious,  and costly enterprise in itself, with endless corn- 
plicntions and incalculable consecperites. 
* The late Gencrd Sir Sydney Cotton, an excellent 
i d i t m y  authority, who served on the North-West frontier 
in several important mmmands, including that of the 
Peshavnw Division, between 1552 and 1562, who led 
several expeditions into the Hills, and had unequalled 
opportunities of observing the morks and mays of the 
unsubjectcd Afghans across the border, and of their 
kindred on our stde, holds Peshaww in utter contempt as 
- 
a strategic position, 2nd advocates the immediate and 
perlnaasnt occupation of Cabul, Candnhnr and I-Iemt. 
H e  says :- 7 
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" 13esh;/wur, our nmin frontier post at present, ?vlli& I& hastily 
and inconsiderately fixed upon as such, is, for us, in a false position. 
J t  is bad in all respects, nnd certain it i s  mc shall some day or 
other, and probably em long, have either to  recede Srmn i t  or to 
progress. r 
"At Peshnwul; a n 4  on our presentyiine of fruntier, willl rest- 
less and wai-like tribes in our front, on onr right and left flanks, 
r and our right and left rear, we are engaged in continual mars, and 
the mountain fastnesses, which were to the  Afghans a s u p p y t  
and refuge, and consequently n security, are to us the very 
reverse, being the source of endless trouble and inconvenience. 
( 'The heavy al-m of oui8 power has been con ti nu all^ felt by 
these deui-savages of the Afghau ~nountains, without any salutary 
or moral effect. r 
" We have not even caused them to respect ns ;  in Fact they 
hate us mom and moye. 0 
" W e  are contiuually disturbing our empire from one end of it 
to the other, by hasty movements of troops, for the purpose of 
inflicting punishment on these border tribes, and no sponer is our 
object obtained than the troops return t o  their quarkers; whilo 
promises are made only 40 be broken, and the withdrawal of our 
forces leads to fresh indications of hostility. Raids and deeds of 
blood, on a small or large scale, are the almost immediate, and 
certainly the eventual conseclnences of such proceedings. Often 
such raids remain unpunished, for fear of disturbing the country, 
to  the manifest injury of our name and cause."* 
Another distinguished officer, General Sir Henry Green, 
for many years Political Superintendent and Commandant ' 
on the North-West frontier of Scinde,  referring t o  the 
"bold and fierce Pathan motmtaineersJJ iahabiting the " 
passes leading to Jellalabad, and the borders from Pesh- 
awur down to Debra+ Ismael Khan, " nulnbering perlia@ 
200,000 men," says, that " to deal with these tribes with 
any hope of success would be most diEcult. They are," 
he continues, " the  most iutraatakle people of the whole 
border country. The necessitlv, of sencling such frequent 
expeditions amongst them has proved this ; and, notwith- 
standing, they are as unyielding and as little aineilable t o  
OLX rule as ever."? 
C 
" ( P b e  C'e&al Asimz Qz&ion, by Liei1t.-General Sir Sydney Cotton, 
1C.C.B. (Iicrshaw, ?Ifanchestel.), pp. 6, 7, 8,,,9. 
I. The Defence of the No&-?fTes6 P'i'ontler of I d a ,  by Colollel Sir 
Henry Green, K.C.S.I., C.B., Honorary A.D.C. to f he Viceroj* of Irlclia 
(Harrison, 59, Pal1 Mall, 1873), pp. 16,'17. 
Sir 1-ieGY Grce~l recommends tho p e l r m m ~ t  ~dnb l i sh  
lncllt of ti j k i t i b l l  force : ~ t  Qnett:~, close to the North e~ ld  
of the Eolan l'nss, within the doioiriions of our nlly, tIlc 
l h n  sf mICllclat, but overlooking the Southern provinces 
'of At$miistnn, and conzt~in~~clincr the roads to  Cantlahar 
;ud Herat. We shodd, he tBitIks, continue t o  hold 
Poshnwur in force ; and the tosvu of D d u r ,  also within. 
tlte territoi*y of Khelat, situated a t  the South entrance of 
the Bokm Pass, slioulcl he connected by a State r a i l w : ~ ~  
with t i e  town of SdtLrur in Scincle. Sir Henry Green's 
l ~ r o l ~ ~ x d s  are avowedly bnsecl on the plans of t h t  chivul- 
~ous a1113 noblc " soldier political," the late Geiicral Jolin 
Jncob, whose worthy pupil :d snccesvor he 1 ~ 1 s  been. 
General Jacob, iu the estrszcts given fkom llis letters t o  
Lords Canning and Elphinstone, in 1 85 6-5 7, suggests 
that  " ill cotnnlencin~ the arrangements for est&1islling 
onrselves".;vt Quettn, 111 addition to the s~lhsidy now pny- 
able to the I<hau of lilielnt, nuder the present Treaty, me 
should take into our pay a body of liis troops, both llorse 
and foot, t o  be elltirely under their ow11 officers, m c l  
~nanagecl in their own fashion. Such wild irregulars are 
invnlnd~le tvllen there is a certain force of our OWI 
solciiers to  form n nucleus of strenwth and give tone to 
the whole." " This would make n$ he says, " in a g e n t  
measure independent of the Afghans, svhile the enjoy- 
ment of regular pny by the Ichelat people would l~nve  
1 
great influence on the Afgllsns generally." " W e  might 
tkn," he continnes, "if we pleased, and it weye neces- 
sary, safely: and with adv:tntage, subsidise all Afghmistan 
with money and mms."* r 
Sir Henry Green admits tlmt " to carry into execution 
the poposed ar%slngetaents would, beyond doubt, be very 
costly a t   first."^ For my part, I do not see where the  
cost would end. 
It may be that Sir Henry Green's plan would be less 
costly than that of Sir Sydney Cotton ; but then i t  does 
not pofess to deal with the Afghan Hill taribes,--it passes 
.I 
* 2'10 Defence ?f the  North-West Frontier of I~~tlin, by Colonel Sir 
Henry Grecn, IC.C.S.I., pp, 28. t ILid., 17. 35. 
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them by, as hopelessly " intractable," and lea<& us bur- 
dened with that humiliating system of strongholds and 
razzins en which we depend a t  present for suchopeace as 
we can maintin in our North-Western marches5 
Captain 3'. Trench, one of that rising class of accomp-' 
lished and thoughtful young officers, of whom our army 
cmay well be proud, and whose book is an indispensable 
store-house of the historical, statistical, and eo ra h i c ~ ~ l  8" ,: g p. facts relating to " The Russo-Indian Question, considers 
that we must "rectify our present bo~~ndary-ling," and 
that, on the whole, the best step would be the occupation 
by a British garrison of " a strong fortress a t  Candal~a~." 
" One thing," he thinks, " is clear. To subsidise an 
Afghan Prince may be the cheapest and most politic ex- 
pedient for a time, but sooner or later (probably within 
the next five or six years) an onma~d movement will be 
found to be the only course that is possible, havi&,g regard 
to the futuse security of our Indian Empire." 
He fears, however, that " there is but little chance of 
m y  such. decisive action being taken, as it wotild entail 
an additional burden on our Indian Exchequer ; and as it 
seems to be a peculiarity of English policy to prefer the 
most lavish prospective outlay to a present moderate dis- 
l)~~sement."* 
The disbursemen-ts required for the construction of a 
strong fortress a t  Candahar, and the introduction of a 
British garrison into it-necessitating improved commu- 
nications and transport service-might be relatively 
" moderate," but couM not fail t o  be a,bsolutely large ; 
- and " the prospective outlay" for the maintenance of the @ 
garrison and its contingencies, though not, perhaps, 
deserving to be censured as r r  lavi~h," woad cer td-y be 
large also. Admitting the strdegy t o  be sound, if all 
advance were unavoidable, I do not like Captain Trench's 
plan, for several reasons besides that one reason which I . 
hold t o  be all-sufficient, that it "would," as he says, 
r 
" entail an additional bmden on the Indian Exchequer." 
r 
* TJL~ Russo-Jndian &zrestiom, by Captain I?. Trcach, 20th B~~ussart; 
(Maomilln~~, 1869), pp. 161, 163. (I 
capdin Trelch and Sir Sydney Cotton a.re, proLably, 
much of the same opinion, 011 the financial p r t  of the 
question, as Sir Hcnry Green, who thinks that akllougll 
'' the pr6ibed arrangements would, beyond doubt, be ;cry costly a t  first," they might, "by proving t o  Eussia 
tlmt we mere prepwed to  meet her with every advantage 
ong our side, m e s t  her progress, and prevent n fearful 
struggle fol-.supremacy-a struggle that wo~~lcl ertainly 
cost untold ~liillions of n~oney."* 
I do pot believe tlmt we should be better prepared t o  
meet Russia by nlaliing ourselves progressively more dis- 
agreeable to the States and tribes that lie between her 
frontier and orus. This we should assuredly do if we 
statiolled British troops close to the chief cities of the 
Afglmns-near Cabul or Candahar, for example-or in x 
conimanding position at  their gates, and among their 
babitntio$, as in the vaJ.lcy of Quetta.? 
Our mllitary politicians and a large number of OLW 
Anglo-Oriental statesmen will not see that ;t, sstste of war 
is only justifiable as an open and strenuous effort, directed 
towards a definite end, attainable within some terminable 
period. Such a military occupation as they recommend, 
~vi tho~l t  the consent of inhabitants or rulers, or with only 
R c010~1~able consent, of territory which me clo not claim 
t o  possess or propose t o  govern, would at  once constitute 
, that  unendurable condition, a state of covert war, of vrar 
without an end. Each British cantonment, mith its 
exceptional and independent jurisdiction, would be a 
fret tbg sore, a husy centre of prosrocation. We should 
* not be able t o  stand still. The causes of irritation would r 
m~dtiply daily. The rights of employing Afghans and 
giving asyl~lrn t o  them, of traversing the country in all 
directions, of freely buyi8g and selling, of importing and 
transporting, that we should claim, insist upon, and be 
" D@me of the No~th-Vest  T v o n t i e ~  oy Indiu, p. 35. 
i (' On entering the (Rolnn) Pass, yo8 are in IChoras~nn'~-i. e., 
Afgllli~tuistaa. (IZbz~g1~'s Ope7wtions of the Army of the lizcZzrs : Allen, 1841, .I 
11. 49.) ('The proviriocs o'f Shawl rind Mnstoong, formerly subject to 
Cabnl, ccm bin a largo Afghan populntion." (Pottilzger's Ilcloocl~istcin : 
Longmau, 1816, p. 31.6.) 0 
p r q ~ : l r ~ ~ I  to ( d o r c 4  h r  U I I ~ ~ P I V C S  iwd iiLI fonGectcd wit11 
US, wtiul~l swm iwclt~r our c~ccnpntion untenable, cxccpt 
1,y a Itrigo rlevelolrmeut u f  military strength, :-i$ 011 the 
:rvonretl. f;~otiug of absolute supreInncg, if not of actual, 
:xclmini..;triltion. Far froin b '  nrre:sting the progress" of 
l tu& ur en:d&ig 11s to imct her with aclvautnge, any 
r ~ f  t l ~  fi~rwartl iuovc~ncuts that h a w  been proyosecl woulcl 
slnootll the progrcss of Eussia by ln:&ng herewelcome 'as 
;z liheratus, and ~r~oulcl, sooner or later, t h o +  IIS, in spite 
of onrsclws, into the  rlisoclrnutageous position of intru- 
c l t w  nucl opprwsori'. I11 all probability, the longer open 
I~&ilitirs were rlcfel.n.et1, the 1nore extended, the more 
tqnld.ti?rc(l T I - U I ~ ~  he the contest. 
i i r ~ c l  yet, ~vitliout rcikrence to ihe progress and tllc 
l,rul,:J,le tlth>ig~is crf' Itussi:~, :tud with sole regard to the 
1)rm~otion uf 1mce ;ud good orclel; and n secure course 
f i r  trtde, ill clistricts where we 1 1 : ~ ~  assumed -&e duties 
of ~overr~ulent,  our iuilitnry ndvisers are quite right in 
saynlg tlxlt we ought not to re~iinin as we are. No one 
cmi de f i~~r l  t l ~ e  sittmtion as it is a t  present. Our frontier 
svstumn has fiilcd liitl~erto, and there is no prospect what- 
4-er uf its fi~ture success. The ulountaiir barrier, through 
d i c l l  all the coinmerce and correspondence between 
rrldit~ and Ri~hanistnn must pass, is in the possession of 
1;~rvless freebooters, ownin$ no imler, recognising no 
iutewsts, duties, or responsibilities beyond the limits of . 
tlleir ow11 piirticulnr tribe. What are the real difliculties 
~ ~ i t h  wliicll we htve to contend ? We are on friendly 
terns with the Mghkn State. But  neither the Afghan 
nor tlic British Governmerit can rule the mountain tribes, 
or cmnrn:ind the Passes, because neither Government can, 
in 1uilit:try language, i)zvest thcnt. * Thus %e entrance to 
the IChyLer Pass on our side, mnrked by the fort of Jum- 
rood, is in our possession ; the exit, after a march of tl1irt.y 
miles, is fairly ~vithin the Afgllan jurisdiction. The . 
transit between these points lies through a natural for- 
tress, which neither Cbvernntent can sunormd or bloc- 
kade. If the Rhyberee tribes asstme a hostile attitude, 
the road call only be made safe for a single journey by :t 
military operation on n large scare. 
A leading wt;lcle in the Timcs qt'luclin of Wcpter~lber 
12th, 1 673, avows " mc3r.e tlzan r t  suspicion that the K11y 
ber has been as freqneut;Lg closed as open during the lust* 
year or two." 
. But, it may be said, these operations against the IChy- 
berees. which, as me have inst heard, have been uncter- 
taken 'by the * ~ m e e r  Slrer Bli, mnj*be com~letely success- 
ful. Certainly they fray be successf~d, as many of ours 
have been, t o  the full estent of what was espectetl or 
intended ; the  offending tribes map bc swcrely p~unisllccl. 
C' \ - 
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But until there is a Government occupying both sides, 
and thereby ruling within the Hills, no possible punish- 
ment Gill ever be permanently effectual. Whenever 
sufficient inducement presents itself, or a good oppor. 
t ~ n i t y  occurs, the doors can be locked again by those who 
have never been deprived of the key. 
The same topographica1 and political diffic~dties, inchr- 
able without such a rectification of frontier, 2s I ventGm 
t o  propose, prevent the  fertile Swat country-now an 
impenetrable Cave of Ad~Uam for d rebels and refugees 
from Afghanistan or British India-from being brought 
into subjection and order by either of tKe two Govern- 
ments. Here Eve8 that m ssterious ascetic, Abd-ul-Ghafur, 9 the Akhoond of Swat, w lose influence extends over all 
the Hill and Plain tribes on the Peshawur frontier," and 
"as far as Kohat," who is "regarded with rexerence by 
the Pathails generally," and "fills towards thaw a posi- 
tion" which can only be described " by comparing it with 
that of the Pope at Rome."* 
Swat is the headquarters of the Yusufzye tribe, 
inhabiting, with its numerous clans and subdivisions, a 
great extent of British territory, as well as many settled 
districts under the Cabul Government. I n  the Umbeyla 
campaign of 1863, "when the Akhoond of Swat, so 
superstitiously regarded, so wild1.y reve~enced by t,he 
people, joined the confederacy against us in person," "the 
impulse of fanaticism brought distant tribes to  join in 
the war," whose " open opposition" had not been " anttici- 
pated" by the most :xperienced officers in the Punjaub.t 
Sher Ali's refractory nephew, Ismael Khan, who con- " 
spired against the Ameer's life in 1863, took refuge ill 
Swat,, when hc eluded the escort "tiat was conveying him 
into British custody a t  Lahore." Feroz Shah, one of the 
Delhi Princes, who escaped capture iu 18 5 9, having been 
one of the boldest and ablest leaders in the rebellion, wasn 
heard of in the Swat country, a t  least as late as 1.568, 
and may very. probaMy be there now. We read in the 
m 
* Papers, Distuvbcmces on the Nort7~ West Prowtier (No. 158 of 1864), 
pp. G8, 132, 133. F 
1. Pqms,  iVort1~-West fi,ontiev (158 Gf 1864), pa, 170, 130. 
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Times 2 772d;a of July 4th, 1873 :-LC The Cabul corres- 
pondent of Indiun Public Opinion states that Syud 
Mahmood Shah, having got annoyed with the* Ameer, 
Jias left* C a b ~ d  for Swat. The Ameel; on his departure, 
addressed a letter to Bhah M ~ u d  Khan, the Governor of 
Jellalabad, telling him to be on the look-out for Syud 
. . 
Mahmood Sliah, and on finding him, to urge him to " 
return to &bul, because, should he not do so, great dis- 
turbances w5dd be likely to take place. After searching 
fbr him a good deal, he was informed that  S p d  Mall- 
mood &ah was with the Akhoond of Swat." It was to 
Swat that Bellram Khan, the Moinund, fled aCter tlie 
m ~ ~ r d e r  of Major Macdonald, neay Fort Michnee, in 
March, 18 73.  The h e w  Xher Ali has proclaimed IGm 
an outlaw, and has confiscated the land wliich he held 
within reach of the Governinent of Cabnl, but the assas- 
sin still fikds in Swat an asylum absol~~tely secure from 
the -possi?dity of capture or molestation. And so i t  must 
be : the Swat country will remain a menacing Alsatia on 
our border,-to become, perhaps, the central stronghold 
of some new f~natical  movement or coaliticn,-because 
its green valleys, though hemmed in on all sides by British 
and Afghan districts, can be turned or blockaded by 
neither Power. 
In the I-Iouse of Commons on J d y  gth, 1870, Mr. 
Grant Iluff, Under Secretary for India, referred to the 
advantages which he hoped a good understanding with 
the, Ameer Sher Ali would give us for checking the raids 
of tlie mountaineers. But there Ltre many reasons for 
believing that such a combination as lie suggested would 
prove to be utterly impracticable. There are many rea- 
sons to doubt wPlether $he routes of communication could 
be kept open permanently, and the Hill tribes brought 
to order, by m y  concerted action between the two 
. Governments. The Ameer Sher Ali might agree to s ~ d i  
action in perfect good faith, though perhaps with some 
misg i~hgs ,  and yet the  desired object might prove as far 
off as ever. His interests in unrestricted commerce 
would ;pot be so apparent,--at least not to him or his 
L people-as o~ws are to us? Coercive measures carried on 
b 
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in common with an infidel Power agninstrthe'ir kindred 
and co-religionists, would be viewed with great aversion 
by the Mussulmau Afglians-the more so because through- 
out those operations their own Arne? vonld i&%festlyc 
hold a secondary and subordinate position, while the 
expected results would appear t o  them of great benefit 
t o  us, and of evil omen to  tl~ernselves. The utter subjcc- 
tion of the mountaineers and borderers wodd seem 'to 
break down the last efficient banier betwe'en their free 
Mahoinedan State and the  formiclable Empire of Bphmins 
and Christians on the other side of the Passes. They ' 
would only so far appreciate the a d v a n t a p  of an undis- 
turbed road for commerce, as to believe that the profits 
would chiefly fall to the haughty Europeans whom they 
fear, and the idolatrous Hindoos whom they despise. 
While the Ameer was supposed by his own people and ' 
his own intimate advisers to be labouring for t'& benefit 
of British trade, he might find opposition rising at  home ; 
religious doubts and scruples might supervene, and the 
i~npending loss of power and popularity might cause his 
co-operation to slacken, witl~out its being politic or even 
possible for him to  ma.ke a candid confession of his cliffi- 
cdties. Even at  the best,-if harmony were outwardly 
peserved,-all the work and expense of the  coalition 
would assuredly fall upon the British Government. The 
Ameer's obligations would be vague ; the extent of his 
resources not easily measured. We should have no means 
of stimulating his languid efforts except by open war., Kf 
we became embroil&d with our ,4lly, all that  we had 
gained would be lost. F 
. The situation would be very different if the Auneer Sher 
Ali were constit~ted Sovereign owboth ddes of the Hills. 
All objections to a closer contaet with British India would 
vanish before the brilliant prospect of regaining the lost 
provinces. There would be no more scr~uples as t o  the ,  
subjugation of the Hills, when it was known that they 
were to be brought mder  the  direct control of Cabul, 
and not of Calcutta-that they were to form a consti- 
tuent and connecting part of the  renovated Afghan State. 
The Ameer's right to clajm thers~ubmission of the mouu- 
tain tribe; ly5lg between two parts of his Kingdom, the 
advantages of maintailling discipline among them, and of 
securing $he free transit of ,goods a d  traveUers 'through 
,the Passes, would then be quite intelLigible and indisput- 
able ; while his power 'to obtain these objects, with tern- 
porary aid, perhaps, from us, would soon be sufficiently 
manifest t u  innke resistance hopeless. 1 
'So long 'as Englrtnd and Xcotlilnd remai 
Kingdoms, excursions for lsluilder were incessant among 
the boqlers on both sides of the frontier. Many land- 
owilers lived more by blaclr-mail than by rent or agricul- 
ture. Castles" and towers marked out the boundary-line, 
and every habitation was constlxcted with a view to 
defknce. Deadly blood feuds inflicted miseries worse 
than way on great and small. The fierce m d  unsettled 
habits arising from the break of j~u-isdiction prevailed 
without jptermission or mitigation, until Jaines I becnme 
King of Engla~ld as well as of Scotland. Soon after his 
accession, the ofsce of Lord Warden of the Mar&es fell 
into disuse, the garrison of Berwick was reduced, and the 
frontier lost its military character. Border fkuds, dege- 
nerating into private quarrels and petty marauding expe- 
ditions, gradually died away, and were suppressed as 
much by improved public opinion as by combined public 
force. 
Peshawur and the DerajLt are Afghan Provinces. The 
1311s between our undefined frontier a,nd the settled d i e  
t A d s  of Cabul can never be reduced to regular govern- 
ment by any one but an Afghan SEvereign. Whatever 
myihical accounts they may give of their origin, diverse as I 
may be the names adopted by the clans, and fieclueut 
their feuds and ?action$ they all-if we except a mixture 
of Beloochees in the Southern district of the Derajiit,- 
speak the Pushtoo or Afghan language, and all we iden- 
. tified with tlie Afghans in religioil, manners, and socia.1 
economy. It would be the greatest mistakk to suppose 
tha t  tlie Hill country is irreducibleyor that the Hill people - 
are irreclaimable. Wb kuovi from recent and authentic 
records,* thak much progress was made-doulntless in 
somewhat rough style-tmowar& the settlement awl sub- 
Y 
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jt~gatiorr of the Afglian borderem during the prosperous 
clays of the Dooranee Empire. Xleasures for the mainte- 
nance o"f good order and :i11 open thoroughfare in,tlle Hill 
regions were taken in the reign of the great Allmed- 
Sha11, founder of the Suddozye dynasty, between 1746 
and 1773, effectual to a great extent, so long as a Govern- 
ment 1asteJI~vhich eld both sides of the mountain rangks. 
His soil, Tunoor Shall, resided a great deal 6i Pesha~v6r, 
ancl there it was tlmt, in 1809, the ill-fated Shah Sujah re- 
ceived, wilh splendid courtesy, the memorable ,British 
mission conducted by Mountstuart Elpl~instone. In the 
disastrous battle of Nomshera (1 3tll of "March, l823), 
wllicll opeued the road for Rnnjeet Singh up to the mouth 
of the Khyloer Pass, the brunt of the fighting on the side 
of the Bfg11a.n ICin@om fell to  the Yusufiyes, fi-om the now 
ungovernable districts of Swat and Bonitir. " Pefo~e  the 
engagement with thc Sikhs in 183'7" (the battla of Jam- 
rood), " the Khyber Pass did not cost Dost Molx~mmed 
more than 10,000 rupees a year, but  after the above affair 
lie paid 20,000 rupees yearly. Subsequently he paid, i t  is 
said, 32,000 rupees." "It wodd seem," continues Captain 
Hough, " that under the Kings the  Khyberees did not 
collect the tax or toll levied on the  passage of animals, 
laden or unladen, and on passengers; but under Dost 
Mohammed this was permitted."* 
During the c o n f ~ ~ ~ i o n  caused by the civil wars in Afgh- , 
anistan and the conquests of the Sild~s, the Hill tribes 
fd ly  resumed their predatory independence. Since that 
P- 
period all their worst temptations and ancestral animosi- 
ties have been revived and stin~ulated by political circum- * 
stances on both sides of their mountain home. Religious 
fuly and a rude feeling of patrFotism kept them inces- 
santly on the alert, first agaidst the Sikh rulers of the 
Punjaub, and afterwards against ourselves. Internal dis- 
sensions made the Afghan Govenlunent weak, while the. 
loss of Pesllawur clirninished a t  once its resources and its 
inducements t o  cont~ol the mountaineers. A strong 
Afghan Kingdom, on good terms %ith our Government, 
* Jfn7rgh's Operrrtiow ?f the Awn!/ o[ the I n d m  (Allen, 1641), pige 
317. 
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would find those resources restored, and those -induce- 
nlents redoubled, by the peaceful possession of the Trails- 
Indus Prp,vjnces. With a friendly and civilised Clovern- 
ment like ours in the Punjaub, able to afford effectual 
assistance, and t o  presc'ribe an enlightened and humane 
method of procedure, the good work could be steadily 
car~ied on without danger of failure or  relapse.. a 
It is clear"+lso, if we look a t  the q~zestion from another 
point of view, that the Ameer would be brought more 
closely 3ncl m ore directly 1.11 cler British influence and 
control. His duty and his interest would run in the 
same path. His responsibility to the British Govern- 
ment would be very clearly defined, and very easily en- 
forced. The territorial aggrandisement of the Afghan 
State would place a matterial guarantee within our grasp 
for the coqstant observance of all our conditions. Illstead 
of a tough and rugged hide, Afghanistan would now pre- 
sent a sensitive cuticle to the hand of her tutor and 
physician. Intrigue at  Herat or Balkh, scandalous op- 
pression at Cabul, an outrage in the Passes, would be at 
once felt, and could be at  once checked a t  Peshawur. 
It has been soinetiines most erroneously suggested that 
the location and habits of these unruly Kill tribes are not 
withont Borne countervailing advalitage to us, inasmuch 
as any invader of India from the North-West would have 
, to fake or to buy his may through them. Any Chris- 
tian army, such as the Russian, would, it is said, excite 
thi?r jealousy and fanatical hostility as much as the 
English, would find in tlle~n a fom:dable obstacle to its 
' 
advance, and a terrible engine for its destruction, how- A 
ever dearly it +ght have bought an unmolested march 
forward, if compelled to make a retrograde movement. 
Rut this is to misimclerstdn,11d the mere elements of the 
case. No invader from Turlrestan or Persia wodd ever 
.tl~inlr of entering the Punja~lb until he had in some man- 
ner secured on his side the Afghan Government of Oabul. 
A Power that  is placed in imin&iate contact with the - 
Afghan State-as Iii~ssia soon will be, and as Grant 
Britain-is not-must thereby acquire, according to the 
pressure it can bring t o  bear and the temptations it can 
P 2 
. p .  hold ouh, tlic ~nesiis of exercising s cestaln 1~lVue11ce over 
all tlle Afghan tribes, even over those in the Hills and 
within "the Britisli dolninions. F ,7 
The chief danger t o  be gua1ded against is not opeg 
encroachment on Afghan territof,~, or the annexation of 
Afghan dist,ricts, by Russia, acting either in  her own 
name or in that of Persia or of Bokhara. It is the 
g,rl.acl~~al growth of Russian ilifluence at C$f~ll, till it be- 
comes actual doinination wit11 all the forms of friendship. 
A well-infonned writer has recently ont &hut " in 
General Duhaniel's Memorandum on LL divemioll against 
British India, recently published by the Allyenxeine 
Zeitzmg, on nothing is so much stress laid as on the neces- 
sity of an Afghan alliance."* 
Some g.1-eat aclvai~ta~gc over Russia, that 1 am incapable 
of' perceiving and appreciat,ing, mczy have beep gained in 
the course of our cliplomatic action from 1869 t o  1578, 
respecting Central Asia, as it appews in the Pasliarnew 
tai-y Papers tlzat have lately been printed. To the ordin- 
ary reader the  nett 1.esults of the correspondence and 
conferences would seem to  he tha t  Russia consents t o  re- 
cognise as the limits of Afghanktan the actual possessions 
of the  Ameer, and inakes a great merit of doing so, declar- 
ing, however, that she is " the more iilcliiled t o  this  act 
of conrtesy as the English Government e n e g e s  to  use all 
her influence with Sher Ali, in orcler t o  mduce him t o  . 
rnainiain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his 
giving up all measures of aggression o r  f~~r thei -  csn- 
cluest."t ~ lms-wi th  a patssing sneer at our "subsidies" 
c- 
-Russia secures good grounds for a grievance a ~ a i n s t  us, * 
and for interference in  Afghan affairs, whenever ~t pleases 
her t o  sct up s dispute as t o  b&~nclarik~, or  as to  river 
navigation between herself, or%ne of her vassals, and the 
Ameer of Afghanistan. A t  the same time i t  is observable 
tha t  no present cause is given the Ameer Sher Ali for a 
grudge against Russia, wliosa desire t o  keep on good 
- torma wit11 him is fmther manifested by General Kanf- 
mann's conciliatory letter on the  gubject of the intrigues 
* Q2~rm-tedy Rezliew, April  i S 7 3 ,  p. 518. P 
'f l'apers, Ce?&to.nl Asia (CJ. G90 of 18 T3), p. 15. 
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of the hiuecr'w ilepllew Abcl-ur-Ral~mZn." Meanwhile, 
Abd-ur-Rah~niin rernaius as a guest a t  tbe 12 endquarters 
of Rnssiap, Turkestan. n 
The well-infbrmcd Prussian Correspondent of the Times, 
in a letter dated Juue ;il.d, 1513, writes as follows on the 
s~lbject of the Kliiva campaign :- 
" ~ h e  principal object of the expedition is the explorirtiou of ' 
t h l ~ m o o  $118 (3x11s) Delta. I f  one of the valiouu arms prow 
navigable, or can be made so, Rnssiau steamers, arter tlie coer- 
cion of I<$va, will soon ascend from Ldce Aral as far as Kooudooa 
and the borders of Badakhshan. The scientific expedltiou wliich 
Iras already reaclwd the mouth of the Amoo, may be destined to 
mndc an epoch in tlie history of Ceutral Asin."-/- 
Since that date the military expedition "has proved 
completely successfill. The defensive strength a id  re- 
sources of the I<!m1 of Khiva have been found t o  be 
utterly in,$guifica.nt. The capital was talcell almost with- 
out resisthce. By the I st  article of the Tl-eatg that 
closes the war, the IUmn " pl.ofesses himself the obedient 
servant of the Emperor of All the Russias," ancl "re- 
nounces the right" of ullalcing ww or " entertaiiiii~g clirect 
relations" with any f5overeig.n or Chief. An indemnity 
for the war expenses is imposecl, which, as it can never 
be paid-tl~ough the Treaty stipulates for its gradual 
payment by instalinents, ending in 189 3-makes the 
State of Khiva, if allowed t o  exist at all, tributary aud 
subordinate f'or ever t o  the Rnssian Govenment. The 
Rbqn cedes t o  Russia all the Delta of the Oxus, and all 
llis territory on the ~ i g h t  bank of the river, with power 
to establish " factories," " harbours and piers," on the left 4 
bank. Then there is the extraorclinary stipdation that 
the free navi~atibn of that river is reserved to Russian 
steamers and other ships, Xhivese and Bokharese boats 
. 
being only permitted t o  navigate the river with the 
special sanction of the Russian authorities.$ 
" P a p s ,  Central Asia (C. 704 of 1873), pp. 43, 44. 
i Letter dated "Berlin, June 3rd," Timeq June 6t11, 1873. - 
$ The ,qttbat,ance of tha Treaty, which is clated August +$th, 
1873, W R ~  telegraphed from Berlin by " O w  Yrussian Correspondent", 
and  :qq,ei&ed in the Times of Nopnber  25th, a d  the terms of a similar 
Treaty with l3olsharrt, clated September 28th) 1873, were puLlisllcd in 
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The Prussiaa Correspondent of tlic Times, in a letter 
dated 26th July, 1873, says, " It is believed that the 
largestmann of the" (Oxus) " Delta can be easily, sleepened 
by closing some of the ilarigation canals. Further np t l ~ a  
Amoo is a deep and magmficent itream a as fiw as  Koo11- 
cl00z.~'* 
,- From the snme valuable source of infornution we %re 
told, in a telegraphic message dated " Berlih, UecernLer 
Bncl," t h a t  Russian oflicers have heen colnrnissiol~ed ttr 
investigate the feasibility of' constructing a ~~nd,bctweeii 
tlie Amoo Darya and the Caspian Sen. "It is intended to 
utilise the ancient bed of the Amoo, the" most westerly 
portion of which comm~u~icutes with the Bay of I h s n o -  
voclsk. I f  the scheme is practicable, a direct cominuni- 
cation by water will be established between the city of 
Tvel; six hours from Moscow, and the  town of,Koondooz, 
on the frontiera of Badr~khahan. "t ,- 
Tllus Khivn is completely cut off from t h e  sea of Aral ; 
and A f g l ~ t ~ i ~ i s t a ~ ~ - a l t L ~ ~ ~ g h  the sources of the Oxus and 
the  navigable part of i ts course for at least a hundred 
miles from I<oo11ciooz, are within her limits-is hence- 
forth cut off from the free navigation of t ha t  liver ; while 
Russia, m7e.ma.y be sure, has no intention of cutting 
herself off from peacefhl access "as  fllr as Koondooz" by 
t ha t  " deep and magnificent stream." Should any brig- 
ands or mwauclers he heard of on its 'badis, s gun-boat or 
two might make an occasional trip in the interests of 
peace a i d  cornmerep. Herc are all the materials for a 
C 
very pretty quarrel, or for a n~agnanimous t ranssct io~~ 
with Afghanistan, wl~ichever may, a t  some future period, 
best snit Russia. 
We may resign ourselres to  ?he +fa& thnt the Oxus, 
formerly navigable domn io  "its mouth, and the main 
stream of which is sajcl to be cnlsable of' improvetxeirt or 
diversion, has fallen under the exclusive control o$ 
,. the Times of January 6th, 1874. The Troaty between Russia nud 
Khivn mill be found in the Parliament,nry-Papers, CclztmL Ask ,  C. 919 
of 1874, pp. 1 to  6. 
" The l ' h e s ,  Tr~csd:yr, Ju ly  2Dtt1, 1j73. P 
j- I b i d . ,  W e d  I I C S C ~ : { ~ ,  1)ecemhcr 3rr1, 1873. 
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Russia. TCveil if i t  should prove impossible t o  open the 
OXUS for boats into either the Caspian Sea or the Sea of * 
Aritl, Sir Alexander Burnes declares the river to he navig- 
:~ble froih" the Afghan district of Koondooz t o  a point very 
'near Oorguizj, the old capital of IChivn, a distance of 
about 550 miles ; and says, moreover, that the river 
a~tual ly  is navignted by '' boats of a superior description" 
--some of owhicl~ must surely belong t o  Afghan subjects, 
inen of Ballrh or Koondooz,-fifty feet in length by eig.11- 
teen in breadth, " con~tructed of square log: of wood, 
each aEout six feet long, Formed of a dwarf jungle tree 
called 'sheeshum,' which grows in great abundance 
throughout the banks of the river."* Besides this tree, 
he mentioils having seen " filrze and tamarisk," and also 
"mulberry aud white poplar ;" "tlie last," he adds, "is 
floated down the river from Hissar" (within Afghan 
territory)' " to  Charjooee, slid applied t o  purposes of house 
building? " There is," he continues, "every facility for 
building a fleet of' boats, tlie supply of wood being abun- 
dant, and, fortunately, found in single trees along the 
valley of the river, a d  not growing in forests in any 
partial spot."? This even distribution of the timber would 
make it peculiarly available for the supply of a very pres- 
sing want in the strategy of these days-unfelt when 
Burnes wrote-ftlel for steamers. 
If  the frontier of Russia thus virtually advances to the 
3 Upper Oxus, while the Hills continue to  form a debat- 
&Je land between British India and Afghanistan, Russian 
influence a t  Cabul will be absolutaly snpreme. Russia, 
firmly established on the Oxus, would not only overawe 
the rulers of Cabul, but could sway them at her will hy 
displaying befo~e them at any convenient crisis the bright 
prospect of recovering the Afghan Provinces conquered 
by Ilunjeet Singh, and held against them by us. If  we 
neglect to use that lever for the &iendly subjugation of 
' the Afghans, we shall have it  used against us whenever 
the occasion wises. A doubly fayourable occasion would - 
I 
* T~avcls in, Bokh~u-CL (John hIurray, 1834)) vol. ii, pp. 190 and 196. 
.F Ibid., p. 198. n 
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be prepased if we should ever be tempted i i t o  5 military 
occupation of any more Afghan territory. 
Withethe Afghan Goverament at her. beck and call, 
Russia would not have to force her way tl~rougli the Hill, 
tribes. She woulci be able t o  push them on a long way 
before her. Any Power that  woulci arni them and pro- 
rvide them, and push them on towards Dclhi, would be-a 
lawful Power for them, even though Eumpean alrd 
Clzristian, even though engaged at the time in the con- 
quest of Constantinople. What d o  they know of the 
Sultan of Turkey ? Their most inspiriting traaitions, 
their loftiest notions of religious glory and worldly re- 
nown, their ballads and tales, their debates by day and 
their dreams a t  night, are of the daughter of iclolators 
and the plunder of Hindustan. I n  order t o  make the 
mixed multitudes of India surpe and quiver, from North 
to South, with a strange canflizt of wi13 hope an? equally 
wild panic, it would be enough t o  insti1 some organization 
and concert into the raids of the border tribes, and to 
spread abroad t he  rumour that they were acting under 
the instigation and guidance of the Afghan State, and of 
a still greater State in  the background. By some such 
nlanmuvres, and without marching a single battalion out 
of the annexed or  protected territory of Turkestan, Rus- 
sia woulcl be able to paralyze our military power by 
giving i t  full employment within the frontiers of India. , 
Nor would the situation be much improved for us or 
impaired for her, if, by long-continued intrigues a ~ d  
affronts, 'we were at k ~ s t  drawn on iuto a Central-Asian 
-expedition, before which Russia might retire without " 
giving u s  any materials for a triumph, knowing that shc 
could come back whenever t h  c o a ~ t  w p  Elear, and calcu- 
1t~f;ing that, meanwhile, every day of our campaign or 
occupation would add to our expenses and increase our 
political difficulties, bo%l in Afgl1anistaa and in Inclia, . 
. Ally one or some one of the plans for advancing beyond 
w. 
our  present limits mayebe perfectly sound from a strate- 
gic point of view, if the Russians were likely t o  accept 
battle a t  a short clate, so that the struggle mkht be 
l~rief and ciecisive, But  we have no reason t o  expect that 
n 
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any such "s1~1%io11 W O L I ~ ~  follow the enlargement of our 
m&tauy mea. The strategists themselves do not expect 
it. For cxample, Sir Sydney Cotton's plan of stationing 
y h a t  he 'c'alis " snbsidiarv forces" a t  Cabul aud Canclalmr, 
and holding other strollg places in Afghanistan, may be 
quite unimpeaclfable as a military movement ; but the 
g d l a ~ i t  Geueral-in common with all those ardents spirits * 
and local axperts who recommend what they lightly 
term the " forwarcl gameJ' of an advance, whether by 
Qnettn y'Jellalabad-means much more than a military 
movmeut  or campaign. He means a great political 
aggression, tho permanent occupation of a free country, 
anainst a the will of the inhabitants and their rulers ; the 
institution of what I have called a state of covert war 
without any definable end. This is perfectly clear, because 
t h e  General says that "the establishment of British 
envoys i n ' s e c u ~ i t y  st Cabd,  Candalxw, and Herat," which 
h e  consi8ers t o  be "essentially necessary," would be 
'' i~practicnlJle," unless they were " supported by subsi- 
diary forces at Cab111 and Candahar." 
A subsidiary force, properly so cdled, is a force the 
annual cost of which is provided from some tribute, 
cession, or territorial assignment, granted by the State 
w l d ~  accepts the service. But in this case there would 
be neiLher acceptance nor grant. Even if the Afghan 
Goverl~ment were a, consenting party, and willing t o  do 
its best, i t  would be iltterly unable to rn&e any appreci- 
abk  contributiou towards the maintenance of a British 
contingent. The ccluntry is so poor that  no regdlar sup- 
' plies worth having, either in money o r  kind, could b e e  
levied by the s trictcst requisitions. Whatever subsidies 
were tvantbd fol' a British Army of occupation in Afghan- 
istan, would have t o  he f ~ ~ r n i s l ~ d  from the Indian 
revenues. A prof~~se  expenditure might keep the Afghans 
- quiet for two OY three years; but how would the addi- 
tional drain-the aniiual2,000,0002. or so, to  be cast upon 
t h e  stony ground of Cabul- be ,liked in India ? The - 
Indian Exchequer could not p~*ovicle for it without Home 
now inl;ond, whic2l would have t o  cu t  more deeply than 
@ n 
B 
the relinqui~hecl incomc-tax; into the scanty r€?sources of 
an under-fed and almost unclothed population. 
Tliat misapplied term, c'subsiditzry force," ~wnincls us, 
therefore, that the plan of occupying strategicmEositio~1se 
in Afg.llanistan cannot be considered merely as a military 
question. The political effects of " the' forward game" 
n would extend far beyond the coinfines of Af )hsnistauar 
the Poinjaub. All India would be a ~ e c t e i  It is au 
Imperial question of supreme importance. * 
But if an onward movement be rejected, something 
'4 
must be done. So far our military advisers are ? q n e s -  
tioiialdy in the right. We  cannot sit still. while Bussia 
creeps towards India, securing every step, improving her 
comnlunicatioins, clestroyiilg our exi;eraal iinfluence, and 8 
making tlie very weakness and disquietude of' our present 
boundary-line a source of her own strength. Wha t  
remedy can be devised except thnl; which is %ere pro- 
posed ? m 
Our North-West frontier system, wl~ile it is enormo;sly 1 
expensive and burdensome, has lnithert,~ signally faiied, 
and there is no prospect whatever of its attaming a saSe 
or steady equilibri~zm. W e  have, in fact, no frontier at 
all, and are in contact along the border with no ~esponsi- 
ble authority. The mountains that  divide us from the  
Afghan State are inhabited by lawless free-booters, sub- 
ject to no government, owning no ruler, recogniciing no 
@ interests or duties, beyond the circle of their separate 
clans, who forin a barrier against peacef~d intercowae 
from either side, buO set up no obstacle in our fjvour I 
--, against hostile operations. Thcir interposition enfeebles * 
our influelnee beyond them, leaves the Afghan S t i ~ t e  
exposed to pressure from other quarters: and'relieves i t  
from wlnolesonie responsibilitie~~that re iuclispcnsable for 
the safety of India. I prol)ose to  break down the barrier 
by making i t  an integral part of the Afghan State, which . 
wo~ild thenceforth be in close contact-with the I id ian  
n 
Empire, and could always be called tc:, a prompt account 
if Britjsli interests were in?jured o~ Cllreakenecl. 
The only plans offered for tlie improvement of o p  Sron- 
I) J 
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ticr systeG b t  the experienced local officials wllo fullyat'lmit 
its failure, involve an  inlnlense increase in our expen- 
diture, whil% every lxoblein, political and military, beyond 
.and w i t h  our pceseut frontier, would, as I have endea- 
vonwd to show, not omly be left unsolved, but would be 
still more complicated than before. 
*By ceding to the Afg.han State, on caref~~lly devised- 
cimditions; the Peshawnr Division and the DerdjRt, most 
of our difficulties wouid disappear, mcl all of them would 
be s iql i f ied.  It is diflic~~lt t o  foresee wlmt objections 
that  will bear u. lnoinent's thought can be adduced againit 
this measure? It cannot be shown that Ly adopting i t  
we shoulcl lose any stock of strength or wealth, in posses- 
sion or in  prospect. It is not, from any point of view, a 
self-denying ordinance ; it is not a relinquivhn~ellt of 
revenue.? Thc expenses of the Peshawur aucl the Deraj5t 
Provincp are immensely in excess of tlie receipts, alid 
the proposed cession would, clear the way for material 
and immediate economies. It is not the abandonment of 
a good military position ; i t  is a retirement from a lllost 
deadly and unmilitary Dontier-which is, ' in fact, no 
frontier a t  all-to a stronger and more healthy line, where 
our troops, tllough in smaller numbers, can be cou- 
veniently concentrated in formidable and clisposable 
mmses. By the same operation a doubtfd friend and 
possible enemy is drawn out, cl~ee~fidly and gratefully, 
from an inaccessible region into a position so weak and 
a0 open to  o w  power, that he is a t  once reduced, very 
much to his own benefit, into political subodination and 
pupilage. It is not the avoidance of a troublesonm  duty^ 
or the desertion of a field of benefice~lt work ; it is, on the 
oolitrary,' the Zdoption and application of efiicient means 
for perfbtining our duty and carrying nut our work, the 
means llitllerto employed having utterly fbiled. Having 
for more than twenty years endeavoured in vain to 
induce t.hose Afghan Hill tribes with whom we are in 
immediate contact to walk in o w  ways, or to treat us as 
friendly neigllbours;. we give them up, sec~lrely enclosed 
on alhsicles, to their own brethren, and ask the reunited 
~iation to coilst ct an orderly State, according to our 
principles, with our counsel, and to some Bstc%li, under 
our control, but by their own methods, with their own 
sppliauces, m d  on their own foundations. 
. . 
No support can be claimed for the policy advocated ip 
these pages from Sir John Lawrence's propost1 in  June 
1557 t o  withdraw our troops from Peshawur,  id to pre-, 
sent the District to the Aineer Ilost Mohammed. I am 
witldield fi-om pleacling the great authority of Lor8 Law- 
rence on my side by two distinct consider~,tions,-first, 
that the measure suggested in 185 7 appears to me t o  ha.vc 
been iimpportune and impel-fect ; secondly, that we arc by 
no means justified i n  assuming that Lord Lawrence would 
approve the measure supgested in 1869, 
We are hardly as yet ~n possession of su6cient nmterials 
for a find judgueut, or even for a cornplete criticism, on 
Lord Lawrence's policy in Central Asian affairs. Ellough 
has, perhaps, beell ncld~lced in these pages to prove that it 
was not aclequately described in the demi-oficiczl :uticlc 
of the E d i d w g h  Review as a policy of "masterly inactiv- 
ity." Nor was much light thrown upon the subject by 
thenolsleLord's speech of the 19th of April 1869. Nobwith- 
staiding the general tone of persoml recollection and ex- 
perieilce runniilg through this interesting speech, we crtn 
find no thread of fixed principle or design birding together .I 
the events of the last fourteen years as therein recapit?; 
lated. Lord Lawrenceremincls the House of Peers of the 
A+rge sha.re he took in these transactionsj and virtually * 
promises the Viceroy a full nleas~n-e of encouragement 
and supp0l-t. Q c 
"I believe Lord Mnyo has doue n s m o r e  than act on  the prin- 
ciples I suggested; I believe there is no intaution arid no desire 
to  do otherwise, but; quite the contrary; and I believe it is the 
wish of the Government in India and of' L D F ~  Mayo t o  pursue a 
course strictly in accordnnce with that hitherto adopted." 
F 
-7  
But he says nothing to make the  " course hitherto 
adopted" appear less crooked. He fills up none nf the 
gaps ; he mends nono of the broken li s. In  q~e&i~-g 
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of the ~?eat,f concluded with Dost Mol~nmmed in 1854, 
eful tribt-ite to  its real author. 
res on the part of the l ~ t e  A ~ I C C ~  m ~ G t  bc attri- 
,hutecl to  the wise a r i d  zealo~is exertions of the  lu te  Sir Berbc1.t 
Rdwardes, n n  offjcer of great mmlr, whose dcath was one of the  
gredest  losses thLt could be inf l ic td  on the Inc l i un  Service." 
Bilt he does not allude t o  the sing~dar fact which we learn? 
Goin Xir JGlm Kaye, a, very safe informant, that Sir John 
Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Puujmb, ol3jected to 
both tbe Treaties wit11 Dost Mohammed, that of 1555 as 
well as that of 1557.% NOY does he say a word in explana- 
t ion of that  Will more singnlar [act, his own proposal in 
Jmle IS57  t o  cede Pcshawur to t1:lst very Ameer Dost 
Mohammed, with whorn in January he had objected to 
make a Treaty. 
The plpposed cession of 1857 seems to have been based 
on no principle whatever, and to have provided for 110 
future course of action ; bnt to have been-as usual-a, 
mere mltke-shift, calcnlated, as was supposed, to meet the 
immediate emergency. The siege of Delhi was then in that 
critical stage when there was even some t l ~ o ~ ~ h t  of rais- 
ing it. Peshawur was therefore to be handed over as a 
peace-offering to Dost Mohammed, -while the troops at 
Peshawur were t o  proceed to Lahore and join an army of 
reserve to reinforce the besieging force before De1hi.t 
The combined remonstrances of General Sir Sydncy Cot- 
ton, commanding. tl-IP, troops a t  Peshawur, Sir Herbert 
Edwaxdes, Commissioner ofthe L)ivi$on, and General John 
Nicholson, Deputy Comn~issione~ of the District, appear to 
have averted this retrograde step, whi011 was also totaI1f- 
disapprovgd by &ord Gaming. Y arious opinions may exist 
as t o  the relative advalltagea of holding Peslmwur and of 
cedir~g it t o  the Ameer of Afglmnistan. The same direr- 
ences of opinion may exist as to the retention of Gibraltar 
or its restoration to the Spanish Government. Bnt there 
are times and seasons. To have surrendered Peshawur to 
rn - 
* Raye's Xepoy JPar, vd. i, pp. 433, 445;44€. 
1. Nine Yeurs on the North-West Frontier of India. By General Sir 
Sydney Tlotton, R.C.U. (Bentley, 186G), pp. 190-1 97; ILiyo's Seppoy W u r ,  
vol. ii,pp. 607, 608, 612, 617~018,619. 
h 
Dost Yol,ilau~inetl, wldo we n.erc cugnged il?tllilt life and 
death strug-le, and wllile thirty tlrausaud 
sadcllingatllelr horses for a raicl on Hindosta 
been as if we hucl given up Gibraltar to the Spaniards, c 
while the French and Sl>anish fleets"ror1e ip Algesiras Bay, 
while the allied armies were in the lines of San Roque. It 
'would have been a capitulation without terms. It woufd 
not have conciliated the Afglmns or  the borc1e"rtribes ; ;t 
would have united them against us, 2nd would have de- 
stroyed the  power of Dost Mohami~~ecl to restraip thein. 
The Inclus wodcl not have stopped them, if they had once 
got throngh the Passes. They mould havencome upon us 
like a flood. The Lumscleils wrote ikom Cai~dahar :-" If 
Peshawur a d  Mohat are given up at this mounent, we 
shall have all Afql~anistnn down upon our backs."" 
Supposing, however, that the cautious and ,moderate 
policy of Dost Mohainined had been proof against the 
temptation of our avowed weakness, and his injunctions 
had sufficed t o  keep the Afghans on their omw side of the 
Indus, the actual danger might  have been tided over, re- 
lief migllt have been given for the m o s ~ e i ~ t  to our over- 
strained military resources, but  no permanent gain would 
have been acquired, no perinanent good would have been 
done. On the contri~ry, there would have been an abso- 
lute loss of power and a real dcsertion of duty. The ag- 
gressive spirit.of the Afghans would have been gratified 
a t  our expense, and the  very &cumstances of the cession 
woulcl have preclilde$ conditions being imposed by a m  
Government for the a,clvaucement sf its legitimate influence 
h 
and interests, and for the maintenance of an orderly nd- 
ministration in the transferred Province. ~i~cI~,condii;ioll8 
could now be imposed without pr8ssure, slid maintained 
without effort. n 
One fatal defect has hitherto possessed and poisoned all 
our communicatidi~s with $he Afghan St ate. To whatever 
extent, and in whatever direction, we have endeavoured 
to control its course, our aim has been sll~vuys t r a n ~ p r e n t l y  
selfish, T o  this i t  must 1.w adclecl that our nletl~ocl has 
beeu ~isnally clcstructive. Our action has been so purely 
negativec;?,nb srqxrlicisl, that it has ncver prochced, at 
,$he best, anytlling rnore thnn s superficial and negative 
effect in our L ~ o u r .  'Too often it has recoiled against 
US. 
pWlletller the British agents i n  Illrlia lmve adhered to " 
o& traditiofd policy of promoting t l ~  e uniou m d  strength 
of the Afghan Kingdom, or whether they have departed 
from it,,tlzeir vision has been always fixed on the outwsl-d 
aspect of ;tff'airs, and their object limited t o  some irnmecli- 
ate exigeuoy of our own. JVlien we assisted Dost Moham- 
med with a sulssicly and n supply of amus in 1857, that 
assistance was given beca~~se the1.e was " weer b s t w ~ e n  the 
B~it ish  ccml Persian Govem7,~en ts," ;lmd was to  be continuer1 
on certaili conditions of active co-operation "clzwing the 
tcrw with,Pe&x"* VIThen we delayed for six months the 
recognition of Alneer 811er Ali Khnn, and prolnptly recoa- P 
nised two successive pretenders, i t  was-at least all Indl:~ 
and Afghanistan believed i t  was,-because we s~~pposed 
Azim Khan, the most able and energetic leader of the in- 
surgents, to be " our friend," to be " more loyally disposed 
towards the British Governrrient than any other Afgllarr 
Sirdnr."j- 
In  1639, when we violently deposcd Dost Mohammed, 
and restored Shah SujsLh ; in 1563, when we superciliously 
ignored Sher Ali, the lawful successor of Dost ~ohsmined ,  
f w 4 x  months ; in 1866 and 186 1, we hailed with 
perverse alacrity the trai~sient succesg of his rivals, a i d  on 
several occasioils during the civil war when we counselledc' 
and encoupged a partition of territory, we never evinced 
the slightest cok4dora~ion for the wishes of %he dfgllans 
tl~ems~lves, or any desireto ascertain what their wi~hes 
were. W e  bent ourselves to the inglorious tat+ of setting 
. up or abetting somepe~~so~~,-~110, if' ever so  firidy seated, 
could not live for ever,--w1lo ~vas expectgd to be grateful, 
or " layal," or manageable for our purposes. I11 every in- - 
stance our project hiletl, as such petty nrakesliftfts deserve 
c " Collecihn of Trccctirs, vol. ii, p. 431. 
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and are destined always to fail. Our policy' wih assuredly 
fhil again, sooner or later, if i t  rests on the expectation 
t h a t  t h e  Anieer Sher Ali, in person, his hei? apprent ,  or 
any of his successors, in person, will be "loyal:' p t e f u &  
or rnailagea,ble, on account of the assistance that has been 
g-iven to him and to  liis branch of the fimily. We  must 
not hope tha t  the Ruler of Afghanistan can long be kept 
i n  the  path of faithful alliaiice and orderly governmeilt, 
by  means of au ailrlual subsidy or occasioid fiuplslies of 
money and warlike stores. We  must have s o ~ n e t h i n ~  
mar? solid than a personal basis for our policy. We must 
worli. for t h e  organisation of an Afghan State, aid make 
i ts  s e l ~ t i o i ~ s  with the British Governineilt definite and 
dursble. 
In ,zcknowleclging the conlmunication of s copy of the 
Treaty with Khiva, Lord Granville poii~tedly~says, in a 
despatch to our Ambassador a t  St. Petersburg, dated 7 th 
January, 18 74, that he sees ','no practical advantage in ex- 
nrni~~ing too minutely how f : ~ ~  these arrangements are in 
strict accordance with the assurances given in January 
last by Count Schoundoff as t o  the int,eiitions with which 
the  cupedition against Khiva was undei%rtken."* Though 
i t  may have served the puq2ose of the  Russian Chancellor 
t o  be perfectly callous t o  this imputation, the meaning 
cannot be misunderstood. Our Foreign Minister declares 
that  we have been duped, bnt sees no present reason for 
showing resentment. He is " not disposed to share in  the 
exaggerated apprehensions which have a t  times beenex- 
pressed in this countEy as  to the  danger t o  British rule in 
-India whicli may arise from the extension of Itussian 
influence in ~ e n i r a l  Asia," but he considers it " not, un- 
natural ?that the Ruler of Afghnistan "should feel and 
express some uneasiness a t  the* rapid advance of Russian 
power towards his frontier. 13s  a,pprehensions have been 
more especially roused by the reported intention to send a. 
Russian expedition to capture Merv and reduce the Tur- 
cornan tribes of those ~ a ~ t s ,  and he has applied t o  t he  Go- 
vernment of India for advice on th~?  subject."^ 
.I 
" Papers, Ce~zt~al  Aeia (C. 919 of 1864), p. 7. 1' Tbicl., p. 8. 
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Prince ~ol%chalcoff, in a despatch dated January 21st, 
1874, expresses his " entire sat,isfaction." In his "opinion 
the undpystanding is complete." He  has "rep&ted to 
Lord Augustus Loftns the positive assurance that  the Im- 
perial Cabinet coptinues' t o  consider Afghanistan as entirely 
beyond its sphere of action."* But  he by no meah un- 
dertalcss so to " continue t o  consider" for any vel-y * 
le&gthened, 'or for any very limited period. On the con- 
trary, he quietly Knts in the following paragraph that 
this period of abstinence may possibly be a very short 
one. t 
a 
"As regards the eventual danger pointed out to  us by Lord 
Granville, and to which Sher Ali appears already to have called 
the attention of the Government of India, namely, that nomnde 
tribes of T~ircomans driven off by our troops may return to seek 
assistance or refuge on the territovy of Herat, and may bring 
about a con3ict betwccn us and Afghanistan, I have told Lo1.d A. 
Loftus th$t we had no intention of undertaking an espedition 
against the Turcomans; i t  depended entirely on them to live 011 
good ternls with us, and even to derive profit from our proximity 
and from the outlets which we are endeavouring to make for 
peaceful commerce ; bnt if these turbulent tribes were to take to 
attacking or plundering us, we should be compelled to punish 
them. This is a necessity vhich Her Mejesty's Government know 
from their own experience, aud which no Crovernmcnt in contact 
with wild populations can avoid. We are in any cam the Erst to 
wish that this punishment, if i t  becomes necessnry, should be in- 
flicted as near as possible to  our own frontier."+ 
I n  plain terms, the Russian troops will certainly invade 
* 0 
Afghanistan to inflict pnishlnent *on the Turcomans, 
whenever such " a necessity" may arise, but wid1 not-at 
least " wa are in any case the first to wish" they should 
not,-penetrate &rther,into Afghan territory than they 
choose. It is, of course, doubly satisfactory t o  hear that 
" Lord A. Loftus has received the same assurances from 
the mouth of our a u g ~ ~ s t  Master, and has ddnbtless re- 
' ported thetn to his Government." Prince Q ~ r t s c ~ l r o f f  
proceeds to observe that "althgugh the eventuality 
pointed out by Shere A& is scttrcely probable, the Ameer of 
" ' I'apevs, Central Ajia (0. 919 of 1874), p. 10. 
+ IbicL., 1). 1 I . 
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Cabul can assist in removing the possi~1ity of i t  by 
making -the Turcolnans understand clearly beforehand, 
tha t  if they provoke rigorous measures by acts ,qf depre- 
dation against us, they cannot count upon any assistance 
or protection from him. The Indian Goyernment is cer- 
tainly in s position t o  give hiin this advice in a form which 
will ensure its effectiveness." The Russian Minister has 
previously taken credit for having always aceed towa<ds 
" the Khai~ats which lie upon our borders," so as " t o  
deter them from all aggression", and to prevent any ' C ~ i ~ -  
lent rcollision from dist~~rbing the peace of Central Asia," 
and adds :-'( We have a full assurance th'at the Govern- 
ment of Indin will act in the same inanner with regard to 
the Anleer of Cabu1, and we have no doubt that it pos- 
sesses the means of making itself listened to."* 
But the Govelminent of India certaiidy does not possess 
the same "means of nuking itself listened to" as,tfie Rus- 
sian Government does. I11 order " to deter the Khanats 
tvhicli lie upon her borders" from "all aggressionJ', and to 
prevent any "violent collision from disturbing the peace 
of Centra.1 Asia,",Russia, has forced those Khanats t o  give 
up " the right of eatertaining direct relations with any Xo- 
vereign or Chief." When exhorting the G~ve~nrneilt  of 
India " to act in tlle same manner with regard to the 
Amcer of Cabul," Prince GortschakoE, perhaps without fl 
intencling it, really suggests a similar measure. If the 
Emperor of Russia, after stripping the Ameers of Eol111ara 
and Khiva of a greatt,part of their territory, has compdled i 
- them to $enounce by treaty all external relations with , 
other States or rulers, he cannot be surprised and ought 
not to complain if' the Queen of GreatBritajp and Em- 
press df India, when ceding teBitory t o  the Ameer of 
Afghanistan ahodd require iA the treaty of cession a 
similar reixunciation. Still less could the Russian Go- 
veri~rnent have any ground of complaint against our ob- - 
taining by treaty the right of control over the external 
r- relations of the Afgh8n Ameer, when it has already de- 
clared the British Government moially bound to restrain 
n 
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the Ameer ?n "a  peaceful attitude," to "insist on his 
giving np d l  measures of aggression,')* and " to give acl- 
vice in, 9 form that will ensure its effectivene&." Our 
- actual influence at the Court of Oabul is not really so 
supreme, or so, easilf applied, as Prince Gortscl~akoff 
chooses to assume it to be. If, however, it were broughtm 
u J to the requisite height by the policy suggested in 
t ! lese nge3, Eussian influence at Cabul, and the rumours 
of suck influence now current througlmut India, would 
soon die away and disappear. W e  should then be, for the 
first time, in a position to make Af&hanistan easily respon- 
sible for kee$ing her engagements with us, and also t o  
hold Russia down to a less equivocal interpretation and a, 
more consistent observance of her freely proffered pledges. 
When we have once installed an  Afghan Governol., with 
a well-chysen British Envoy close by him, a t  Peshawur- 
in forinej clays a favourite winter residence of the Afghan 
Sovereign-the Russiails may be allowed to embank the 
Oxus with their forts, and eucouraged to navigate it with 
their steam-vessels, fbr British influence thronghont the 
Ameer's dominions will then be paramount and irresistible. 
The Hill tribes will then be subjects of the Afghan State, 
Afghanistan, richer and stronger for our profitable retro- 
cession, will be an unpaid outpost of the Indian Empire, a 
willing basis of operations if it should ever be necessary to 
wage war beyond our frontiers. 
Among the details of the terms of transfer, on which 
nwdecided opinion need be @ven liere, there might be a 
condition in the Treaty reserving to the British Govern; 
rnent the right of holding a camp of exercise,'at its dis- 
cretion, in, any ?art of the Afghan dominions,--in ordi- 
nary times, perhaps, @every second or third yEar, and 
within the Peshawur Prdvince,-when an efficient force, 
i t  matters not how small, of Afghan troop@, might be 
, bound to appear, to be regularly mustered, and to take 
their place in line, under the command of the English 
General. The irritations and entfiglements that wait on 
a stcznding garrison 2 cantonment, need not be feared 
3 
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during the  three active months of a rnovabblk camp of ex- 
ercise. 
0 "  
I n  a second article which appeyed in the Fortnightlj/" 
Review of March 18 '70, under the heading, " Mischievou~ 
, ActivityJ',-the former one, of December 1 SG9, having besn 
entitled " Masterly Inactivity",-Mr. J. W. S. Wyllie con- 
demned the  policy of supporting Sher Ali, initiated in tho 
last days of his Viceroyalty by Sir John Lawrence, and 
carried out by Lord Mayo. The strictures of Mr. Wyllie 011 
the pageantry and negotiations of the Uqballa c a l ~ p  in 
April 1869, are wonderfully characteristic of the spirit of 
hopeless contempt that has long reigned supreme in the 
Foreign Office of Calcutta. " Lord Mayo erred on the 
side of excessive complaisance to his Afghan guest." I f  
"the duty of meeting Sher Mi had fallen to thc retiring 
Governor-General, i t  probably would have been psrformerl 
in very different style". Sir John Lawrence " would httvc? 
run up to Peshawur, attended only by t w o  or three mem- 
bers of his staff", and would have "settled in an hour's 
personal chat with the Ameer whatever needed settle- 
ment". " He would have made no more fuss about i t  
than hc did about the flying visit which he paid to the 
Mal~araj ah Scindia, a t  Gwalior, in November 18 6 6."" 
Instead of" grovelllllg in supplication at the feet" of the - 
English, Sher Ali "has risen t o  swagger among them as a 
patron." " He was allowed to brag and bluster as only an 
Afghan can." " Sher- Ali at  Umballa represented little I&- 
- yond his ,own  interest^",-‘^ his attendants, save two or . 
three, were little better than menials, and vindicated their 
nationality by their dirty clothes.'k " British influence in 
~fghanrstan is staked on the fate of one ungrateful and 
half-crazy individual, who clarnkm to us for more gold as 
his only chmce of escaping snnihilation."f 
He says that there are "in the national character and - 
- " When he  displayed thomost nm?ignifiecl mistrust on the part of the 
Imperial Government, and insulted a meribrions Prince, by compell i~~g 
ScinGa to  bred< up his camp of exercise, and disperse the tr2ops about 
the  country. 
t Portwiglrtly Review, March 1870, 279, 286, 287, 301. 
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customs "o the Afghans inherent defects", which render 
"the erection of a strong Goveri~ment" on their soil " a com- 
plete impossibility". " W e  all knowJJ, Be coutinrres, " the 
,homely Bhge about a silk purse and the material out of 
which it can't be made:'. Aud then, after quoting several 
authorities as tb the turbulence end lawlessness of the 
~ f ~ l l a n  Chieftains and people, he inqnires :-'r What is t o  * 
be done wiith fellows of this kidney ? W e  cannot make 
the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots."*' 
The "inherent defects" in h e  constitution and customu of 
the Afghan State and of Afghan society, are-as MI.. Wyllie 
perceives-tha very defects which the Alneer Sher Ali 
has been persistently endeavoru-ing to cure, but all such 
endeavours on his part are "Utopian", and all atternl~ts 
on our part t o  help him must be " artificial". " The Sir- 
dars, or Chiefs of clans", he explains, " are all Sovereigns 
within th&r respective domains". " The authority which 
the AmJeer, the head of the principal clan, nominally 
exercises over them all comprises, at best, little inore than 
a right t o  levy a fixed proportion of troops and money from 
each for the common defence."t 
" Hitherto", he observes, "Afghanistan had been parcelled out 
among Governors, each of whom received and usod the taxos of 
his province after his own fashion, and remitted fo the central 
authority ody so much balance as he thought i t  unsafe t n  with- 
hold. Sirnilai.ly the army had been nothing more than an assembly 
of the contingents which, on sound of war, the heads of the vari- 
ous clans severally brought to the royal camp. These foderal and 
. f~udd arrangements Sher Ali eudea~oured to replace by a system 
of monarchical centralisation. Ho wantoil a stmanding army of his 
own ; and, still more, he wanted local treasuries of his ~ w n ,  so t h a t  
the taxes might reach him entire, and the emoluments of the pro- 
vincial govwnors fake the form of tixed tialarie~.'~S 
Sher Mi Khan, t h l t  :'half-crazy individual": having 
recurred, after his reinstatement, t o  "the self-same scheme 
for exalting the kingly power", which had plvved su un- 
' popular " soon after the commencemeut of his reignJJ, is 
declared t o  have, "like the Bourlynu of the Restoration, 
learned nothing in adversity and forgotten notlGng."$ . 
* Fqrtniyhtly Review, March 1870, pp. 304, 306. 
t Ibicl., p. 304. q $  Ibid, p. 298, 0 1bi2. 
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One might have thought it would h a m  be'en clear 
to the student of history, that there is a period in 
tllo progress of nations when the exaltation of kingly 
po~\~er is a step forward, although there may  b8 bnother * 
period when it would be a retrogression. Louis XI. was 
a true reformer, though Charles X. was a ~ e a c t i o n a r ~ .  
I t  might have been equally clear to tho practical nd- 
miilistrrttor that the " unpopular measures"" 013 which tlre 
Ameer Xher Ali was persistently bent were indispensable 
for the formation of a regular and orderly government. 
But no ! " Can the Ethiopian", he asks, " c11stllg.e his skin, 
or the leopard his spots ?" The " normal canst-ltution" of 
Afghanistttn is that of " discordant tribes," " of several 
we& and antagonistic principalities."? The Afg l~an  Prince 
was " a half-crazy indivic1ual"-in short, a fool-to dream 
of rushing in where an administrative angel, even a British 
Resident or Commissioner, might fear t o  t read.  
In  the four years, however, that have elapsed s i h e  ridi- 
cule I I ~  thrown upon his efforts, the Ameer Sher Ali has 
manifestly gone a great way towards overcoming " the ill- 
herent defecis" of the national character, and transforming 
the " normal constitution" of Afghanistan, It would be 
too much to say that he has brought aJl t h e  treasuries 
and all the troops tluoughout his dominions under his 
direct command, thc~t all the feudal Chieftains have sunk 
into proviilcial governors, still.less that all the " discordant C 
and antagonistic" tribes have been reduced t o  order and 
obeclience. But most of the Chieftains, including -Ule 
Princes of his own'fan?ily, one or two of his sons  excepted, 
Aave been deprived of control over the local finances alld ' 
forces, their jayhires being resumed and comlmutcd into a 
money pilyment, and their persona,l ifollowdrs dis'banded or  
enlisted into the Ameer's newly-~puised regimellks. And, 
according to the best ancl latest informatioll, the culti- 
vators of the resumed estates throughout t h e  Afghan tcr- 
ritories rejoice a t  the change, and find the A1aeer's assess- 
,- ments much easigr thqp the indefinite demallcls of the 
Chief'taiils, whose insecure tenure m d e  them gloasp i ~ t  all 
1 
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that  codid bo got in each year. There can be no doubt 
tlmt these were " unpopular measures" with the Princes 
and Chieftains and all their class. Thus i t  was that  Sirdar 
Isinael El~an,  the Ameer's nephew," being aggrieved a t  his 
'reduction from the pcasition of a territorial feudatory to 
that of a salaried commmder, was twice detected in trea- 
sdnable conspiracy againlst his uncle's life, and, having; 
been once fwgiven, was, after the second attempt, finally 
placed in the custody of the Government of Indin a t  La- 
hore, where he died in 1872. 
A very recent article in the Zdidnwglt  RCV~BZU, evi- 
dently based .on the most authentic official information, 
bears testimony to the " s-trong natural affections " of the  
Ameer Sher Ali, arld describes how measures of combined 
coercion and conciliation at leilgth brougl~t he  most able 
and ambitious ofhis sons, Yakoob Khan, to his feet, and 
led to "bursts of penitential confession on the part of 
Yakoobf who said he lived only to be forgiven, and would 
welcome death a t  his father's hands if p a -d 011 were once 
obtained ".t His father gavc the greatest proof not only 
of ~mdirnillisl~ed paternal affection, but of undisturbed 
confidence and cool temper, by restoring the pUclonecl 
rebel t o  the government of Herat. When, in additioii to 
these later instances of his clemency and self-command, 
we call to mind his repeated and ill-requited forgiveness 
of his brothers, Afzul and h i m  Khan, and mark his 
efforts at reform-even if they be, in some respects, pre- 
p $ m c  and purely imitative-it will be no more t11a11 
' justice to acknowledge that in prosperity, as in adversity, 
the Ameer Sheer Ali-very unlike the Bouq-bons-ha3 
evinced a great faculty for learning, and a great and 
geilerousi%lacriby in fo~e t t ing .  Such a ruler mnerits our 
sympathy and support. , 
Imperial st:ttesmen ought fully t o  redise one great fact, 
v 
W o n  of his brother, Mhomed Ameer IChan, who was killed, fighting 
against him, in t11e same battle before Cendahar in wbich his own sou 
fell. Ante, p. 21. ?, BcZinburyh Review, July 1673, p. 2'56. 
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~vhich Indian officials always seem to lose R;;ghC of, t ha t  
Asiatics are men endowed with intellectual faculties very 
similar tie our own, actuated by motives, passions, and  
ambitions, good and bad, very much like ours:. If t h e  
relations between the British Ernpip and t h e  many alien 
States and communities beyond its immediate bounds, oy 
,encircled by them, and more or less under i ts  rnle, pr6- 
tection or influence, are ever to assume a lwalthy clm- 
racter, with some promise of permanence and consistency, 
our nlost exalted fuilctionaries in India must  be tanght  
certain lessoas, which, judging from their conduct and 
counselv up to the present day, they will aLever learn for 
themselves. They must be tauglll: by detailed instruc- 
tions from home in all mattem of Imperial policy not t o  
despise Asiatics, whatever their complexion or creed-not 
t o  despair of the progress of an Asiatic State, though left  
to  its own devices. It will not help us much towards a 
clear understanding of their wants and capgbilities, 
t h r o ~ ~ g h  which we might win them t o  our p~~rpose ,  and 
guide them in to a better ~ ~ a y ,  if we halsitnate ourselves t o  
think of the Afghaas only as " picturesque ruffians,"* or 
dwell exclusively upon what we call their " treacheryJ' 
when struggling against foreign invaders. Le t  us  rather 
look a t  the brighter points of their mtional character, re- 
cognise such evidence of moral a.nd social progress as their 
recent annals present, and assure ourselves t h a t  they " 
know far more about their own afhil-s, and are far more 
competent to manage them, than we have been hithersg 
disposed to allow. Let us  be very kind t o  their virtues 
qnd successes, and not entirely blind t o  our own hilings 
and failures. W e  shall then be in a better position t o  
survey the present necessities, and ,to form a p k n  for our  
future cofiduct. W e  meddled qost  injuriously with Af- 
ghan affairs from 1839 to  1842 ; we neglected them most 
injuriously f ~ o m  1 6 63 t o  18 6 8. Though I am far froln 
saying that British in f l~~e i~ce  and example have been of ' 
no avail, for I believe boLh Dost Mohammed and Sher Ali 
* profited by ihem lergelyfit is in the main t rue  t h a t  in the 
1 
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last quafier oif a century the two Afghan Ameers, acting 
almost entirely without our help, and with very little of 
our advice, have made great progress by concentrt~ting 
their stmlgth, improving their administration, and hu- 
*mmlising their political practice. Were friendly and con- 
fidential relations fully in play, our example and instruc- 
tibns, through the persorial agency and influence of two* 
OY three fixst-rat;e British officers. mi& do much for 
the good of the Afghan Government aGd people, without 
any approach to those contemptuous displacements and 
sweeping innovations that have clmracterised in general 
our political guidance of India W e  must help our friends 
across the Indus t o  build on their own foundations. 
I n  the circumstances attending the accession of the 
Ameer Sher Ali, and his deferred recognition, the best 
possible illustration %rill be found of an opportunity for 
what I call assisting the Afghans to build on their own 
foundati%ns,-an opportunity, which was, uufurtunately, 
rejected and perverted by the Government of India. The 
Ameer D ost Mohammed, well knowing his country's his- 
tory, the chuacter and habits of its people, and the quali- 
fications of each of his own sons, aud desiring to prevent 
a civil war, publicly nominated his heir and successor, had 
the i2omination recorded in s treaty of perpetual friend- 
ship with the British Government, and on the death of 
the first heir-apparent for~nally notified a second nomina- 
tion. But  when the crisis arrived, which the old Ameer 
bad foreseen,-when good faith and good policy both 
cafled for the prompt and cordial retognition of the heir, 
whose nomination had been solemnly confirmed a t  hig 
father's death-bed, the praisewortliy efforts of our Afghm 
ally were i ~ u l l i f i d  by tlae dubious and dilatory progeedings 
of the authorities at Calcyttw. The germ of n law of suc- 
cession, which, a t  the touch of a true statesman, might 
have blossomed into a pact and a precedent,*was blasted 
' by the cold and disdainful treatment it received from an 
Anglo-Indian offici.d. The lost o por t~bi ty  may still be . 
"i regained. The most,urgent prob em of Afghan politics 
is that pf the sucbession t o  the tl~ruue. However strong' 
may be the ties of natur3l affection and mutual respect 
J 
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between the Ameer and Yakoob Khan, the most%ble and 
ambitious of his sons,-complete as may be the father's 
authority aiid tlhe son's obedience, while their relative po- 
sitions and obligations last,-there can be no doQbt as t o ,  
Yakoob Khan's determination t o  succeed his father, or as 
to the Ameer's desire to  secure the throne for his favourite 
.son, Abdoollah Jan, whom he has publicly nominated ks 
his heir. Unless an effectual process for peaceably carrying 
out the next succession,-or, better far, a permanent rule 
and procedure of inheritance,--can be settled while Sher 
M i  lives, his death will be the signal for another fratri- 
cidal contest, involving once more the Afghan State in I 
anarchy, and threatenin-g. its dismemberment. If we are , 
unprepared for this crisis, Russia, we may be sure, will 
not overlook its approach. If, when it comes, we are 
still separated from Afghanistan by lofty mountain 
ranges, while the Russians are in contact along the Oxus, 
they will be able by gentle aud unobtrusive riieaus, to 
which we could oppose nothing but military violence, t o  
manage the  crisis in their own way. Without moving a 
bayonet across their acknowledged frontier, the rulers of 
Russian Turkestan would be able either t o  bend the 
Afghan State under oppressive obligations, or to  break it 
up for their own benefit, fiussian patronage aiid a little 
money would suffice t o  turn the scale in favour of their 
chosen candidate, o r  Balkh and Badakhshan might be re- 
claimed and occupicd by their vassal, the Ameer of 
Bokhara. A pretext and an occasion would never be - 
wanting in the mids tmof a civil x-ar. 
It may& said that the Russian Government cannot 
compete with ours in the expenditure of money, and tlut 
if Russiawere to enter any Afghmqroviilee, eitber opeilly 
with her own troops, or by pusl$iig on Bokl~ara, we could 
bl-iag a superior force into the field and easily repel the 
invaders. But that  is not the question. No sane person, 
surely, would advise us at any time to engage in a corn- ' 
petition of subsidies with Russia. 'It would spoil the 
.% 
Ameer Slier Ali and his successors,~both as rule~s and as 
' d l i ~ ~  No sale person, surely, loolrs upon a caml~ign ill 
Centrul Asia-whether with Q~ssia, againat us as all 
Ip 
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avowed Enemy, or not,-as a desirable or indifferent con- 
tingency. 
There cau be no doubt that the military ressurces of 
+the Indi'dn Empire available for employment in Central 
Asia, far exceed, at  present, those that could be opposed 
to them by R~bsia.  W e  need not sllrink, on milita1.y 
gPounds, from a campaign beyond the Indus, or beyond n 
the Oxus. .Our troops would be welcome in Afghanistan 
or in Bofiara, if it were clear that they only went there 
to drive out the Russians. But such operations woulcl be 
very expensive, and an ignorant "impatience of taxation" 
is beginning t o  manifest itself in India, whence, in con- 
. formity with precedent, the funds would have to  be 
drawn. R~~ssia ,  though poor in comparison with Great 
Britain, is rich in co~npasison with India, and can raise all 
the money she wants without any political anxieties. And 
if we look a t  the comparative cost of establishments, we 
shall find that money goes a great deal fhrther in Russia 
thau i t  does in India. W l ~ e r e v e ~  a Russian army may 
march, its coininissioned officers are paid mncl~ less than 
that average annual rate of 2650 which is required for 
the officers of the Indian army. A Russian General of 
I)ivkion, even on active service, does not receive the 
fourt,h part of the emoluinent~s of an Anglo-Indian General 
of Division in tinze of peace, amounting t o  24,500 a year. 
' The Commandant of 5 0 0 Cossacks does not get S2,0 00 per 
annum, like a Lieutenant-Colonel commanding a regiment 
sf Jndian Cavalry. The pay and allowances of a Major a t  
the head of 650 Sepoys, about X1,50 a year, consiclersbly 
exceed the pay of a Russian officer in coinrnanchof an Inir 
fantry Battalion. All the cost and charges of our Army 
in India Qe on%he sawe grand scale, and would have to 
be very midl aggravated,before we could pass the OXLK 
Without feeling any excessive anxiety as t o  the troubles 
of such a tame creature as the Indian tax-pqer, neither 
* Indian financiers nor Indian fundholders ought, perlmps, 
on cool reflection, to feel quite satkfied & such n prospect 
of enhanced expenditnre. 
The geal ~ ~ ~ ~ e s t i d n ,  herefore, is not  whether we can*beatl 
Russia in subsidising or,in fighting. The real problems 
I 
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to be solved by the Indian statesman are how'To avoid 
both military and monetary operations beyond our fron- 
tier, howdo avert a civil mar in Afghanistan, and, should 
a contest commence, how to keep its issues wtthin our. 
own control, and insure its being a d o s t  one. To attain 
these objects the Afghan State mast be &ally conllected 
.with India, and made a recognised part of our Imperikl 
system. The great political want of Afghanistan, the  
chief obstacle to the  establishment of an orderly and pro- 
gressive administration in that  co~mtry, and to the form- 
ation of any weighty and permanent engagements with 
its ruler, is the absence of any law of sucoession. This 
crying want we should induce the Afghans to supply ; 
this grievous obstacle we should persuade them to  remove. 
W e  ought not to endeavour t o  do the work for them, or 
to dictate the details ; but t ry  to lead them to do i t  for 
tl~emselves, and as much as possible in their dwn way. 
W e  should help them to build on their own foundations. 
An article of great merit and interest, entitled " Recent 
Events in Afghanistan," in the Edinbul*gk Review for 
July 1573, which, if not oEcially inspired, is written 
with full official information, warns us to take no part on 
either side in the contested inheritance, and tells us that  
during the  Umlsalla interviews of 1869, although Lord 
Mayo gave "good counsel as t o  conciliation rather than 
severity," he  "was careful to say no word in favour or 
disfavour of any particular successor." " Such a word," 
the  writer continues, " would have immediately rousgd 
- 
the jealousy of foreigv intervention, which is, perhaps, the 
dominant passion in that  strong-passioned and uncontrol- 
lable race."* 
With dl this I fully concur. Not a word Should be 
said by us in favo~u. or disfavopr of any particular suc- 
cessor. More than tllat, the Government of India should 
encleavo~u- t a  divest itself of any predilection for any par- 
ticular candidate. The personal element should be, as far * 
as possible, discaded fsom our calculations, and entirely 
.. 
from our propositions. Our object ehould be to, promote 
m 
# Edinburgh Review, July 1873, p. 297. 
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in ~ f ~ h c n i s t g n  the growth of legal principles and formal 
procedure, so that  good and orderly government may gra- 
dually cgme to depend less on the  personal abilities and 
.character of the reigning Prince than i t  does a t  present. 
It would be a great step in the right direction if we 
c ~ u l d  get the Bmeer, with the assent of his family, his 
ministers, and the leading Cliiefiains, to promulgate a rule" 
f i r  settling the succession, and a method for securing its 
peaceable observance. Such an important advance could 
&ever be made without some po-w&fi~l motive operating 
upon all the parties concerned. The advisability and 
wisdom of the course recommended, though by no means 
above their comprehemion, would not suffice to subdue 
contending passions and interests. But the motive held 
out by the British Government to the Ameer and his 
Durbar might be made all-powerful and irresistible. No 
Prince or Chieftain would venture or would be allowed to 
i9 impede with his private ambition the restoration of the 
Afghan provinces conquered by Runjeet Singh. No 
course need be proposed that would be in the least humi- 
liating or burdensome to the Afglmn State. The British 
Government, before transferring provinces that  have been 
under its administration, is obviously bound in honour and 
duty to take measures for saving them from the anarchy 
and misery of civil war. Such conditions would, there- 
fore, be sl~ggested as might best pevent  the recurrence 
of a disputed succession. The Ameer would be asked to 
- carry out effectually the programme of his illustrious 
father. W e  should ask that  an hei? and a rule of inherit- 
ance should be chosen, not so as to please us, Eut so as 
please thgse in the family and the State who might have 
power to  distulrb or s~rpport a succession. And if it were 
once well ~mderstood that  the settlement when duly 
made and recorded, would be no mere idle form, but would 
, be placed, virtually if not expressly, under tiie safeguard 
of the Indian Empire, there would be lit$le or no danger of 
any one a t  any time revoking hi% acceptance or suffrage. . 
The odds again& hifn would be too great; these very 
Trans-hdus Provinces would constitute a material* gua- 
rantee for good order md good faith, in this and other 
points, always within our grasp. 
* 
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Tl~us, by granting tlie boon of $erritorin1 aggrandisement 
to the Afghan State, ~vitll no loss or expense, but  witlt 
profit a d  advantage to ourselves, i t  will be qui:? possible 
for us t o  extend the benefits of our superior knowledge. 
and acquirements to a nation conf&sedly jn a lower stage 
of civilisation, p ld  at the same time t o  bring her mgre 
closely uucler our influence and control, without conquest, 
without any forcible intervention. If everyfacility ahcl 
encouragement be given to commerce, the constant expe- 
rience and observation of a mild rule and an orderly ad-  
ministration of justice on one side of the Indus, will tend 
t o  ensure the maintenance of similar institutions on the 
other side, in the districts where we have already planted ' ' 
thein. 
Of course there are those-especially if they have 
gracluatec. in the Calcutta Foreign Office or fallen under its 
influence,-who will for ever dcclaim against the incurable 
defects of Afglmn chamcter and cristorns, who wil19continuc 
to  ask if the leopard can change his spots, or if a silk purse 
can be made out of a SOW'S ear, and will protest t ha t  t he  
formation of a strong Government on Afghan soil is a 
coinplete impossibility. If we did not know something of 
the blinding effect on tlie English nlincl produced by  the  
climate of Bengal and 11y purely official relations w i t h  
Eastern races, we should be inclined to suppose tha t  
officials high in tlie Indian Civil Service and StaE Corps 
-competitive examinations notwithstanding-had never 
heard of the Wam of the Roses, or of the long Carkist . 
war and numerous in"surrections in  Spain during t h e  laat 
60rty yeas .  Spain has made great progress, materially 
and morally, since 1833, in spite of, partly gerhaps in  
consequence of, those cruel warsrof sutcession. \Vhen 
gentlemen who have won academic honours and high 
official rank talk of predatory tribes a.nd petty jurisdic- -! 
tions a s  abbrmal  phenomena, peculiar t o  Central Asia, 
we can only wonier if they have heard what the political 
condition of Germany nr of Scotland was in the Middlo 
,Ages, or of Italy towards the close'of the 16th. century, 
during the Poiitificate of Sixtus V. I s  i t  possible tha t  
they can have ever tried to forrn~some notion of the emly 
- p -  " THE OXUS AND THE INDUS. 9 5$ 
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years o r  OLII? Heiwy the Seventh's reign, when half the 
property of England changed hands,-when every man 
' who ha4Aelped Richard the Third in the slightt8st degree 
became the new King's " rebel" or "traitor," and his 
lands or goods were inade forfeit to the Crown, because 
he had eidecl'and abetted "the late Duke of Glou- 
cester, King of England, in deed but uot in right"?' 
I-Inve tlley7any clear idea of the forces a t  work and the 
feelings prevalent in these islands when the following 
words were penned by a well-informed person of high 
rank and culture, the  letter being dated in November, 
1748 ? 
"'New dangers threaten ns from the trntameable bigotry of the 
Scotch Jncob~tes, encouraged by the insolence of their friends i n  
maiiy parts of Englaud. We hear thut one of the Frnsers, who 
was witliess against Lord Lovnt, is already murdered iu Scotland, 
and his liouso burnt down to the ground. Lod Elcho aud some 
otlicrs ofihis fellow rebels aro returned to the Highlands, and the 
youagost son of Lord Lovat, who was lately at Utrechb, is come 
over nud joined his father's clau, and seems i~esolved to keep 
possession of the esbate."" 
It may be that as late as, the middle of the eighteenth 
century there weye English and even Scottish politicians 
who, with Pharisaic piety despaired of the Highland clans 
and their Chieftains ever being converted into orderly 
" citizens. But surely we have learned something since 
17'45 in both historical and political science. 
Those who within the last cl~mrter of a, c e n t ~ ~ r y  Lave 
. kld  oa~ortunities of local observation a i d  intercourse. 
1 * 
may be of opinion that such rudiments ,of refoqp 
and improvement.as are discernible in the doctrine and ' 
practice af tlm Afgh9n State, are due to our rii~fluence 
and example. There ma7 be a great deal of truth in this, 
and wc may well be proud of it. Moreover, it has been. 
said that a decided change in the public opilGon a i d  poli- 
" tical nlaxims of the country may be traced t o  the reports 
and recollectioils of what was accompRshed or attempted 
during our brief s~qmrvision of ~ L a h  SujahS Govermneut, - 
1 
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This is very probable. Good often rises outrof e k  ; and 
we may hope that the Afgl~ans did really reap some per- 
manent advantage from that iniquitous aggressios. That 
in spite of all enmities and heartbnmirgs, a distinct im- . 
pression was left of some of our better cpalities as men 
and as rulers, may well be believed. Of the great persons1 
*influence exercised for good by certain British officers 
there can be no doubt at all. The name of Rawlinsoli, 
for instance, will never be forgotten or unhonoured a t  
Candahar. And yet in this direction, also, it is equally 
true that we must have something more solid than a per- 
sonal basis for our policy in Afg11anista.n. We must put 
our trust neither in her Princes nor in our PaIadina. 
Such personal influence is not all in all ; nor is it always 
to be had. Certainly I do not undervalue those rlistin- 
guished men who have wrought out great results for their 
country's glory, and for the good of Eastern races, by their 
gallantry, their talents, and their devotion to dut?. It is 
not I who undervalue them, but those who seem to think 
that the supply of such men is unlimited. I by no means 
believe that an Edwardes, a George Clerk, or a Henry 
Lawrence can be picked up in every messmom, or even 
in every compei;itive examination. Even if they could be 
fonud, they are not wanted in great numbers. The per- 
sonal influence of exceptional men from our own ranks, 
- 
were they always at hand at the light moment, codd 
never be all in all in our relations with the Eastern world. 
Their fine qualities and rare acquirements are rightly a p  - 
plicable for the adv'ncement of our interests among 
Qriental mtions, and for the benefit of those nations 
themselves, only with the predetermination that their 
action shall be temporary,-chiefly for rn'l1ital-y and dip- 
lomatic affairs, sometimes for carts of organisation and 
settlement in c~itical emergencies. 
When we'are compeIled to unde7_.take the thorough re- 
construction of a, dependent State,-whether in confor- 
, mity with the provisiow of a Treaty, or simply on pru- 
dential grounds,--the act is revolfitio~aary, and should 
be limited in extent and time t.o the positive necessities 
of the case. This is the work wa were doing in Mysore, 
3 
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until thd oE&l 1)ro~ensities of Calcutta turned 
9 7 
it into a 
L A 
field for patronage. This is the work we are doing with 
most beneficial effect in Bhxwulpoor. This is $he work 
*we now i%ve a noble opportunity of aiding in the Nixam's 
Dominions, during the infancy of the reigning Prince. 
The establishment of a regular financial and judicial sys- 
tm.n in an Easteril State, under the mai~agement of English - 
officers,-should it unfortunately be necessary t o  employ 
more than one or two,-must never be the aim and end 
of our reforming operations. Our work will not be fairly 
done until we have replaced Native agency at the head 
of every department. I do not object t o  the use of lead- 
ing strings, but only t o  their being kept on for ever. 
Good administration is not identical with good govern- 
ment, so long as it can only be worked by'foreigners, 
and maintained by military force. 
The most urgent problem of Eastern statesmanship is 
how to iyxoncile self-government for India with Imperial 
supremacy for Great I3Rrain. My doctrine is that the 
more we concede the former, the more we confirm the 
latter. Many who dispute, or would indefinitely defer, 
the applicability of this problem to Indian affairs, will 
admit it with reference to Afghanistan. 
The possibility of leading the turbulent cornmunities of 
the Hills t o  abandon their wild habits, to become peacef~d 
c;~ltivators and punctnal taxpayers,-if any regular Go- 
vehment codd get at  them,-has beon sufficiently proved 
by the successful transformation of that  sort effected, 
among the cognate tribes of the Trans-Ind~~s Provinces. 
These are +he trhlest and brightest -tl.iumphs of $ir. John 
Lawrence's administrdion of the Punjaub. Some inter- 
esting Notes ole Btmnoo, &he most Northerly part of the 
Derajgt, immediately adjoining the Kohat Di6trict of the 
Pesl~nwur Division*) by Major H. B. Urmston, Deputy 
Commissioner, written in 1 86 6, printed *early in 15 6 9 at 
the Government Pre~s ,  Ldlore, nlny be nsefully quoted 
.e a 
. 
., * See Map. 
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been done inlhis9istrict.  
recently u<dar his own chwge, Major Urmston gives th; 
highest wedit, as was due, t o  those distinguished officers 
who first ruled in Bumoo,-Herbert Ed.cvasdea, during - 
our guardianship of the Malmaj 41 Dhuleep Sing, Johu 
Nicholson, and Reynell Taylor since the annexation, of 
. whom the lastrmentioned alone ii Li+.ng.* 
"Eighteen years have now passed away since Sir Herbert (thbn 
Lieutonant Edwardes, AssistBnt to the Resident at Lahore), in 
the name of the Sikh Govelnment, tools possession of the country, 
and laid the foundations of the fort of Dhnleepghur. Many of 
the leading characters described with so much life in his book 
(A Y e a y  01% t h e  A ~ w j a u Z ,  lirontio~) have disappeared from the 
scene; some we still living who delight to speak of the first 
English d e r ;  while the younger branches, now well advanced in 
manhood, have not foTgotten those early days when their fathers 
were called upon to level their 400 forts, and b a d  their necks for 
the first time to the yoke of the Peringhee Eakim. Nor have sis- 
teen yeam of peaceful rule been unmarked by progress; many a 
blood-stained sword and dagger hnve been converted into s 
ploughshare,-many a fighting 'goondceJ, or faction, into loyal and 
obedient agriculturists. True-the 'goondees' do still exist to a, 
certain extont. They will not, perhaps, ever become wholly ex- 
tinct; but their quai~.~els are now quietly referred to the Courts 
of Justice, instea,d of, as in olden times, to the force of allme. This 
of itself is one great stride in civiliscztion,-a sure sign of ct strong 
and settled Government. Indeed, it is impossible tro mix wilrh the 
people, or talk with the old grey-beards of a village, without 
being struck by thei~. opinion of the revolution caused by British 
rule and British laws. One and all acknowledge the blessings,- 
political and social,-which have been conferred. 
cr These benefits are qanifest in marked increase of value gitreh 
to  property, improved appearance and condition of the people, 
mnd their appreciation of lights in the soil. Land previously 
fallow for &any generations has, within the present decade, been 
brought under cultivation to the extent of mmy thoBsand acres, 
which were, till recently, covered ~ i t h  jungle, infested by mild 
beasts and highway robbers.."t 
* ~njoF~e;eral, Commimioner of the Umritaur Division, and after . 
more than a quarter of a century of continuou~ly distinguished usrvico 
only a C.B. and EL C.S.1. 
t Notes on  the Bunnoo ~is'TiCt (Xelcctions,fwxn the Recorch of the Pun- 
'jaub Government, No. I), by Major H. B. Urmston,CDeputy CUmmissioner. 
Govefilment Press, Lahore, 1869. . 
e 
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It may be asked whether we are justified in riading the 
continued existence of these remarkable reforms, by trails- 
ferring British territory and s~lbjects to the t endb~  mercies 
*of an E ~ e t e r n  despot. Such a policy i ~ a y  be denounced 
as an unworthy abdic~kion of power and abandonment of 
duty. It is not 911 abdication, but an ass~mptioa of power. 
The Kingdom of ~ fgha&tan  is drawn by this policy from - 
a  emote a i d  unapproachable seclusion into direct contact 
and intimate association with the Imperial Goverllment of 
India. What is that  but subordination to British power ? 
With jud.icious management, the result cannot be doubt- 
fill. It is not ail abandonment, but a f~dfilrnent of duty. 
A charge is imposed upon the Ruler of Afghanistan which 
he can perform with our aid and counsel, but which, even 
with his assistance, is beyond our ability, ancl he is 
the~kby led from Eastern despotism towards a Sovereignty 
of law and order. The plant of progress, exotic and pre- 
carious 31nder foreign iiursing, is acclimatised and made 
hardy by being trusted t o  native cdtivation. 
Of course the Ameer would not be placed in possession 
of any territory that  had been under British management 
without ample securities for the maintenance of good 
government, religious toleration and equality before the  
law of all sects and races, as at present established. Those 
w11o"have felt and enjoyed those blessings will not be in- 
- clined to give them up ; and it may be hoped that a short 
experience by Prince and people of their advantages on 
this side, would soon carry them over to the other side of 
.. the Hills, no longer a barrier between separate jurisdic- 
tions. The greater freedom and fkequency of intercours$ 
and commerce between the two sections of the Afghan 
State, and, betw$en the Afghan 8tate and British India, 
the force conferred o$British counsels, the fadities ac- 
.2- 
cpired for British instruction and guidance, must all work 
towards the same goal,-the absolute pred~minance of 
British influence in the regions between the Oxus and 
the Indus. 
(AJ 
I 
Treaty betzaeen t l ~ e  British Goverwnent und His Higlmess Amew 
Dost Mc~hom?ned Khurb, TTc~lee of Ck~bz~l nnrl of those Uoz~~ztries of 
Afghanistaw now in 72is possession, colzcl~ded, on' the part qf the 
B ~ i t i s h  Cove?~~ntent, by John La~urelace, Espzhe, Chief Comnzis- 
sioner of the Pzmnjnb, i n  virtue of fidl powe~s vtxted hz him by  the 
Most Noble Jamcs Andrew, M u r p i s  of Dalkousie, l<.!ll., etc., 
Governor General of Jndirt, a ~ ~ d  on the p u ~ t  ofths A,mee?%f UubuZ, 
Dost Nolzanzmed Khaq By Sirdas Gkolum Eyclw Khan, in uirtzm 
of $dl authority grafited to I ~ i m  By His Higlz?~ess. - 
ARTICLE PST. 
Between the Honourable East India Compr~ny and His Highness 
Arneer Dost Mahommed Khan, Walee of Cnbul and of those Coun- 
tries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the  
said Ameer, there shall be perpetnal peace and friendship. 
n 
The Honourable East India Company engages to respect thgse 
. 
Territories of Afghmistm now in His Highness' possossion, and 
never to inteisfere therein. 
0 
b ARTICLE ~ R D .  
His HighnessArneer ~ o s t  ~ n h o h m e d ~ h a n ,  %she of Cabul and 
e of those Countries of Afghanistan new in his possession, engages , 
on his own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the Ter- 
ritories of th@Honouralsle East India Company, and never to in- , 
terfkro tharein; and to be the friend of the friends and enemy of 
the enemies, of the Honourable East India Company. " 
CI * 
' Done atpeshaw~lr this Thirteeuth day of DIarch, 011% thousand 
* Eight hundred and Fifty-five, corresponding Qith tho 
b 
n 
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- Elewnth day of Rujjub, One thousand Two buddred and 
Seventy-one Hijree. 
(Signed) JOHN LAWRENCE, . 
-.' Chief Comnzissioum of the Punja b. 
(Signed) GHOLAM HYDER, 
E e i ~  Apparent, 
- A: the 12epreso~tative of Ameel, Dost &la. 
hommed X l m n  nlzcl in yewon. on his o w n  9 
account as H e i ~  A p p a ~ e n t ,  
Ratified by the Most Noble the Governor,General at Ootaca- 
mnnd, this First day of May, One thousand Eight hundred and 
FiYty-five. 
O By order of the Most Noble the Governor-General, 
(Signed) G. I?. EDMONSTONE, 
Sec~e tary  t o  the G o v e ~ n m e d  of India ,  
T i t h  the Governor-GcnwaZ. 
(B.1 
"THE OLD FOOTING OF TRUST AND GOOD WILL." 
(Page 37.) 
bord Mayo's reception of the Ameer Sher Ali at  Omballah, and 
the subsequent negotiations at that place in April 1869, may have 
brought about n, better understanding, but the following extract 
from the letter of a well-informed observer, will suggest, perhaps, 
a doubt whether the 2clinburgh Reviewer did not rather anticipate 
emtters, when he wrote of " trust and good willJ' in 1866. 
"It is said that the negotiations we& not cawied to their pre- 
sent satisfactory conclusion without some difficulty. Everytllipg 
has, however, at  last terminnied well, and the Ameey, who was at 
/&-st veyy & t r u s p Z  of Bri t ish policy, will go away pleased with 
i i s  fisit and satisfied of our since+. He says he %tends to 
l a d e  no secret of the agmement between himself and us. ' I a 
hate paper work,' he siid, and secret diplomacy. I like a clear, 
plain policy, I shall announce what has beon &geed upou, for I 
am not going to give grounds for suspicion that there are two a 
treaties; one secret, the othel- public.' I kava o6gewecl that ho ' 
&stwstecl u s  ntJirst  n y l  made  n o  sVoret of his f e e l i q .  To one ' 
official hasaid : ' T h e  B ~ ~ t i s l ~  Government is +espoq&le f o ~  the blooc8- 
sl~ecl of the last t h e e  yeam.' To another, who begged him48 speak 
v 
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out his wishes and intentions in order that the British Gomrnment 
might know how to frame i ts  policy, he rejoined sharply, 'What is 
the policy of t h e  British Government Py jJ* 
. 
(C .) 
m RUSSIA I N  CENTRBL ASIA. . 
(Page 43.) @ . 
Mr. Gladstone's remarks in the House of Commons on the 8th 
of April, 1869, concerning the exchange of opinions between the 
British and Russian Gove~nments on the state of Central Asia, 
wit11 reference e proposed mobion on that subject by Mr. E. B. 
r Pend~yn, are thus animadverted upon in the 
Noscow Gaxette :- _ _ .  
CC W h a t  w e  have foreseen for a couple of months has come to 
pass. England and Russia have entered upon acnegotiation of a 
most friendly and satisfacto~y charactery respectingdsiatic affairs. 
It is uot  very intelligible, though, why Mr. Gladstone, in letting 
Parliament into the secret, should have thought it necgpsary to 
oonfiue his disclosures to the few words we have just quoted. 
Ordinarily, i t  is only in the case of difficnlt negotiations, or when 
wal. and peace are a t  issue, that British Ministers deem i t  incum- 
bent upon them to  give evasive auswers to questions of .a diplo- 
matic nature pu t  to them in  Parliament. Neither being the case 
in t h e  present instance, we are at  a loss to divine why gseator 
communicativeness on the part of the Ministers might, as he sQd, 
interfere with the satisfactory progress of the affair. What pro- 
gress ? W h a t  affair ? Probably the British Government have m 
reasons of their  own for wishing to prevent the matter being dis- 
cussed by t h e  representatives of tho country. However that may 
bo, t h e  press, not being fettered by dipIomatic consideratio!:. 
ought to sift this particuly subject all the more carefully, Opln- . 
ions enunciated by independent papers, though not binding upon 
G y r n m e n t s ,  mag. yet serve to throw consideral~le light upon the 
R L L ~ J ~ C ~  und& discussion, and had better be published while as yet ' 
i t  is not tog late to influence the decisiong to be alerivebat. *We 
have watched the English press sincg i t  first began to speak of 
the necessity of effecting some arrangement between Russia and 
England touchipg Dentmi Asia. Among the expedienk proposed 
by the Euglish papers, there mas one suggesting that Afghanistan 
:should be converted iyto a neutral State on the Belgian pattern, 
and the adjoining Khanates be included in the pl,iviloges of Euro- 
* pean national law. But me cannot bring oarselyes to beljeve that 
D e 
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English .politicians should have really hit upou the device of 
making us engage not to extend our frontiers beyond a certain 
point, or not to do such and such things in our relations with the 
Khanate% There is too mnch political good sense in'England to 
make them adopt a basis of negotiation which could not produce 
any practical results. 8ur  suppositions in rogard to this are 
strengthened by the circumstance that England has hastened to 
secnre, without foreign codcurreuco, the neutrality of Afghauistan, 
o~ rather the goodwill of the Afghans for herself. After a long 
interval, in "which Eug1,zncl contented herself with the part of a 
vigilant observer, she has recently paid subsidies to Sher Ali, and 
rocognised him as the legitimate Ruler of Afghanistan. Quite re- 
cently this newly-made potentate has been received with much 
th'eatrical display by the Governor-General of India, and, i t  is 
rumoured, been promised an annuaI salary of 22120,000. Thus 
England is endeavouring to place herself on good terms with the 
Ameer of Afghanistan ; and if Russia is obliged to let her do as 
she pleases, England in turn muat be content with our treating 
the Ameer of Bokhaila as we please. A political agreement being, 
then, entirely out of the question, the negotiations alluded to by 
Mr. Gladstone can have reference only to commercial interests. 
Our comnlercial stake in Central Asia is quite as important to us 
as our political; and if My. Gladstone is right in expressing him- 
self with so mnch complacency upon the attitnde assumed by our 
Government in their confidential palavers with him, i t  is but too 
probable that what he regards as satisfactory will not be equally 
so to our mercantile community. As to the wish of the English 
papers to see Consuls installed in Turkistau, and Russiau Consuls 
in fidia, we cannot ouyselves see the good i t  mould do. We have 
no direct commerce with India. There alle neither Russian fac- 
tories nor Russian subjects to be found in tho country. Why, 
then, should we burden our Budget with the salaries of superflu- 
p ~ s  representatives ? And why, indeed, should England wish to 
station a Consul at Tashkent ? Would not his onlv occuaation 
consist iu watching the action of our Government, and is hi, per- 
haps, to intrigue with the Natives and to al-m themeagainst ud? 
But recenily M. QambBry, in a letter to tho Times, advised the 
English to send donsulsdio the towns of Central Asia. M. Qam- 
bdry is the implacable enem of Russia, and counsels vouchsafed by f him ought to serve as a time y warning to ourselves. Only extreme I 
necessity has forced us to extend our Asiatic frontieqfurther South. 
* We believe we have a right to expect some reward for the sacri- 
fices made on that occasion, and, if our h o ~ e s  are hlfilled, shall ) 
not only retain possession of the vagt ma Turkistan, but . 
through $ gain acGgss tt, Chinese Tartary, 
able from every other side. I t  is but nn 
0 & 
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should t ry  t o  throw impediments in our way iu thaWiTe&ion. , I ~  
conclusion, we cannot but repeat the opinion expressed by us on 
a former occasion, that in tho evcnt of an Eastem war Turkistnn 
will be  a folmidable basis of operations for us against thaEnglish. . 
If,  however, we are let alone by the Euglisll, and our interests 81-e . 
not interfered with, we have certainly IUI cause to menace theil. 
Indian Empire." 
. I n  a similar strain, but in  nluch mord v i~ len t  language, is C O B -  
posed an article in the St. Yetersbu~g Goloss. Acco1;ding to thig, 
the more advanced organ of the National pa l+-"The colnrnorcial 
war already being waged between England and Russia, on the 
Northern frontiers of Afghanistan, is not at all unlikely to give 
way some day to a combat with more sanguinary weapons than 
weights and measures. I n  this case, the rifles presented to ti& 
Ameer by the  Darl of Mayo would stand him in good stead, though 
for the matter of that, the  Ameel; after taking pounds sterling, is 
quits as likely as not to t ry  Toubles for a change." 
A Berlin correspondent of the Times remarks on the above :- 
'<I believe I am right in saying that the spillt manif'ested in these 
words porvades nearly all Russian utterances on the subject, much 
as the languago used by the individual papers may Val3 If an 
inference can be drawn from the attitude of the press and the 
tone of Russian society as to the policy likely to be pursued by 
the St. Petemburg Cabinet, it i s  not imp~obablo that an attempt 
will be mado to benefit by the advice contained in the concluding 
passage of the JiIoscoeu Gazette." 
(W 
RECENT EIILfi EXPEDITIONS. 
( P a p  48.) 
0 '  . 
"In order p om ow hat to hcilitnte Colonel Keycs' incursion into the 
13ozotee country Don1 Kohat, a strong demoustration was contempom- 
neh~sly made from the Peshawnr side. Successfill as Colonel Reyes' 
inroad on the  Bezotoes" (on Fcbrun1.y 24th, 1969) '' was, it ha~dly to 
be cou-cctly.ilescriheclect1 c l s i b e c  ns a surprise. The cliastisetnent was a&mlly 
givon to a, village foi- which it was not intended. I t  mas intended for 
Dnna Khooln, but fcll upon Gam. f i e  MuUiclru of the so.cdled 
'friendly Bezotecs' who accompnnied the party, had nssured Captain 
Cavagnari and ~%lonel ICcyes that no  opposition was to be apprehended + 
(from the people of Garn, which is the first villa@ within the.nntwa1 
fort~wss of the OoLlnnt As tho force approached Gara the kdliclcs . 
wwc sent ahead .n tho Rillabitnnts thni no harm would be done 
their own condnct. NoverCheless, d ~ n  Colonel 
d tho villagers busy removing their nettle nnd $ 
? 
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C faalies,  and the force had no sooner got within rangc than some shotR 
were fired s t  it. The village was then attacked and carried at once. 
,&. consiclerable number of the enemy mere Idled on tlle spot-Captail, 
Cavagnnri Qooting two with his o m  hand-and t h e  ent&e villnp 
destroyed, the grnin burnt, and d l  the live-stock carried off. As the 
fugitives from Gara had takea the direction of Dana Rhaola, there was 
clearly no chauce oE surprising the latter place, and accordingly t,he 
ktachment returned, having irrflicted probably ten tinles as m11c11 loss 
as i$ suKered, and, above all, having 'lifted the pu~tkch' (t.11~ veil) of 
the Ooblun, theg virgin fortress whose strength and inaccessibility had 
defied Coke and his successors, and been confidently vnunted all ovc? 
the Hills as a nut that would nlmays be too hard for British cmcl~ing."' 
1% this cl~astiscment and destruction of a village, CCfor which it 
was not intcudecl", our loss was thirty-three killed ancl wounded. 
111 Alcn ' s  Indicm Nail of April 5th, 1869, the general opinion is 
said to bo that the expedition was inconclusive, :tnd t h a t  the  
Bezotees "have not learned tlieip lesson as they should." They 
certainly did not learn their lesson thoroughly on t lmt  occnsion, for 
they  were giving the British authorities "some annoyance" in 
April 1874,-see p. 54. 
4 
* The Calcutta Pio?zee~, extracted from the Homezrwd JItril of April 
5th, 1869. 





